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Foreword
The primary objective of this project is the formulation of software independent verification and validation
(IV&V) methodologies that can be readily applied to future software development projects both for and
within the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Inherent in the methodologies is the
precise specification of software measurement and data collection processes in the software development
process so that more precise comparisons may be made in future software verification and validation
activities. This objective will be achieved through the modification of existing reliability models to
incorporate measures of dynamic program complexity. We now understand that reliability of a software
system is directly determined by the execution environment of the software. Our goal is to build on the
measurement methodologies established in the first phase of this project to improve the accuracy of
software reliability assessment for the Space Shuttle primary avionics software system (PASS) and,
ultimately, all software delivered to NASA.
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Introduction
As software is maintained or reused, it undergoes an evolution which tends to increase the overall
complexity of the code. To understand the effects of this, we brought in statistics experts and leading
researchers in software complexity, reliability, and their interrelationships. These experts' project has
resulted in our ability to statistically correlate specific code complexity attributes, in orthogonal domains,
to errors found over time in the HAL/S flight software which flies in the Space Shuttle. Although only a
prototype-tools experiment, the result of this research appears to be extendable to all other National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) software, given appropriate data similar to that logged for
the Shuttle onboard software.
Different flight scenarios cause the software system to execute different subsets of code of varying
complexity. Some flight scenarios will execute functionally complex code sequences and will thus have a
very strong likelihood of failure. Other flight scenarios will execute only code sequences of limited
functional complexity and, thus, have higher reliability.
The reliability of a software system may best be modeled with those techniques that incorporate the
functional relationship between software complexity attributes and software faults. Software models will
demonstrate considerable variability on the complexity attributes. As the various models are executed in
response to varying software inputs, the actual degree of exposure to fault-prone code will also vary. In
essence, the reliability of a software system is not a static measure. It will be directly related to the varying
functionality of the software.
In addition to observed failure history, reliability models should incorporate information as to the internal
nature of the software that is actually executing. Earlier research has established that the functional
complexity induced by each of the various functions that primary avionics software system (PASS)
software may execute will be a direct determinant of this reliability. It is, therefore, the intent of this
research to incorporate complexity effects into reliability modeling techniques.
The process of software reliability modeling using this enhanced approach is complicated by the fact that
most software systems contain code modules of varying levels of maturity. This is the result of an effort to
ensure maximum use of existing software by reusing it or by modifying code to control development costs.
Software reliability measurement techniques should reflect the differences in reliability between older, more
mature and newer, less-tested software modules in the same software system. To ensure measurement
accuracy, the reused or modified code will be modeled differently than code whose reliability is yet to be
determined.
The primary objective of this project was to formulate a process that can be readily applied to future
software development projects, to be achieved through the modification of existing reliability models to
incorporatemeasuresof dynamicprogramcomplexity.Existingmodelsofsoftwarereliabilityweretobe
enhancedtoincorporatetwodistinctaspectsof variabilitypreviouslyunaccountedfor in reliabilitymodels:
reflectheinternalstructureof thesoftwarein themodelingprocess,andreflecthevaryinglevelsof
softwaremodulematuritywithinasystem.
Thefirstprojectphase,in 1994,focusedondatacollectionandmanagementprocessessurroundingthe
softwaredevelopmentprocess.The1995phasefocusedonthedevelopmentof mathematicalmodelsof
softwarereliabilitythatreflectbothsoftwarecomplexityandsoftwarematurity.Theworkwasdividedinto
sevenmilestones,allofwhicharediscussedin thisdocumentin theorderof sections.In SectionI, we
showguidelinesdevelopedforstatisticaltestingoftheSpaceShuttlePASSsoftware.Newdataderived
will providethebasisforthefollowingassessments:
- Theadequacyof asoftwaretest
- Theprobabilitydistributionfor theexecutionprofiles
- ThetestabilityofthePASS
- DesignrulesforfuturePASSsoftwaredevelopment
InSectionII, weprovidethefollowingenhancementstomathematicalsoftwarereliabilityprediction:
- Reliabilitymodelingwithfunctionalcomplexity
- Parameterstimation
- Empiricalvalidation
- Userguidelines
In SectionIII, weprovideanenhancedversion(3.1)of theHAL/SMetricAnalyzer(HALMet)whichwill
now
- Executeonanumberof additionalworkstationenvironments.
- BeintegratedintothenewSpaceShuttlesoftwaredevelopmentmethodologybeingdesigned.
Deliverablesalsoincludethecompanionsoftwaretool,theprincipalcomponentsanalysis-relative
complexitymetricdataanalysistoolcalledPCA-RCM.
TheHALMet3.1toolspackageinstallationmanualandtheoperationmanualareprovidedinAppendixes
A andB, respectively.ThePCA-RCM2.0toolinstallationmanualandoperationmanualareprovidedin
AppendixesCandD,respectively.
In SectionIV, wepresentareporthatincludesthefollowing:
- Executionprofiledatafor PASSrunningonanumberof differentoperationssequences(OPS)
- Anassessmentof thevariabilityof thefunctionalcomplexityofthesystem
- Anassessmentofregressiontestefficiency,whichallowsasoftwaretestertoidentifypotentialfaults
thatwereintroducedinchangestoaprogram
SectionV providesafinalreviewdemonstrationf theHALMetattheNASAJohnsonSpaceCenter
(JSC).
SectionVI describeshowweclassifiedseveritylevelsof softwarefaultsandresearchedconstructinga
statisticalsoftwarefilter tohelpidentifyregionsof theon-boardflight softwaremorepronetoSeverity1
failures.
In SectionVII, wedescribesoftwarerequirementsspecificationandpreliminarydesigndocuments
developedforareliabilityassessmenttoolset,andthesoftwareimplementedanddemonstratedatJSC.
Finally,wecontractedwithDr.NormanF.SchneidewindtoprovideanenhancementofhisSchneidewind
softwarereliabilitymodelusingmetricstoimprovepredictionaccuracy.Hisresultscanbefoundin
AppendixE.
Ourresearchasdemonstratedthatamorecompletedomaincoveragecanbemathematicallydemonstrated
withtheapproachwehaveapplied,therebyensuringfull insightintothecause-and-effectsrelationship
betweenthecomplexityof asoftwaresystemandthefaultdensityof thatsystem.Byapplyingthe
operationalprofilewecancharacterizethedynamiceffectsof softwarepathcomplexityunderthissame
approach.Wenowhavetheabilitytomeasurespecificattributeswhichhavebeenstatistically
demonstratedtocorrelateto increasederrorprobability,andtoknowwhichactionsto take,foreach
complexitydomain.Shuttlesoftwareverifierscannowmonitorthechangesin thesoftwarecomplexity,
assesstheaddedordecreasedriskof softwarefaultsinmodifiedcode,anddeterminenecessarycorrections.
Thereports,tooldocumentation,user'sguides,andnewapproacht athaveresultedfromthisresearch
effortrepresentadvancesin thestateof theartof softwarequalityandreliabilityassurance.Details
describinghowtoapplythistechniquetootherNASAcodearecontainedin thisdocument.
Section I
Statistical Testing of the
Space Shuttle Primary Avionics Software System
Abstract
Traditional software testing practice assumes that faults in a computer program may be found by the
application of rigorous deterministic processes. Computer software systems, however, are rapidly growing
in both size and complexity. This paper presents a new view of statistical testing and provides for the
redefinition of basic test objectives and for the optimal allocation of test resources. The term statistical
testing will be used in conjunction with the statistical properties of the functional complexity of a software
system and the number of faults it may contain. Testing effort should be concentrated on those functions
that result in high functional complexity. From a statistical testing perspective, the adequacy of the test
process is based on two distinct criteria: that sufficient testing has occurred across the range of functional
complexity to provide reasonable estimates of the measures of central tendency and variability for
functional complexity, and that adequate stress testing has occurred by identifying those functions that
maximize its functional complexity.
Introduction
A significant problem with modem software testing procedures is that the objectives of the test process are
not clearly specified and sometimes not clearly understood. If questioned, most software testers will
associate the testing process with a process of finding faults in programs [Morell]. If this is the case, is the
purpose of testing to find all of the faults or just some of the faults? How will we know when to stop
testing? An implicit objective of the deterministic school of testing is to design some sort of a systematic
and deterministic test procedure that will guarantee sufficient test exposure for the random faults
distributed throughout a program [c.f., Frankl; Lou; Nakajo; Weyuker]. However, there is reason to
believe that it is possible to identify measurable program attributes such as complexity that can explain a
large proportion of the variance observed in the software faults in their location in software modules
[Khoshgoftaar, 1992; Khoshgoftaar, 1990; Munson, 1990, "Regression..."]. This being the case, it would
only seem reasonable to look for software faults in the complex code segments rather than introduce them
only to see if we could locate these same injected faults again as is the case with previous approaches to
statistical testing [Mills].
In keeping with the rapid increase in the functionality and capability of computer hardware, the average
size of computer programs has grown consistently. In the 1960s, programs were measured in terms of
hundreds of lines. In today's software development technology, programs are measured in terms of millions
of lines. As programs have increased in length several orders of magnitude in the last three decades, the
problems associated with testing these programs have also increased several orders of magnitude. The
rapid growth in the size of new software systems has brought into question the viability of deterministic test
methodologies.Techniquesneedtobedevelopedtoserveasafilterforthecodeto identifyregionsof the
code that are most likely to contain faults. We must also come to accept the fact that some faults will
always be present in the code. The objective of the testing process is simply to find those faults that will
have the greatest impact on the safety/survivability of the code. Under this new view of the software
testing process, the act of testing may be thought of as conducting an experiment in the behavior of the
code under typical execution conditions. We will determine, a priori, exactly what we wish to learn about
the code in the test process and conduct the experiment until this stopping condition has been reached.
One of the fundamental tenets of the statistical approach to software test is that it is possible to create fault
surrogates. While we cannot know the numbers and locations in faults, we can, over time, build models
based on observed relationships between faults and some other measurable software attributes. Software
faults and other measures of software quality can be known only at the point the software has finally been
retired from service. Only then can it be said that all the relevant faults have been isolated and removed
from the software system. On the other hand, software complexity can be measured very early in the
software life cycle. In some cases, these measures of software complexity may be extracted from design
documents. Some of these measures are very good leading indicators of potential software faults. The first
step in the software testing process is to construct suitable surrogate measures for software faults. In the
case of this study, a single measure, relative complexity, will be constructed to serve as such a surrogate.
In those program modules that have large values of this surrogate measure, there is reasonable evidence to
support the conclusion that the numbers of faults will also be large. If the code is made to execute a
significant proportion of time in modules of large relative complexity, then the potential exposure to
software faults will be great and, thus, the software will be likely to fail.
Measurement of Software Attributes
If we accept the premise that faults are introduced in code by systematic errors committed by programmers,
then it should be possible to identify a set of measurable software attributes that are distinctly related to the
conditions that lead to faults. Indeed, there are certain complexity metrics that have been shown to be
distinctly associated with software faults [Munson, 1990, "Regression..."]. The methodology for
identifying these attributes and their relationship to software faults has been demonstrated in several
antecedent studies [Munson, 1990, "Regression..."; 16]. The main point here is that, if we can identify
those software attributes that are associated with faults, we may use these data to identify regions of code
of software currently under development and test that are likely to contain faults.
There are two distinct and separable issues now. First, it is one thing to have a software system that
contains faults. Second, it is quite another for the regions of code containing faults to be executed. If there
does not exist a set of input data that will drive a program into a region of code that is likely to contain
faults, then there will probably be few failures during the processing of this input set. If, on the other hand,
mosteveryinputdatasetwill drivethecodeintothefaultycoderegions,thenthesoftwarewill provequite
failureprone.
If softwaremeasurementtechniquesaretobeusedinthetestingprocessthenextreasonablequestionis,
whatis thebest single metric to use to represent the internal nature of a program? There are now over 100
such candidate metrics. Each, according to its author, clearly outperforms and eclipses all of the others. In
truth, there is a high degree of interrelationship among all of the metrics. Recent research suggests that
there are probably no more than four or five distinct complexity domains that are measured in some degree
by each of the existing metrics [Munson, 1989]. If this is tree, the best metric is, in fact, a set of metrics
chosen to represent as much variance in the underlying complexity domains as is possible.
In most linear modeling applications concerned with the mapping of software metrics onto software faults,
such as regression analysis and discriminant analysis, the independent variables or metrics are each
assumed to represent some distinct aspect of variability not clearly present in other measures. In software
development applications, the independent variables--An this case, the complexity metrics---are well
correlated and thus demonstrate a high degree of multicollinearity. Such models may be subject to
dramatic changes due to additions or deletions of variables or even discrete changes in metric values. To
circumvent this problem, principal components analysis has been used, quite successfully, to map the
metrics into orthogonal attribute domains [Munson, 1989]. Each principal component extracted by this
procedure may be seen to represent an underlying common attribute domain.
The relative complexity, p, of the factored program modules may be represented as follows:
Pi = Ej/_jdji
where _ is the eigenvalue associated with the jth factor and dji is the jth domain metric of the i th program
module on the jth domain. Each of the eigenvalues represents the relative contribution of its associated
domain to the total variance explained by all of the domains. In essence, then, the relative complexity
metric is a weighted sum of the individual domain metrics. In this context, the relative complexity metric
represents each raw complexity metric in proportion to the amount of unique variation contributed by that
complexity metric.
Program Functions and Operations
Software systems are designed to implement each of their functionalities in one or more code modules. In
some cases there is a direct correspondence between a particular program module and a particular
functionality. That is, if the program is expressing that functionality, it will execute exclusively in the
module in question. In most cases, however, there will not be this distinct traceability of functionality to
modules. The functionality will be expressed in many different source code modules.
AssumethatthesoftwaresystemS was designed to implement a specific set of mutually exclusive
functionalities F. Thus, if the system is executing a function f _ F then it cannot be expressing elements
of any other functionality in F. Each of these functions in F was designed to implement a set of software
specifications based on a user's requirements. From a user's perspective, this software system will
implement a specific set of operations, O. This mapping from the set of user perceived operations, o, to a
set of specific program functionalities is one of the major functions in the software design process. It is
possible, then, to define a relation IMPLEMENTS over O × F such that IMPLEMENTS (o,f) is true if
functionalityfis used in the design process to implement an operation, o. For each operation o _ O, there
is a relation p' over O x F such that p'(o,f) is the proportion of time assigned to functionalityfby
operation o.
A typical non-functional requirement for modem systems (particularly safety critical systems) is that these
systems perform reliably. One method of ensuring that this non-functional requirement will be met is to
subject the software system to a series of tests. Each test will exercise one or more of the functionalities in
F. Each possible test of the software system will select a subset of F. There is a relation EXHIBITS over
T × F such that EXHIBITS(t,f) is true if test case t exhibits functionalityf.
From a software design standpoint a system is generally decomposed into many program modules. For a
given software system, S, let M denote the set of all program modules for that system. Let T denote the set
of all test cases in a test suite for S. For each test case t _ T, there is a relation p" over T x M such that
p"(t,m) is the proportion of time assigned to module m by test t. Let us assume that there is a
relationship between program functionalities and software modules. Program modules may be viewed in
terms of a number of different subsets. Some modules may execute under all of the functionalities of S.
These are the set of common modules. The main program is an example of such a module that is common
to all tests of the software system. These common modules, M c M are defined as
M = {m:MlVt_ • "T p (t,m)>0}
All of these modules will execute regardless of the specific functionality being executed by the software
system.
Yet another set of software modules may or may not execute when the system is running a particular
function. These modules are said to be potentially involved modules. The set of potentially involved
modules is
M II_ = {m:MI3t _ T • EXHIBITS(t,f) ^p"(t,m) > 0}
P
In other program modules, there is extremely tight binding between the functionality and the module. That
is, every time a particular function is executed, a distinct set of software modules will always be invoked.
The set of indispensably involved modules is
M_ i) = {m:MtVt e T • EXHIBITS(t,f) :=¢, p"( t, m) > 0}
For the execution of a function, f, the set of modules, M/that are designed to implement this function is
. • n(f) - (i)
M / = M< w iv,v t..)M i
Clearly, for the test process to be effective, the range of functionalities,f, must be well known.
Within a test suite, each test will exercise one or more of the system's functionalities. For a given test t
these expressed functionalities are those with the property
F_') = {f: F1Vt • T • EXHIBITS(t,f)}
For any test t the execution profile will consist of the probabilities p"(t,m) derived from
#
where Mp = UMp(F_"),
M #
meM t =McU p _Mi(F_ '))
and Mi(FJ'_ ) are the modules that are actually invoked in the test t.
From the standpoint of software design and the test process, the real problems introduced into testing are
not necessarily attributable to the set of modules that are tightly bound to a functionality M_ or to the set of
common modules that will be invoked for all executing processes/t4<. The real problem is the set of
potentially invoked modules M_. The greater the cardinality of this set of modules in relation to M i the
less certain will be the outcome of a test of this functionality. For any one test of this functionality, none of
the modules may execute or they may all execute.
The Estimation of Profiles
Each test suite will implement a subset of functionalities, i.e., FJ ') c F. As each test is mn to completion
it will generate a test execution profile. This test execution profile may represent the results of the
execution of one or more functions. To simplify the discussion let us assume that a test expresses precisely
one functionality. When a program begins the execution of a functionality we may envision this beginning
as the start of a stochastic, Markov process. For the system S there is a call graph that shows the transition
of program control from one program module to another. The transition from one module to another may
be seen as a stochastic process. In which case we may define an indexed collection of random variables
{X, }, where the index t runs through a set of non-negative integers, t = 0, 1,2,... representing the epochs
of the process. At any particular epoch the software is found to be executing exactly one of its M modules.
The fact of the execution occurring in a particular module is a state of the system. For this software
system, the system is found in exactly one of a finite number of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states
thatmaybelabeled1,2,..., M. In this representation of the system, there is a stochastic process {X, },
where the random variables are observed at epochs t = 0, 1, 2,... and where each random variable may take
on any one of the M integers, from the stated space A = {1,2,...,M}.
The probability that a particular module may execute is, in fact, a conditional probability. Let Y be a
random variable defined on the indices of the set of elements of F. Then pfk) = Pr[X = ilY = k] where
k = 1,2,..., # {F} represents the execution profile for a set of modules executing a function k exclusively.
The distribution of the execution profile is also multinomial for a software system consisting of more than
two modules.
As a matter of the design of a program, there may be a non-empty set M_ I_ of modules that may or may
not be executed when a particular functionality is exercised. This will, of course, cause the cardinality of
the set M z to vary. A particular execution may not invoke any of the modules of M_ I). On the other
hand, all of the modules may participate in the execution of that functionality. As we will see, this
variation in the cardinality of M I within the execution of a single functionality will contribute greatly to
the amount of test effort that will be necessary to test such a functionality.
Functional Complexity
The execution profile for a program can be expected to change across the set of program functionalities.
This will result in a concomitant variation in the functional complexity of a program [Munson, 1992]. In
other words, for each functionality, fi, there is an execution profile represented by the probabilities
p(i) _(i) _(i) _(i)
,/-'2 ,k'3 ,,'" ",/_', ,. As a consequence, there will be a functional complexity _(_) for the execution of
lp
each function, f/, where
_(i) _ _ _(i)_p - _,j pj.
j=l
This is distinctly the case during the test phase when the program is subjected to numerous test suites to
exercise differing aspects of its functionality. The functional complexity of a system will vary greatly as a
result of the execution of these different test suites.
It is possible to determine the functional complexity for various functionalities at varying stages of software
maturity and thus to understand their likely reliability. To test effectively a software system we must
necessarily determine the functionality of the program and how these functions will interact as the program
executes. The latter information not only directs the formation of test suites but also provides the
information necessary to formulate execution profiles. The functionalities that imply execution profiles
which cause the functional complexity to increase merit our attention since these are the conditions that will
increase failure rates for a given design.
Statistical Testing
The central thesis of statistical testing is that programs will fail because of their indigenous faults that are
in turn directly related to measurable software attributes. If you can understand the relationship between
faults and specific attributes, you will know where to look for faults. Of particular utility, in this role as a
fault surrogate, is relative complexity as a static measure of program complexity and functional complexity
as a dynamic measure of program complexity. The important thing for the following discussion is that
there exists some measurable program module attribute, say _ that is highly correlated with software
faults. Intuitively (and empirically), a program that spends a high proportion of its time executing a
module set My of high _ values will be more failure prone than one that seeks out program modules of
smaller values of this attribute.
From the discussion earlier, we see that a program may execute any one of a number of basic
functionalities. Associated with each of the functionalities there is an attendant value of _ . At the
beginning of the test process, the first step in statistical testing is to understand the nature of the variability
of _ within the functions that the program may execute. The next step in the statistical testing process is
to understand the nature of the variance of _ between functionalities. The greater the variability in the
of a program found during normal test scenarios, the more testing will be required. It is normally presumed
that a major objective of software testing is to find all of the potential faults in the software. We cannot
presume to believe that a test has been adequate until we have some reasonable assessment of the
variability in the behavior of the system.
In this new perspective, the whole nature of the test process is changed. Our objective in this new approach
will be to understand the program that has been designed. It may well be that the design of a program will
not lend itself to testing in any reasonable time frame given a high ratio of within module variability to
between module variability. We cannot hope to determine the circumstances under which a program might
fail until we first understand the behavior of the program itself.
The next logical step in the statistical testing process is to seek to identify the precise nature of the mapping
of functionality to _. That is, we need to identify the characteristics of test scenarios that cause our
criterion measure of _ to be large. Test scenarios whose values of _ are large are those that will most
likely provide maximum exposure to the latent faults in a program. In this new view, a program may be
stress tested by choosing test cases that maximize _.
The initial stage in the testing process is concerned primarily with developing an understanding of the
behavior of the software system that has been created by the design process. As such, all test suites during
this phase will be carefully architected to express a single functionality. For each of these program
functionalities fi let us define a random variable a (i)defined on the domain of values of the functional
.th
complexity v-ym(_lof the t function. As each test of functionality f, is conducted, we will have a sample
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datapointa;!° on a (i) . After a sequence of tests of fi we may compute a sample mean _ (;) = ,...,j_"a j(° , an
estimate of the parameter//(i), the mean functional complexity of the i 'h functionality. Similarly it will be
possible to compute the sample variance s2 =--1 Z (a!i) -- fi(i))2 2
_) n J J , an estimate of the parameter, 0"(;v the
variance of ,_a for the ith functionality. Note that the contribution in variability of each test is stronglyv-f
(f)
influenced by the set Mp . If this is an empty set, the range of the functional complexity for a given
functionality will be considerably constrained.
Without any loss in generality, let us assume that the a (;) are defined on a normal probability distribution.
2
This distribution is specified succinctly by its mean #(0 and its variance 0"_) of which the sample mean
2
_(/) and variance st;) are sufficient statistics. It is now possible to construct a standard error of the
for a set of n tests of the i 'h function.
estimate _(;_ as follows: s_o) =_n
Once we have initiatexl a testing phase it would be desirable to be able to formulate a mathematical
statement or a stopping rule for determining the conclusion of the test phase. A stopping rule for this first
test phase is based on the attainment of an a priori condition for b and t_ that
[ -/1 7
PrL-b< <bj=l-cx.
In other words, the initial test phase will continue until we have attained an estimate for each of the mean
functional complexities of the software system with the 100(1 - iX)% confidence limits set as a condition
of a test plan.
As the test process progresses during this first test phase, it may well emerge that the variation in the
functional complexity may be inordinately large. We can begin to see in advance that a significant amount
of total test resources will be consumed only on this first parametric estimation phase of the software. In
this circumstance it is quite possible that the software system is not testable. This being the case, we are
now in a position to specify that the implementation of certain functionalities, specifically those for which
the within functionality variability is so large as to demand too many test resources, be redesigned and
recoded. Not all software may be reasonably or economically tested. This view represents a fundamental
shift in test philosophy. In the past, software testers were obliged to take their best shot at whatever
systems were designed and coded by a staff outside the test process. Through the systematic introduction
of measurement processes in the testing phase of the life cycle, it is now possible to set criteria a priori for
the testability of software systems. In looking at the parameter estimation phase of software testing, we are
working strictly with the within functionality variability of a design. For the next phase of the software test
process, let us focus on the variability among the set of all functionalities. The focus in this next phase is
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ontheconstructionof asequenceof tests that will focus on the set of operations, O, that will represent the
user's view of the system.
It would be entirely unrealistic to suppose that it would be possible to construct a fault-free software
system or to test a large system exhaustively to find all possible faults in the system. It is not really of
interest that a system has faults in it. What is relevant, however, is that there are no faults in the range of
functions that the consumer of the software will typically execute. It would take unlimited test resources to
certify that a system is, in fact, fault free. What we would like to do is to allocate our finite test resources
to maximize the exposure of the software system to such faults as might be present.
Let us assume that we are investigating a system designed to implement a set of n functional requirements.
As a result of the design process, each of these functions fi will have an associated functional complexity
0I lu . From the initial stages of the test process we will have an estimate ai for 0I _) . We can now
formulate an objective function for the allocation of test resources as follows:
Q =alx_ + a2x2+. "'+anX,t
where x_ is the amount of test resources (time) that will be allocated to the test of the i th function and Q is
a measure proportional to software faults (quality). It would be well to remember that functional
complexity is an expected value for the relative complexity of the design implementation of each
functionality. Relative complexity was constructed to be a surrogate for software faults. Thus, a
functionality whose functional complexity is large may be expected to be fault prone. By maximizing the
value of Q in the objective function above, a test plan will be seen to have maximized its exposure to the
embedded faults in the system. Clearly the best way to maximize Q is to allocate all test resources to the
function f; whose functional complexity is the largest. That is, allocate all resources to a i where ai > a;
for all j _: i.
The real object of the test process, at this stage, is to maximize our exposure to software faults that will
have the greatest impact on those functions that the user will be performing with the software. In this
sense, the test process is constrained by the customer's operational profile. As per the earlier discussion, a
user of the software has a distinct set of operations, O, that he/she perceives the software will perform.
These operations are then implemented in a rather more precise set of software functions, F. From this
operational profile we may then construct the following constraints on the test process to ensure that each
of the user's operations receives its due during the test process.
blix_ + bt2x2 +'" .+bi,,x,, < cl
b21x_ + b22x2 +'" "+ b2,,xn < c2
b,._x, + b,.2x2+" .+bm.x. <-cm
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Thecoefficientsbo, are proportionality constants that reflect the implementation of an operation in a set of
appropriate functions such that:
p'(q,fj) if IMPLEMENTS(o, ,fj ) is truebij = if IMPLEMENTS(o, f:) is false
and c_ represents the test resources assigned to the i `h operation. The total test effort is simply the sum of
time apportioned to each of the functionalities,
n m
i=1 j=l
Test Results
To demonstrate the concept of measurement of the testing process, the test results for a sequence of tests of
a past release of the space shuttle PASS will now be examined. Table 1 summarizes these test results. To
initiate this process, we used the metric tool, HALMet, to obtain the 19 complexity metrics for each of 572
higher-level program modules for PASS. We then transformed these 19 measures on 572 modules into 4
orthogonal measures as per the earlier discussion of principal components analysis. Finally, we then
developed relative complexity measures for each of the 572 program modules. These represented the static
measure of program complexity for each program module. It should be noted that the values actually
computed for relative complexity were adjusted so that they had a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of
10. Thus, a program module that had a relative complexity of 55 would be one whose complexity was
approximately one-half a standard deviation above the mean for all of the 572 program modules.
As each test was run in each test suite, we obtained the execution profiles for the 572 program modules.
These values, again, represent the proportion of time that was spent in each of the program modules for
each of the tests. We then computed the functional complexity of each program module. The system
functional complexity under each of the tests was the sum of all of the functional complexities for all of the
program modules (most of which are zero in that each test would only exercise a limited number of
program modules). A test of average complexity is one with a functional complexity of 50.
Table 1 presents the results of the execution of four distinct test suites. The test suites are represented by
columns in this table. Each test suite represents the exercise of a distinct functionality of the PASS.
Within each test suite there are a varying number of tests. For example, in the case of G1 Ascent, there are
a total of three tests. For each of the test suites, the within test statistics are then shown in this table.
These test statistics include the mean functional complexity _i (j) for each test suite, the within functionality
variance s 2(_), the standard error of the estimate for the test suite mean szoj, and the 95% confidence
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intervalsfor thetestsuitemean.Table1alsoshowsthecardinalitiesforthesetsM c , M_, and Mp, for
each of the test functionalities.
The test suites are most unusual in that there is extremely little variation in their functional complexity both
within the test suites and across all test suites. The G3 Entry tests are the least complex of the series. Both
the G1 Ascent test and the G1/G6 RTLS tests represent the most complex in the series. The test suites also
clearly differ in terms of their variability. Though the total number of test observations is small, we can see
that there is more variability within the G3 tests than within the G1 tests. The G3 test suites are
significantly less functionally complex that the G1 series. In that the level of functionality is of high
granularity, the functional complexity of the entire test is very close to the expected value of 50. The real
value of the statistical testing process comes with a more fine-grained test scenaio. The current test data,
though, do demonstrate the viability of the approach.
Table 1. Test Results
Test Suite
test
1
2
3
4
_i (J)
2
S (i)
lower 95%
upper 95 %
Mc
M,
M,
G1 Ascent
52.53
53.02
52.80
52.78
0.06
0.14
52.50
53.07
92
80
3
GI/G6 RTLS
52.79
52.17
52.17
52.18
52.33
0.10
0.16
52.02
52.63
92
150
7
G3 Deorbit
51.41
49.31
50.09
50.60
50.35
0.78
0.44
49.49
51.22
92
98
11
G3 Entry
48.06
49.31
49.29
49.30
48.99
0.38
0.31
48.38
49.59
92
105
10
It is also worth noting that the ratio of the cardinality of Mp, the potentially invoked modules, to M,., the
modules that are always invoked for the execution of a functionality is greatest with the G3 Deorbit test
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suite. As may be seen in this table, the variance in functional complexity is also greatest for this test suite.
Within the limited variance component of each test, this variance changes in proportion to the ratio of Mp
to M_.
Each of the columns in Table 1 represents the within function sources of variation in implementing each
function. If we now compute the average of the average functional complexity between systems, we will
have a between suite functional complexity of 51.00, just slightly above average relative complexity for the
whole software system. The between suite variability is 2.74, indicating a remarkable lack of variation in
functional complexity across the several functionalities.
Table 2 shows the average relative complexity of just those modules that actually executed in each of the
test cases. Again, it is most unusual for the relative complexity of these module subsets to have values of
average relative complexity so close to the PASS system average complexity of 50.00. This means that the
static complexity of each of the module subsets was almost exactly the same as the complexity for the
entire system. This is certainly not a chance nor a random phenomenom.
Table 2. Test Relative Complexity
Test Suite
test
1
2
3
4
G1 Ascent
51.08
50.70
52.08
GI/G6 RTLS
50.52
50.51
50.51
50.43
G3 Deorbit
50.74
50.74
50.74
50.67
G3 Entry
50.25
50.34
50.38
50.38
Figures 1-6 depict a series of six frequency plots. Each of these frequency plots shows the distribution of
the relative complexity of the modules in each of the test suites together with the combined plot of all 338
modules that were invoked in at least one of the four tests. A visual inspection of these charts shows a
rather different distribution of relative complexity for each of the tests. In particular, the distribution of the
module relative complexity for the G1 Ascent series is visually different from those in the other test series.
In the presence of this apparent visual difference in distribution, it is even more remarkable that the average
module relative complexity is practically invariant of the four test series as may be seen in Table 2 above.
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Summary and Conclusions
Complexity metrics can provide substantial information on the distinguishing differences among the
modules of a software system regarding the conduct of the testing process. There is reasonable evidence to
support the conclusion that computer software metrics may be used as leading indicators of software
quality in the test process. Further, these metrics can be used (1) to guide the formulation of a test plan for
structuring the test process and (2) to allocate test resources to yield a maximum exposure to software
faults during the test process. An ancillary benefit is that we may now begin to consider some software
configurations (designs) as being untestable within the limited time frame available for the whole testing
process [Munson, 1993].
However high the level of test granularity might be for these tests, it is most unusual that 1) the functional
complexity of each of the individual tests is so very close to the expected value of 50 and 2) there is so very
little variability in the functional complexity. The only reasonable explanation for both points 1 and 2 is
that this software system represents a very mature state of software development and that any undue
variation in functional complexity would have been removed over time because of the inability to test the
software effectively. This process is analogous to a rock newly cleaved from a steep cliff falling into a
swiftly flowing river. The sharp edges on the rock will very rapidly be removed by the abrasive action of
the stream yielding a rock with very little surface variation.
A similar observation could be made about the static complexity of the modules actually involved in each
of the tests. The fact that there was so little variation in these static complexity measures is very
surprising. This is also not a chance phenomenon. It must also be an artifact of the maturity of the PASS
software.
The success of this technique is predicated on the ability to identify a surrogate for software faults.
Relative complexity is a stand-in for aspects of software quality that we cannot directly measure such as
software faults. From the results of our recent research, we believe that the relative complexity measure
and functional complexity are stable and reasonable measures to use in the testing process. Unlike other
metrics, the relative complexity metric combines, simultaneously, all attribute dimensions of all complexity
metrics. We have established that software complexity metrics, and subsequently the relative complexity
metric, are closely associated with measures of program quality and that this relationship may be exploited
in the statistical testing process.
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Section II, Results of Reliability Model Application
Abstract
Ongoing investigations into the etiology of software failures in the Space Shuttle PASS have provided
substantial insight into the measurement of the reliability of this system. This review has led to the
conclusion that it is not the software system that fails: It is the software system executing a particular
functionality that fails. From this new perspective, the sequential execution of program functions may be
modeled as a stochastic process. In particular, the program functionalities are physically expressed within
a program as subtrees of modules in a program call tree hierarchy. The transitions between the program
modules in a pairwise fashion may be represented in a transition matrix of a Markov process. Program
failures are represented by an absorbing state in the transition matrix. This view of reliability permits the
dynamic estimation of the parameters of the underlying multinomial probability distribution representing
the transition between program modules. This use of the multinomial probability distribution is
particularly useful in that it has a Dirichlet distribution as its natural conjugate prior distribution. Thus, a
Bayesian approach may be employed so that each step or epoch in the software test process provides
incremental information as to the evolving reliability assessment of the program.
This report represents the results of the second project milestone for this fiscal year. It formulates a new
measure of the determination of the functional reliability and the overall reliability of the Space Shuttle
PASS using a Baysian decision process based on a Markovian model of the system operation.
Introduction
The traditional concept of time as it is commonly used in software reliability modeling has little or nothing
to do with the failure of computer software. Program failure is simply not time-dependent. A program
may be viewed as a set of program modules that are executing a set of mutually exclusive functions. If the
program executes a functionality consisting of a subset of modules that are error free, it will never fail, no
matter how long it executes this functionality. If, on the other hand, the program is executing a
functionality that contains fault-laden modules, there is a very good likelihood that it will fail. Further, it
will fail with certainty when the right aspects of functionality are expressed. Another significant problem
in the determination of the reliability of a software system is the precise determination of the failure event.
The failure event, and the circumstances that surround the failure, have proven to be most elusive concepts.
This section will explore an alternative view of software reliability, together with a mechanism for the
collection of the data necessary to understand the failure.
The main problem in understanding software reliability is getting the granularity of the observation right.
Software systems are designed to implement each of their functionalities in one or more code modules. In
some cases there is a direct correspondence between a particular program module and a particular
functionality. That is, if the program is expressing that functionality, it will execute exclusively in the
module in question. In most cases, however, there will not be this distinct traceability of functionality to
20
modules.Thefunctionalitywill beexpressedinmanydifferentcodemodules.It istheindividualcode
modulethatfails. A codemodulewill, of course,beexecutingaparticularfunctionalitywhenit fails. We
mustcometounderstandthatit isthefunctionalitythatfails.
Asaprogramisexercisinganyoneof itsmanyfunctionalitiesinthenormalcourseofoperationof the
program,it will apportionitstimeacrossthissetoffunctionalities.Theproportionoftimethataprogram
spendsineachof itsfunctionalitiesi thefunctional profile of the program. Further, within the
functionality, it will apportion its time across one to many program modules. This temporal distribution of
processing time is represented by the concept of the execution profile. In other words, if we have a
program structured into n distinct modules, the execution profile for a given functionality will be the
proportion of time spent in each program module during the time that the function was being expressed.
As the discussion herein unfolds, we will see that the key to understanding program failure events is the
direct association of these failures to execution events with a given functionality. A Markovian stochastic
process will be used to describe the transition of program modules from one to another as a program
expresses a functionality. From these observations, it will become fairly obvious just what data will be
needed to describe accurately the reliability of the system. In essence, the system will essentially be able to
appraise us of its own health. The reliability modeling process is no longer something that will be
performed ex post facto. It may be done dynamically while the program is executing, if need be. Since the
reliability of a software system is a major concern specifically during software test activity, we will focus
on the reliability assessment process during the test activity.
A Formal Description of Program Operation
Assume that the software system S was designed to implement a specific set of mutually exclusive
functionalities F. Thus, if the system is executing a function f _ F then it cannot be expressing elements
of any other functionality in F. Each of these functions in F was designed to implement a set of software
specifications based on a user's requirements. From a user's perspective, this software system will
implement a specific set of operations, O. This mapping from the set of user-perceived operations, o, to a
set of specific program functionalities is one of the major functions in the software design process. It is
possible, then, to define a relation IMPLEMENTS over O × F such that IMPLEMENTS(o,f) is true if
functionalityfis used in the design process to implement an operation, o. For each operation o _ O, there
is a relation p' over O × F such that p'(o, f) is the proportion of time assigned to functionality fby
operation o.
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Themainpurpose,then,of the software specification process is to define the mapping of user-defined
operations into functions that will be implemented by the software design process. An example of such a
mapping may be found in Table 3, below. From this table it can be seen that a user's perceived operation
o 1 has been implemented in two specific functions, fl and f2-
OxF
01
0 2
03
04
05
06
Table 3.
fl
T
Mapping From Operations to Functions
T
T
T
f, f, f7 A f9
T
T
T
T
T
T T
T T
T
T
The software design process is strictly a matter of assigning functionalities in F to specific program
modules m _ M, the set of program modules. The design process may be thought of as the process of
defining a set of relations, ASSIGNS, over F x M such that ASSIGNS_m) is true if functionalityfis
expressed in module m.
The principal function of the software design process is to achieve the mapping from a set of functions
defined in the specification process to a set of program modules that will express this functionality. An
example of such a mapping may be seen in Table 4. From this table we can see that module m I will be
executed in all of the specified functions. On the other hand, module m 2 is unique to function fl. Other
program modules, such as m 4 are used in two distinct functions.
A typical non-functional requirement for modem systems (particularly safety-critical systems) is that these
systems perform reliably. One method of ensuring that this non-functional requirement will be met is to
subject the software system to a series of tests. Each test will exercise one or more of the functionalities in
F. Each possible test of the software system will select a subset of F. There is a relation EXHIBITS over
T x F such that EXHIBITS (too is true if test case t exhibits functionalityf.
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Table 4. Mapping From Functionality to Program Modules
F X M m_ m 2 m3 m 4 m 5 m 6 m 7 m 8 rrt9 mio
f_ T T
f2 T T T
f3 T T T T T
f4 T T T
f5 T
f6 T
f7 T T T
fs T T T
f9 T T T T
A designer of software test is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the functionalities that will
express the user's operations actually perform reliably after the tests have been conducted. The tester will
architect a sequence of tests that will map specific test activities to specific functionalities. An example of
this mapping may be seen in Table 5. From this table, we can see that test tm will express the functions fl,
f,, and L"
TxF
t 1
t 2
t3
t4
t5
Table 5.
f, f2
T
T T
T T
T T T T
Mapping From Tests to Functions
L L L L L L
T T
T T
L
From a software design standpoint, a system may be decomposed into many program modules. For a given
software system, S, let M denote the set of all program modules for that system. Let T denote the set of all
test cases in a test suite for S. For each test case t E T, there is a relation p over T × m such that
p a(t,m) is the activation frequency of module m in test t. In a continuation of the hypothetical example of
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testmappingfromTable5,listedbelowinTable6aretheproportionof modulexecutionsfor eachofthe
modulesexercisedineachof thetests.Fromthistablewecansee,forexample,thatundertestt 1 module
m 4 has received control in at least half of the module transitions during the execution of this test. Modules
ms, m 6 and m 9 have not executed at all during the test.
Table 6. Mapping From Tests to Program Modules
T× M ml
tl T
t2 T
t3 T
t4 T
t5 T
m 2
T
rn3. rn4 rn5
T
T
T
T
m 6
T
m 7 rn8 m 9 ml0
T T
T
Let us assume that there is a relationship between program functionalities and software modules. Program
modules may be viewed in terms of a number of different subsets. Some modules may execute under all of
the functionalities of S. There will be the set of common modules. The main program is an example of
such a module that is common to all tests of the software system. These common modules, M c c M, are
defined as
Mc = {m:MlVt _ T . p" (t,m)> 0}
All of these modules will execute regardless of the specific functionality being executed by the software
system.
Yet another set of software modules may or may not execute when the system is running a particular
function. These modules are said to be potentially involved modules. The set of potentially involved
modules is.
M_y) = {m:MI3t _ T • EXHIBITS(t,f) A p"(t,m) > 0}
In other program modules, there is extremely tight binding between the functionality and the module. That
is, every time a particular function is executed, a distinct set of software modules will always be invoked.
The set of indispensably involved modules is
M_r) = {m:MIV t _ T • EXHIBITS(t, f) =_ p"( t, m)> 0}
For the execution of a function, f, the set of modules, M r , that are designed to implement this function is
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(f) _.j M[ i)M i =Me uM r
Clearly, for the test process to be effective, the range of functionalities,f, must be well known.
Within a test suite, each test will exercise one or more of the system's functionalities. For a given test t
these expressed functionalities are those with the property
F_') = {f: Fl'v't _ T • EXHIBITS(t,f)}
For any test t the execution profile will consist of the probabilities p(t, m) derived from
I
m e ill, =m, _ M r (F_'))uMi(FJ '))
P •
where Mp = U Mr, Mp (FJ t) ) and Mi(F_ (')) are the modules that are actually invoked in the test t.
r:,
From the standpoint of software design and the test process, the real problems introduced into testing are
not necessarily attributable to the set of modules that are tightly bound to a functionality M i or to the set of
common modules that will be invoked for all executing processes M c . The real problem is the set of
potentially invoked modules M r . The greater the cardinality of this set of modules, the less certain will be
the outcome of a test of this functionality. For any one test of this functionality, none of the modules may
execute or they may all execute.
When a program begins the execution of a functionality, we may envision this beginning as the start of a
Markovian stochastic process. For the system S there is an activation graph that shows the transition of
program control from one program module to another. To simplify this discussion, let us define a relation
ACTIVATES over M/× Mr. A sample activation graph for a hypothetical program is shown in Figure 7.
For example,
(0.7 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 ")
10.4 0.3 0 0.3 0 0
I o.1 0 0.3 0 0.1 0.5
P=IO 0.8 0 0.2 0 0
[_ 0 0.5 0 0.5 00 0.7 0 0 0.3
From this activation graph we may then construct a probability adjacency matrix, P, whose entries
represent the transition probability from each module to another module at each epoch in the execution
process. Thus, the element p_") of this matrix on the n th epoch axe the probabilities that
ACTIVATES(mi, m i ) is true for that epoch.
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Figure 7. Hypothetical program sample activation graph.
The transition from one module to another may be seen as a stochastic process, in which case we may
define an indexed collection of random variables {X t }, where the index t runs through a set of non-negative
integers, t = 0, 1,2,-.- representing the epochs of the process. At any particular epoch the software is
found to be executing exactly one of its M modules. The fact of the execution occurring in a particular
module is a state of the system. For this software system, the system is found ih exactly one of a finite
number of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states that may be labeled 0,1,2,--., M. In this
representation of the system, there is a stochastic process {Xt}, where the random variables are observed at
epochs t = 0, 1.,2,... and where each random variable may take on any one of the (M + 1) integers, from
the state space A = {0,1,2,...,M}.
A stochastic process {X t} is a Markov chain if it has the property that
Pr[Xt+ _ = jlX, = _ ,X,_ x = i,__,X,_ 2 = i,_2,---,X0 =/ol = Pr[X,+_ = j]X, = i,]
for any epoch t = 0, 1,2,.... and all states i0,i1,'" ",/r in the state space A. This is equivalent to saying that
the conditional probability of executing any module at any future epoch is dependent only on the current
state of the system. The conditional probabilities Pr[X,÷ 1 = jl X, =/,] are called the transition
probabilities. In that this nomenclature is somewhat cumbersome, let p_"_ = Pr[X, = jl X,__ = i]. Within
the execution of a given functionality, the behavior of the system is static. That is, the transition
probabilities do not change from one epoch to another. Thus, Pr[Xt+l = jl X, = _ ] = Pr[X1 = jl X 0 =/0 ]
for i, j, in S, which is an additional condition of a Markov process.
(n)
Since the pq are conditional probabilities, it is clear that
Po(") >_0, for all i,j in A, n = 0,1,2,...
and
M
E (n)PO = l , for all i in A and n = O,1,2,...
j--o
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If weusethenomenclatureP todenotethematrixofone-steptransitionprobabilitiesattheinitialepoch,
thenthesystematthen + 1 st epoch can be obtained from the expression
p(,_ = p, =p.p,-i
What we would like to ascertain is the unconditional probability of being in a particular module at a
particular epoch. To find this conditional probability let us first observe that
Pr[X,+, = jlX, =/_] = Pr[X_ = jlX o = to]
It is clear that the unconditional probability of executing a module j and epoch n, then, is dependent only on
the initial state of the system. Thus,
M
Pr[X = j] = _ p_"' Pr[X o = i].
i=0
Interestingly enough, for all software systems there is a distinguished module, the ma i n program module
that will always receive execution control from the operating system. If we denote this main program as
module 0 then,
Pr[X 0 = 0] = 1 and Pr[X 0 = i] = 0 for i = 1,2,..-,M
We can see, then, that the unconditional probability of executing in a particular modulej is
Pr[X. = j] = p_">Pr[X o =0] = p_")
The granularity of the term epoch is now of interest. An epoch is operationally defined to be the transition
of a software system from one module to another. Computer programs executing in their normal mode will
make state transitions between program modules rather rapidly. In terms of real clock time, many epochs
may elapse in a relatively short period. Thus, we will now turn our attention to the steady-state behavior of
the software system.
First, let us observe that the states being modeled represent nodes on an activation tree. As such, these
states are intrinsically aperiodic. Positive recurrent states which are aperiodic are called ergodic states. If
states i andj are ergodic, then it can be shown that
lim p_"_ = Tj
where the _j's satisfy the following steady state equations:
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_'j> O,
M
Tj =Z Tip_ 0)' forj inA,
i=0
M
_'j =1.
j=O
The "t'j's are the steady-state probabilities of the Markov chain. These probabilities profile the behavior of
the system. They may also be interpreted as stationary probabilities. That is, if Pr[X0 = j] = _'j for allj
in A then Pr[X, = j] = _j for any later epoch n.
Modeling Software Failures
While the Markovian process discussed earlier dealt with a program that would not fail, we now wish to
examine the potential for modeling the failure of a software system. When a program module fails, we can
imagine that the module has made a transition to an absorbing state, a failure state, in the Markov
transition matrix. Thus, every program may be thought to have a virtual module representing the failed
state of program. When this virtual module receives control, it will not relinquish it. The transition matrix
for this new model is augmented by an additional row and a new column. For a program with M modules,
let the error state be represented by a new state, K = M + 1. For this new state,
_,, j'= 0 for allj = 1,2 ..... M
n = 0,1,2,...
Pxj "[= 1 for j= K
This represents the augmented row of the new transition matrix. Each row in the transition matrix will be
_(n)
augmented by a new column entry -(") for i = 1,2, ..-,M, where Pix represents the probability of thePiK
•th thfailure of the t module in the n epoch.
The Estimation of Profiles
When a program is executing a functionality it will apportion its time among a set of modules. As such it
will transition from one module to the next on an activation sequence. Each module activated in this
activation sequence will have an associated activation frequency. Let p( t, m) represent the proportion of
transitions for each of the modules that comprise the system. The particular set of M t modules that will
execute are determined by the functionalities F (') that are expressed. If p(t, m) is normalized by dividing
by the total event transitions, the result is the execution profile for the function.
Another way to look at the execution profile is that p(t, m)/Zm p(t,m) will represent an estimate of 27m,
the steady-state probability of the execution of module m in any epoch. However, as the software is
subjected to a series of unique and distinct functional expressions, there will be a different Markov chain
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foreachof the user's operations in that each will implement a different set of functions that will, in turn,
invoke possibly different sets of program modules.
Functional Profiles
When a software system is constructed by the software developer, it is designed to fulfill a set of specific
functional requirements. The user will run the software to perform a set of perceived operations. In this
process, the user will typically not use all of the functionalities with the same probability. The functional
profile of the software system is the set of unconditional probabilities of each of the functionalities F being
executed by the user. Let Y be a random variable defined on the indices of the set of elements of F. Thus,
ok = Pr[y = k] is the probability that the user is executing program functionality k as specified in the
functional requirements of the program [Musa, 1992]. A program executing on a serial machine can only
be executing one functionality at a time. The distribution of o, then, is multinomial for programs designed
to fulfill more than two specific functions. The prior probabilities for each f _ F must be known before
the software is designed.
Execution Profiles
Each test suite will implement a subset of functionalities, i.e. F (t) c F. As each test is run to completion
e
it will generate a test execution profile. This test execution profile may represent the results of the
execution of one or more functions. In order to simplify the discussion let us first describe a test that
expresses precisely one functionality. For this test case the probability that a particular module may
execute is, in fact, a conditional probability. Then % = Pr[X = ilY = k] where k = 1,2,...,#{F}
represents the execution profile for a set of modules executing a function k exclusively and # {F} is the
cardinality of the set of functions. As was the case with the functional profile, the distribution of the
execution profile is also multinomial for a software system consisting of more than two modules. As a
matter of the design of a program, there may be a non-empty set M; f) of modules that may or may not be
executed when a particular functionality is exercised. This will, of course, cause the cardinality of the set
My to vary. A particular execution may not invoke any of the modules of M; y). On the other hand, all of
the modules may participate in the execution of that functionality. As we will see, this variation in the
cardinality of My within the execution of a single functionality will contribute significantly to the amount
of test effort that will be necessary to test such a functionality.
Most tests, though, do not exercise precisely one functionality. Rather, they may apportion time across a
number of functionalities. For a given test, let l be a proportionality constant equal to the proportion of
time spent executing a given function. Thus, 0 < Ik < 1 will represent the proportion of time executing the
k th functionality in F_° . Thus the test execution profile will represent a linear combination of the
conditional probabilities, % as follows:
p_ = 2f_eFit, lkUik"
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Module Profiles
The manner in which a program will exercise its many modules as the user chooses to execute the
functionalities of the program is determined directly by the design of the program. Indeed, this mapping of
functionality onto program modules is the overall objective of the design process. The module profile, q, is
the unconditional probability that a particular module will be executed based on the design of the program.
It is derived through the application of Bayes' rule. First, the joint probability that a given module is
executing and the program is exercising a particular function is given by
Pr[Xn = j n Y = k] = Pr[Y= k] Pr[Xn = jl Y = k] = OkU_k
Thus, the unconditional probability, q_ of executing module i under a particular design is
qi = Pr[Xn = i]
= _kPr[Xn = i_ Y= k]
= _-Jk ok uik
As was the case for the functional profile and the execution profile, only one module can be executing at
any one time. Hence, the distribution of q is also multinomial for more than two modules.
Dynamic Profile Execution
One of the objectives in modeling the reliability of a system is to come to understand the nature of the
distribution of the probabilities for various profiles. We have so far come to recognize these distributions
in terms of their multinomial nature. This distribution is useful for representing the outcome of an
experiment involving a set of mutually exclusive events. Let S = U S_ where S_ is one of M mutually
i=l
exclusive sets of events. Each of these events would correspond to a program executing a particular
module in the total set of program modules. Further, let Pr(Si) = w and
W T = 1 - w I - w2..... wM,
under the condition that T = M + 1, as defined earlier. In which case w_ is the probability that the outcome
of a random experiment is an element of the set Si. If this experiment is conducted over a period of n trials
then the random variable S_ will represent the frequency of Si outcomes. In this case, the value, n,
represents the number of transitions from one program module to the next. Note that
X r=n-XL-X2 ..... XM
This particular distribution will be useful in the modeling of a program with a set of k modules. During a
set of n program steps, each of the modules may be executed. These, of course, are mutually exclusive
events. If module i is executing then module j cannot be executing.
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Themultinomialdistributionfunctionwithparametersn and w = (wl, w_,.... wr) is given by
x, x2 xM?n
w,
where x_represents the frequency of execution of the i th program module.
The expected values for the xi are given by
E(xi) = xi = nwi , i= 1,2 ..... k,
the variances by
Var(xi) = nwi(1 - wi)
and the covariance by
Cov(x_,xj) = -nw_wj , i ¢: j
We would like to come to understand, for example, the multinomial distribution of a program's execution
profile while it is executing a particular functionality. The problem, here, is that every time a program is
run we will observe that there is some variation in the profile from one execution sample to the next. It will
be difficult to estimate the parameters w = (w_,w_ .... wr) for the multinomial distribution of the execution
profile. Rather than estimating these parameters statically, it would be far more useful to us to get
estimates of these parameters dynamically as the program is actually in operation.
To aid in the process of characterizing the nature of the true underlying multinomial distribution, let us
observe that the family of Dirichlet distributions is a conjugate family for observations that have a
multinomial distribution [Wilks, 1962]. The p.d.f, for a Dirichlet distribution, D(cz;ar), with a parametric
vector tx = (cz_, az ..... aM) where (cz_> 0; i = 1,2 ..... M) is
f(wl_) r(al + az+'"+aM) _,-l t_ 1 --I CtM-I
= W 1 W 2 • • • W M
r(a,) F( a2 )"" F( o_u )
zTwhere (wi > 0; i = 1,2 ..... M) and i-i wi = 1. The expected values of the wi are given by
E(w;) = -
O_o
T
where ct0 = Z,=I t_i • The variance of the x_ is given by
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ai(a -
Var(w_) = t_02(a o +1)
and the covariance by
ai a i
Cov(wi,wj)- a (ao+l)
Within the set of expected values Pi, i = 1,..., T, not all of the values are of equal interest. We are
interested, in particular, in the value of pr. This will represent the probability of a transition to the terminal
failure state from a particular program module. So that we might use this value for our succeeding
reliability prediction activities, it will be useful to know how good this estimate is. To this end, we would
like to set 100o_% confidence limits on the estimate. For the Dirichlet distribution, this is not clean. To
simplify the process of setting these confidence limits, let us observe that if w = (w_,w_, .... wM) is a random
vector having the M-variate Dirichlet distribution, D(_ar), then the sum z = w_ +...+w m has the beta
distribution,
ftj(zlT, otr) = F( 7 +a_)
F(7)F(otr) zr(1 - z) _,
or alternately
fo(wrly,ar)= F(7 + at) (1-wr)r(wr) _,
F(y)F(ar)
where 7 = o_l + 0_2 "_-'" "-_-O_M "
Thus, we may obtain 100or% confidence limits for
pr -a < pr < pr + b
from
F,(pr - al 7, at) = f #r-aaO fo(wrl7, ar)dwr = a12
and
FtJ(I.t r + b l 7, otr ) = jut +bf o(wr 17, ar)dwr = 1 - a / 2Jo
Where this computation is inconvenient, let us observe that the cumulative beta function, Fo, can also be
obtained from existing tables of the cumulative binomial distribution, Fb, by making use of the knowledge
from Raiffa [1961] that
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Fb(yl//r --a, 7 + aT) = F_(ll r -aly, ar)
and
Fb(ar I 1- (I.tT + b ), y + aT) = F_(laT + b l )',aT),
The value of the Dirichlet conjugate family for modeling purposes is twofold. First, it permits us to
estimate the probabilities of the module transitions directly from the observed transitions. Secondly, we are
able to obtain revised estimates for these probabilities as the observation process progresses. Let us now
suppose that we wish to model the behavior of a software system whose execution profile has a
multinomial distribution with parameters n and I_ = (wt, w 2 ,..-, w M) where n is the total number of
observed module transitions and the values of the wi are unknown. Let us assume that the prior distribution
of W is a Dirichlet distribution with a parametric vector a = (ix1, a: ,..., a M) where
(a_ > 0; i = 1,2,..., M). Then the posterior distribution of W for the behavioral observation
X = (xl ,x 2 ,... ,x M) is a Dirichlet distribution with parametric vector
(x* = (_1 + Xl ,a2 + x2 ,"" ,txu + XM ) [DeGroot, 1970]. As an example, suppose that we now wish to
model the behavior of a large software system with such a parametric vector. As the system makes
sequential transitions from one module to another, the posterior distribution of W at each transition will be
a Dirichlet distribution. Further, for i = 1,2 ..... T the ithcomponent of the augmented parametric vector tr
will be increased by J unit each time module mi is executed.
Functional Reliability
Not all states that a system of K program modules can get into hold equal fascination for us. In the
augmented program model above, a virtual program module, m r , was employed to represent a program
module representing an error state. From the steady-state equations of the Markov model of this system,
_'j >0,
K
"t'j = _E_ 'r/Pij, forj in A ,
i=0
K
_/_Tj = 1,
j=0
the probability _.(s) is of interest in that this is the long-term probability of winding up in state K, the
virtual failure module when executing the function, fi Quite simply, the reliability of the system executing
a given functionality,f, is given by r (f) = 1 - "_tc. Further, with the proper instrumentation in a program,
the reliability of this system may be estimated on thefly by exploiting the Dirichlet conjugate distribution
family for the multinomial distribution of execution probabilities.
This reliability estimate, however, is only for a particular functionality. It is based entirely on the
execution profile of a given functionality. Thus, each function has its own independent reliability
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assessment.Thatwastheoriginal intent of this investigation, to show that reliability is dependent directly
on the function that is executing. It is program functions that fail. Some functions are more reliable than
others.
System Reliability
From a more global perspective, it is also useful to consider the reliability of the software as a system of
functions. To this end, let us observe that not all functionalities will operate with equal probability. There
is a functional profile, o k = Pr[y = k], which is the probability that the user is executing program
s
functionality k as specified in the functional requirements of the program. The reliability of the system, r ,
is the expected value of the functional reliability, to wit:
#2_£}
r s = E(r)= ___oir_r'
i=1
.th
Y' is the estimate of the reliability of the lwhere # {F} is the cardinality of the set of functions and r r
function. The variation in reliability from one function to another will have an impact on the understanding
of the system reliability. The overall system reliability will be bounded below, conceptually, by the least
reliable of the program functionalities.
User Guidelines for Data Collection
To obtain the necessary information for the posterior distributions of the execution profiles, we will need
the program (or operating system [or hardware]) to maintain certain information for us. Specifically, for
the computation of the posterior distributions of the Dirichlet distributions for each of the functionalities,
we will need a vector containing a simple count of the number of times that each module has been executed.
Thus the complete information necessary for this modeling process will be kept in an n x m transition
matrix, T for a program with n functions and m modules. The elements, tij, of this matrix represent the
number of times modulej has been activated while executing function i.
Necessarily, if the program is maintaining the transition matrix, it will not be able to update the vector for
the virtual module that represents the failure state of the program. When the program transitions to this
hypothetical state, it will be dead. If T is being maintained by the operating system, or even better, in the
hardware, then we will also be able to capture the program's transition into the virtual failure module.
In the specific case of the Space Shuttle PASS, there now exists a processor (PMIP) that will serve the data
collection process very well. In this sense the Shuttle code is already instrumented for reliability
assessment. To develop the system reliability for PASS, the functional reliabilities must fast be
established. To achieve this objective, tests must be identified that express each of the functionalities we
identified in Milestone I Phase II. For each of the tests, an execution profile must be constructed. This will
be used to derive the state transition probabilities for the transition matrix of the basic Markov model.
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Thereliabilityaugmentedmodelmaybeconstructedbyaddingtheestimatedstatetransitionprobabilities
fromeachof thefunctionalstatestothevirtualfailurestate.Theinformationtoreconstructthesetransition
probabilitiesmay,in fact,notbeavailable.In thiscase,thepriorprobabilitiesmaybesetatarealistically
smallvaluerepresentingtheintuitivereliabilityofeachofthefunctions.Themoreaccuratetheseprior
probabilitiesare,themorerapidlytheMarkovprocesswill convergeto reasonablyaccurateanduseful
reliabilityfigures.AsisalwaysthecasewiththeBayesianapproach,if wedonothaveanyinformationas
tothepriorprobabilities,wemayassumethatall eventsareequiprobable.Thus,if therearetenmodulesin
theactivationsetfor aparticularfunction,theneachwouldhaveapriorprobabilityof 0.1underthis
assumptionof equiprobableoutcomes.
Specific Data Collection Items
1. A state vector that will track the specific function that a program is currently executing. This vector
will contain sufficient information to identify the function being executed. For example, this vector
might contain zeros for all entries except for the i th entry which would be a one. This would indicate
that function i is currently executing.
. As a specific function is executing, it will have an associated activation tree of m program modules.
The program will transfer control from one program module to another. As control passes from
module i to module j, this fact will be used to update a transition matrix. The transition matrix M will
initially have zeros in all entries. As control passes for module i toj the matrix entry mij will be
augmented by one. As the system switches from one functionality to another, it will also do a context
switch on the function transition matrix. The transition frequencies recorded in this matrix will be
used to compute the execution profiles for each functionality.
. A failure event may be represented by two different states in this matrix. First, there will be a module
that will serve as a total failure of the system. When control is apparently transferred to this module,
it means that the program has gone into an irretrievable collapse. The second failure state will be
represented by a module category representing a contingency management routine. Such a
contingency as a floating point overflow might be raised that will not result in the complete failure of
the program. This is a recoverable failure. Both failure states will appear as module entries in the
transition matrix M. Thus, if the program has a total of m modules then the augmented matrix will
have m + 2 states.
4. The complete failure management process data will be stored in an n × (m + 2) transition matrix
containing the currem steady-state probabilities of the Markov process.
. The above data may be periodically logged by the operation system or programming environment to
secondary memory. The contents of these registers and matrices constitute the complete operating
environment of the program as it executes. The precise state of software system failures may be
captured from the contents of these data matrices and registers.
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. The current reliability of each of the system functions may be determined from the last two columns of
the transition matrix. This may be displayed in real time on a console using either a digital or an
analog performance meter. The scale of this meter may be uniform on the interval from least reliable
to most reliable or it may be logarithmic for ultra-reliable software
Reliability Modeling With Modules of Differing Ages
All of the OPS that comprise the Space Shuttle PASS contain software modules of wildly differing ages.
Many of the program modules are over l0 years old. Some modules are new to OI24. Some of the legacy
code has been modified to varying degrees over the last several OIs. For standard approaches to reliability
modeling, this system of modules of varying ages presents a real challenge. Under this new approach, time
is not a term in the model. It really doesn't matter how young or old a HAL code module is. The principal
difference, under this modeling approach, between an element of legacy code and a junior program module
is the determination of the prior probabilities for the Direchlet distribution. For legacy code, the priors for
the distribution will be the posterior probabilities from the previous software build (OI). The choice of the
priors for modules that are new to the system or have been modified may best be derived from the
functional complexities of these modules under software testing. These prior failure probabilities will be
developed from historical failure data.
Summary
The failure of a software system is dependent only on what the software is currently doing. If a program is
currently executing a functionality that is expressed in terms of a set of fault-free modules, this
functionality will certainly execute indefinitely without any likelihood of failure. If a program executes a
sequence of fault-free modules, it will not fail here either. A failure event can only occur when the software
system executes a module that contains faults. Even in this event, the faults must lie in a region of the code
that is likely to be expressed during the execution of a function. If a functionality is never selected that
drives the program into an activation subtree that contains faults, then the program will never fail.
Alternatively, a program may well execute successfully in an activation subtree that contains faults just as
long as the faults are not expressed.
Some of the problems that have arisen in past attempts at software reliability determination all relate to the
fact that the perspective has been distorted. Programs do not wear out over time; if they are not modified,
they will certainly not improve over time, nor will they get less reliable over time. The only thing that
really impacts the reliability of a software system is what the system is doing at the moment. A program
may work very well for a number of years based on the functions that it is asked to execute. This same
program may suddenly become quite unreliable if its functionality is changed by the user. By keeping track
of the state transitions from module to module and function to function we may learn exactly where a
system is fragile. This information coupled with the functional profile will tell us just how reliable the
system will be when we use it as specified.
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Withthisnewapproachto reliabilitymodeling,thereliabilityestimationprocessneednolongerbea
laboriousandexternalfunctiontotheoperationof thePASSsoftware.An objectiveof thisstudyisto
outlineaprocedurewherebythePASSsoftwaremaybeinstrumentedtoprovideadynamicassessmentof
thereliabilityoftheindividualfunctionsthatconstitutethesystemandalsothereliabilityof thePASSasa
whole.Withtheappropriatesoftwareinstrumentationf futurereleasesof theSpaceShuttlePASS,there
iseveryreasontobelievethatthesystemwill beabletoprovideanaccurateanddynamicassessmentof its
ownreliabilitythatmaybedisplayedin realtimeonasystemconsole.
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Section III
HAIJS Metric Analyzer, Rev. 3.1
Introduction
The objective of this deliverable is to document the latest release of HALMet and its companion software
tool, PCA-RCM. The installation and operating manuals for release 3.1 of HALMet are included as
Appendixes A and B. The installation and operating instructions for the PCA-RCM tool are included as
Appendixes C and D.
This report documents the modifications in the latest revision of the software metrics system for the Space
Shuttle PASS. This final version has been enhanced to execute on the SUN workstation in the NASA
environment. It also includes a software tool that will perform principal components analysis on the raw
complexity measures to produce domain metrics. An associated tool for the computation of system-relative
complexity has been incorporated into this tool.
HALMet 3.1
The objective of the HALMet software measurement tool is to obtain measurements on 24 software
complexity measures for programs written in HAL/S. The 24 metrics that have been selected for use in
this tool are shown in Table 7. Of the 24 metrics chosen, 20 were found to describe a significant amount of
variation in the total faults in the Space Shuttle PASS historical database for discrepancy reports (DRs).
Four of the metrics designed to measure the real-time quality of the software did not contribute significantly
to the understanding of software faults in the currently available HAL/S source code. There is reason to
believe that they might play a stronger role in the measurement of earlier systems. For this reason, the
following four real-time metrics are calculated by the HALMet software measurement tool, but are
removed from further analysis: Signals, Terms, SigA, and TermA. For information on installation and
operation of the tool, see Appendixes A and B.
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Table 7. Metrics and Their Definitions
772
Strut
LOC
Comm
Nodes
Edges
Paths
Cycles
MaxP
AveP
DataStruc
Sets
Resets
Signals
Cans
Terms
SetA
ResA
SigA
CanA
TermA
Halstead's count of the number of unique operators
Halstead's count of the number of unique operands
Halstead's count of the total number of operators
Halstead's count of the total number of operands
Count of total non-commented source statements
Count of the total number of non-commented lines of code
Count of the total number of commented source statements
Number of nodes in the control flow graph
Number of edges in the control flow graph
Number of distinct paths through the control flow graph
Count of the number of cycles in the control flow graph
Total arc length of the maximum path through a control flow graph
Average path length of the total paths in a control flow graph
Measure of data structure complexity
Number of SET statements in a program module
Number of RE SET statements in a program module
Number of SIGNAL statements in a program module
Number of CANCEL statements in a program module
Number of TERMINATE statements in a program module
Largest numlser of arguments in any one SET statement
Largest number of arguments in any one RESET statement
Largest number of arguments in any one SIGNAL statement
Largest number of arguments in any one CANCEL statement
Largest number of arguments in any one TERM-INATE statement
System Baselining
The measurement of an evolving software system through the shifting sands of time is not an easy task.
Perhaps one of the most difficult issues relates to the establishment of a baseline against which the evolving
systems may be compared. This problem is very similar to that encountered by the surveying profession.
If we were to buy a piece of property, there are certain physical attributes that we would like to know about
that property. First, how big is the property? What is its physical shape? Where is it? What is its
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physicalelevation?Whatabouthephysicaltopologyof theproperty?In thisexample,thefirsttwo
questionsmaybeansweredwithatransitandameasuringtapeatthesite.Toanswerthequestionsasto
thelocationortheelevationof theproperty,wemusthavesomethingmore,sincewecannotmakethese
determinationsfromthesitealone.Wewill havetoseekoutabenchmark.Thebenchmarkrepresentsa
surveymarkerthatrepresentsapointin alargerstandardgridwhereineachpointisclearlyrelatedtoevery
otherpointin thegridbothin termsof distanceandelevation.Thisbenchmarkmaybesomedistancefrom
ourproperty.Tocontinuethisanalogy,to measurethetopologyof theproperty,wemustfirst establisha
fixedpointorbaselineontheproperty.Thedistanceandtheelevationof everyotherpointontheproperty
maythenbeestablishedinrelationtothefixedbaseline.Interestinglyenough,wecanpickanyotherpoint
ontheproperty,establishanewbaseline,andgetexactlythesametopologyfortheproperty.Theproperty
doesnotchange.Onlyourperspectivechanges.
Baselining s System
With all of this in mind, we find that the software measurement process is very much the same as the
survey process. We wish to understand the individual elements of the whole system in relation to each
other. We also wish to understand just how a system has evolved over time. It is very difficult to use raw
complexity metrics for either of these purposes. The dilemma confronted by those who wish to use
measurement of evolving software systems may be seen in Table 8. In this table we see two program
modules named A and B. We have two measurements on each of these two modules: lines of code, LOC,
and cyclomatic complexity, V(g). Measurements have been taken at times T 1 and T2. First, let us look at
the two modules A and B at time T1. Is module A more complex than B? Now, let us look at how the
system containing modules A and B has changed from time T1 to time T2. Is the system more complex at
time T2 than TI? Clearly, the total number of lines of code has dropped by 10 from T1 to T2. But, the
total cyclomatic complexity has risen from 35 to 37.
Table 8. A Measurement Example
Time 1 Time 2
Metric Module A Module B Module A Module B
LOC 200 250 210 230
V(g) 20 15 19 18
The whole notion of establishing a baseline system will allow us to begin to answer the questions raised in
the dilemma created by the data represented in Table 8. The first thing that we must do is to identify
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commonsourcesof variationamongthemetrics.Wewill useprincipalcomponentsanalysistocreateaset
of orthogonalmeasuresforthesoftwaremodules,allof whichwill bedefinedonthesamescale.From
thesecommondomainmetrics,wethenhavetheoptionof computingrelativecomplexityvaluesforeachof
theprogrammodules.Thiswill reducethedimensionalityofthecomplexityproblemtoonesinglemeasure
for eachprogram.
Whenanumberof successivesystembuilds(OIs)areto bemeasured,wewill chooseoneof thesystemsas
abaselinesystem.All otherswill bemeasuredin relationtothechosensystem.Thisisexactlyanalogous
totheselectionof anarbitrarypointorapieceofpropertytobeginatopologicalsurvey.Sometimesit will
beusefultoselectheinitialsystembuildforthisbaseline.If weselecthissystem,thenthemeasurements
onallothersystemswill betakenin relationtotheinitialsystemconfiguration.
Data Transformation
Having established the need for a baselining approach to the analysis of a number of related systems, we
realize that for measurement purposes, it will be necessary to standardize all of the raw metrics so that
•th
they are on the same relative scale. For the t module, m/, on the jth build of the system, there will be a
data vector, x J =< J J Ji xit,x_2 .... ,xik >, of k raw complexity metrics. We can standardize each of the raw
_. x j .2)
J li-- 1
metrics by subtracting its mean, x(, and dividing by its standard deviation, _(, such that Z_ - 6/
represents the standardized value of the first raw metric for the i th module on the j,h build. The problem
with this method of standardizing is that it will erase the effect of trends in the data. For example, let us
assume that we were taking measurements on LOC and that the system we were measuring grew in this
measure over successive builds• If we were to standardize each system by its own mean LOC and its own
standard deviation, then the mean of this system would be zero. Thus, we will standardize the raw metrics
in relation to the baseline system such that the standardized metric vector for the i 'h module, m/, on the jth
X j =0
build would be wJi = _0 where,_° is a vector containing the means of the raw metrics for the
ffi
0
baseline system, and G_ is a vector of standard deviations of these raw metrics. Thus, for each system, we
may build an m × k data matrix, W j , that contains the standardized metric values relative to the baseline
system.
Using the standardized data matrix, W J, the orthogonal domain metrics for each of the systems will also
be developed in relation to the baseline system. Let T represent the k × o transformation matrix for the
computation of the domain metrics for the baseline system where o represents the number of orthogonal
complexity domains in the baseline data. The domain metrics for each of the remaining systems may then
be derived from T as follows: D J = WIT, where D j is an m × o matrix containing the baselined domain
metrics for the m program modules on the jth build. An example of the transformation matrix, T, can be
seen in Table 9.
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Table 9. Transformation Matrix for PASS Software
Variable
01
7?2
Stmt
LOC
Comm
Nodes
Edges
Paths
Cycles
MaxP
AveP
DataStruc
Sets
Resets
Cans
SetA
ResA
CanA
Eigenvalues
Domain 1 Domain2 Domain3 Domain4
0.069 0.031 -0.076 -0.056
0.086 -0.005 -0.168 -0.058
0.087 0.005 -0.218 -0.042
0.087 0.009 -0.221 -0.034
0.090 -0.010 -0.199 -0.034
0.089 0.037 -0.125 0.004
0.078 -0.013 -0.173 -0.048
0.085 -0.100 0.140 0.042
0.084 -0.111 0.145 0.043
0.066 -0.122 0.089 0.014
0.059 -0.154 0.259 0.104
0.083 -0.123 0.224 0.083
0.082 -0.121 0.234 0.089
0.071 -0.063 -0.119 -0.038
0.053 0.240 0.122 -0.134
0.043 0.246 0.185 -0.163
0.032 0.221 -0.011 0.511
0.048 0.209 0.133 -0.223
0.037 0.231 0.158 -0.266
0.028 0.219 -0.012 0.517
9.963 2.442 1.844 1.357
In the computation of the principal components for the baseline data, each of the resulting orthogonal
complexity domains has an associated eigenvalue, &i. We can now use these baselined eigenvalues to
compute the relative complexity of each of the system builds as follows: pJ = AD j where pJ is a vector
of relative complexity values for the m modules of the j,h build, and A is the vector of eigenvalues
associated with the o domains of D j .
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Insertions and Deletions
In light of all of these carefully planned transformations, there is still one significant problem that occurs in
evolving software systems with which we have not yet dealt. That is the fact that software modules come
and go. Stated another way, the cardinality of the module set will certainly vary over time. This is not a
problem when it comes to the computation of the individual module domain metrics and the computation of
module relative complexity. It is a problem when we are looking at the average system metrics. For
example, if the initial build of a system contained m program modules and the next system contains m + 1
modules, how should the average relative complexity of the new system be established? We can understand
this problem a little better if we consider a program module that was simply split into two modules from the
first to the second build. This being the case, the relative complexity of each of the two new modules will
be less than the relative complexity of the parent module. Thus, if we were to compute the average relative
complexity of the new system with the value of m + 1 as the normalizing value, then the apparent
complexity of the new system will have been reduced. However, because of the coupling complexity
introduced between the two new modules, the net system complexity will have risen. To this end, the
normalizing value for the computation of all averages will be the cardinality of the set of modules in the
baseline system.
By definition, the average relative complexity, p, of the baseline system will be
pl= 17 Z'P:: =50,
where N 1 is the cardinality of the set of program modules. As the system progresses through a series of
builds, system complexity will tend to rise. Thus, the system relative complexity of the k ,h version of a
system may be represented by a non-decreasing function of module relative complexity as follows:
¢ =
where V k represents an element from the configuration vector, Vk , described earlier. This change in the
overall relative complexity of the system over time is represented pictorially in Figure 8. This is an
example of the relative complexity of the most recent 20 software builds for the Space Shuttle PASS. For
this presentation, the baseline system is represented by system 0 on the X axis of this graph and, in this
case, corresponds to O123.01. All other systems are measured relative to this one. However, it is
important to keep in mind that while there may have been some very good reasons for choosing this
particular OI as the baseline, the user is free to choose any OI that is deemed appropriate for this purpose
as pertaining to the above discussion. One pattern that becomes obvious from this figure is that the
complexity of a system will continue to rise over the life of the software system. If we were to move the
baseline system back another 10 systems in time, the general upward trend of the complexity of the system
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would be sustained. The particular baseline for this figure was selected because of the change activity that
we had observed before and after this baseline build.
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Figure 8. Change in overall relative complexity of system.
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Principal Components Analysis/Relative Complexity Metric (PCA-RCM) Tool 2.0
The objective of the PCA-RCM data analysis tool is, first, to perform a PCA on the specified input file
containing raw metrics data and, second, to use the output of this analysis to calculate the RCM for the
observations in the original raw metrics data file. The process by which this is achieved, together with the
resultant RCM calculations, is dependent on the type of analysis desired. The requested analysis is
assumed to be either a baseline analysis or a build analysis as discussed in the previous sections. The type
of analysis to be performed along with the desired input and output files can be specified on the command
line.
One important fact to keep in mind concerning the applicability of this tool is that this tool in no way
requires the existence or prior use of the previously mentioned HALMet tool. Although the PCA-RCM
tool was designed to be used in conjunction with the HALMet tool, this dependence only exists in the sense
that the HALMet tool produces an output file that is formatted in such a way as to be directly suitable as
input to the PCA-RCM tool. In other words, the ability to use the PCA-RCM tool is completely
independent of the HALMet tool. The only requirement for proper operation of the PCA-RCM tool is that
the input raw metrics data file be properly formatted. The proper format consists of each line of the input
file being composed of a name field followed by any number of numeric fields. The number of fields of
each line is assumed to be the same as the number of fields occurring in the first line with the name field
being the first field of each line. The field separator is assumed to be 'white space' (spaces or tabs), while
a line feed is the character separating the lines.
Proper use of the PCA-RCM tool requires that the user not only be using a correctly formatted input file,
but also that he be aware of the operation of the tool as it pertains to the specific type of analysis chosen
via the '-base' or '-build' command-line option. Typically, the first analysis to be performed will be a
baseline analysis, which is specified as being the desired analysis by using the '-base' command-line option.
Under this type of analysis, a full PCA is performed, and certain relevant information that will be necessary
for subsequent analyses is stored for later use. This relevant information consists of the column means and
standard deviations, the eigenvalues, and the transformation matrix.
Having performed the initial baseline analysis, a number of subsequent analyses may be performed relative
to this initial baseline. At this point, the user would have already determined the relevancy of this baseline
as it pertains to the new data file that is being analyzed by, for example, its place in the sequential order of
the data files to be analyzed. By virtue of this premise, the previously stored baseline information is loaded
and used for the subsequent analysis as specified to be a build analysis using the '-build' command-line
option. This analysis, therefore, is not comprised of a full PCA, but rather by a transforming of the input
data file using the data generated by the previously executed baseline analysis.
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Thistransformationisachieved in three steps. First, the given input data file is standardized using the
stored means and standard deviations from the baseline analysis. Secondly, the resultant standardized data
file is transformed into the domain metrics using the baseline's transformation matrix. And, finally, the
RCM is calculated using the eigenvalues calculated by the PCA of the baseline data file. Through the use
of this three-step process, the build analysis produces results that are relative to the baseline and, therefore,
can be compared to the baseline.
For more information on the installation and operation of this tool, see Appendixes C and D.
Tool Installation and Operation Manuals
The tool package manuals for HALMet 3.1 and PCA-RCM 2.0 can be found in Appendixes A through D.
The installation manuals provide a detailed explanation of both the hardware and software requirements,
and they take the user through a step-by-step process for performing a full installation of all of the tools
available in each tools package. The operation manuals provide a detailed description of each of the tools
available in each package in terms of the following categories: tool name, description, synopsis, input,
output, compilation, files used, and see also. The operation manuals are purposely designed to coincide
with the manual page documents provided under the full Unix distribution. In this way, specific
information pertaining to the usage of the tools can be obtained on-line.
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Section IV
Functional Complexity and Test Efficiency
Introduction
A significant problem with modem software testing procedures is that the objectives of the test process are
not clearly specified and sometimes not clearly understood. If questioned, most software testers will
associate the testing process with a process of finding faults in programs. If this is the case, is the purpose
of testing to find all of the faults? Some of the faults? How will we know when to stop testing? An
implicit objective of the deterministic school of testing is to design some sort of a systematic and
deterministic test procedure that will guarantee sufficient test exposure for the random faults distributed
throughout a program. However, there is reason to believe that it is possible to identify measurable
program attributes such as complexity that can explain a large proportion of the variance observed in the
location of software faults in software modules. This being the case, it would only seem reasonable to look
for software faults in the complex code segments.
We have developed techniques that will serve as a filter for the code to identify regions of the code that are
most likely to contain faults. We must also come to accept the fact that some faults will always be present
in the code. The objective of the testing process is simply to find those faults that will have the greatest
impact on the safety/survivability of the code. Under this new view of the software testing process, the act
of testing may be thought of as conducting an experiment on the behavior of the code under typical
execution conditions. We will determine, a priori, exactly what we wish to learn about the code in the test
process and conduct the experiment until this stopping condition has been reached.
Faults are introduced in code by systematic errors committed by programmers. With this fact in mind we
have identified a set of measurable software attributes that are distinctly related to the conditions that lead
to faults. Indeed, these complexity metrics have been shown to be distinctly associated with software
faults. The main point is that, if we can identify those software attributes that are associated with faults,
we may use these data to identify regions of code of software currently under development and test that are
likely to contain faults.
One of the fundamental tenets of the statistical approach to software test is that it is possible to create fault
surrogates. While we cannot know the numbers and locations of faults, we can, over time, build models
based on observed relationships between faults and some other measurable software attributes. Software
faults and other measures of software quality can be known only at the point the software has finally been
retired from service. Only then can it be said that all of the relevant faults have been isolated and removed
from the software system. On the other hand, software complexity can be measured very early in the
software life cycle. Some of these measures are very good leading indicators of potential software faults.
The first step in the software testing process is to construct suitable surrogate measures for software faults.
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In the case of this study, a single measure, relative complexity, will be constructed to serve as such a
surrogate. In those program modules that have large values of this surrogate measure, there is reasonable
evidence to support the conclusion that the number of faults will also be large. If the code is made to
execute a significant proportion of time in modules of large relative complexity, then the potential exposure
to software faults will be great and, thus, the software will be exposed to these faults.
There are two distinct and separable issues now. First, it is one thing to have a software system that
contains faults. Second, it is quite another for the regions of code containing faults to be executed. If there
does not exist a set of input data that will drive a program into a region of code that is likely to contain
faults, then there will probably be few failures during the processing of this input set. If, on the other hand,
most every input data set will drive the code into the faulty code regions, then the software will prove quite
failure prone. In this current investigation we will examine the problem of executing the code segments that
contain faults for testing purposes. We will measure the execution of the suite of code modules that
constitute the whole program in terms of the total proportion of time that we must spend in each program
module. In this guise we will measure our exposure to potential program failures in terms of the degree of
exposure to potentially faulty program modules. Thus, we may come to establish a dynamic measure of
program complexity. In both of these cases, we will understand that our exposure to program faults is
directly proportional to the complexity of the code that we will execute. It is one thing for a program
module to be complex and thus be fault-prone; it is quite another for this module to be executed during a
nominal flight scenario. If a module is complex and therefore fault-prone but not likely to execute on a
nominal scenario then it will not be likely to contribute to the failure of the software system. The extent to
which a software module is actually executed in a particular scenario is described in the execution profile
of the system (c.f. Section II, Section VI).
The following empirical analysis is intended to be a proof of concept test. The two software systems that
will be compared in this study are OI23.10 and OI24.09. Technically, the results should have been
obtained from regression tests on precisely the same functions (tests) on two sequential builds (OIs).
However, because it was not possible to obtain data from the testing process with the PMIP processor
running, the test process will be emulated by the analysis of the two systems for which PMIP data were
available.
This section represents the results of the fourth project milestone for this fiscal year. Execution profile data
for PASS running on a number of different OPS provided the basis for the computation of functional
complexity. An assessment of the variability of the functional complexity of the system is presented. This
will show the range of functional behavior for PASS in which it is executing a spectrum of functionalities.
This is important in that the ultimate reliability modeling capability for PASS is dependent on the
measurement of the range of functional complexity that the system may generate as it executes a
representative suite of its possible functionalities. Profile data were on a test suite for O124.09 that
corresponds directly to the same test suite for OI23.10. These data were used to emulate a regression test
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of theO124.09todemonstrateheconceptof regressiontestefficiency.Thetestefficiencyof these
regression tests will then be reported. This will serve as a demonstration of the concept in which the
measurement process may be used to evaluate the effectiveness of a regression test. Using this
methodology, a software tester may evaluate just how effective a regression test is in identifying potential
faults that were introduced in changes to the program..
The fifth milestone of this project comprised a presentation entitled, "A Detailed Look at the HAL/S Metric
Analyzer." Subjects of the discussion included
- preparing an OI build for analysis
- preparing the HALMet analysis tool for operation
- using the HALMet analysis tool
- synopsis of principal components analysis
- preparing the PCA-RCM tool for operation
- using the PCA-RCM tool
The Measurement of Test Efficiency
The precise effects of changes to software modules can now be measured with the deltas in relative
complexity. The magnitude of the deltas in p also show the likelihood of the introduction of software
faults. That is, the larger the change in the value of the relative complexity of a module, the more likely
that it is to have newly introduced faults. From a statistical testing perspective, test effort should be
focused on those modules that are most likely to contain faults. Each program module that has been
modified, then, should be tested in proportion the number of anticipated faults that might have been
introduced into it.
Each program module is usually closely linked to a specific functionality. That is, as we exercise a
particular functionality in PASS a particular execution profile emerges for that functionality as can be seen
in Milestone V, Phase I. For each functionality, some modules have a high probability of being executed,
while others have a low probability. These execution profiles were characterized by the probability
distribution P= {pill < i <n}.
The initial phase of the efficient testing of changed code is to identify the functionalities that will exercise
the modules that have changed. Each of these functionalities so designated will have an associated test
suite designed to exercise that functionality. With this information, we can now describe the efficiency of a
test from a mathematical/statistical perspective.
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Let Apki = [pk _ p_-I I represent the absolute change (delta)in relative complexity p_ of module i from
release k-1 to release k. For subsequent calculations, let S k = AR_. Associated with any testj there will
be an execution profile P/ for that test. The efficiency 0 of the testj on release k is as follows:
8.i =
This concept of test efficiency permits the numerical evaluation of a test on the actual changes that have
been made to the software system. It is simply the expected value of the change in relative complexity from
one release to another under a particular test. If the value of 0 is large for a given test then the test will
have exercised the changed modules. If the set of/_s for a given release is low, then it is reasonable to
suppose that the changed modules have not been testing in proportion to the number of probable faults that
were introduced during the maintenance changes.
An Analysis of the Test Results
Data prepared for this analysis included matched tests from O123.10 and OI24.09. These data will be
useful to demonstrate the proof of concept of regression test efficiency. Normally this analysis would be
performed during the test process at all stages between successive or incremental builds. That is, we would
normally compute the changes in relative complexity from two successive builds such as O123.01 and
OI23.02. The whole purpose of the computation of the deltas between these sequential builds is to guide
the regression testing for the precise changes that have occurred between these two builds. The actual
functional complexities that are obtained using the O123.10 and O124.09 data are quite small in that the
tests for which PMIP data are available do not stress the execution of the changed modules as much as a
specifically designed regression test would do.
To begin the measurement process between the two builds of O123.10 and O124.09 we must have a
common baseline to compare the results of these two builds. The baseline that we have chosen to use is
one that was established for the Milestone III deliverable. This baseline was obtained from O123.01. We
will use the baseline transformation matrix established in that study as a transformation vehicle in the
current study so that the relative complexity values obtained in the current study may be related to previous
deliverables. Again, the choice of the baseline transformation matrix is arbitrary. We could just as well
have used a transformation matrix obtained from either O123.10 or O124.09.
The first step in the measurement process was to obtain the relative complexities for each of the high-level
program modules for each of O123.10 and O124.09 systems. Examples of module relative complexities for
each of the test program modules may be seen in Tables 10 and 11. These two tables list all program
modules that have changed from OI23.10 to OI24.09. For each program module that has changed, the
second column of the table shows the relative complexity value on O123.10 and the third column shows the
relative complexity for that same module on O124.09. The fourth column, labeled Deltas, shows the
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change(inabsolutevalue)inrelativecomplexitybetweenO123.10andO124.09.Thefinalcolumnshows
thenormalizedsignedpercentagechangefromOI23.10to OI24.09.Thenormalizingvalueforthis
computationwasarelativecomplexityof 50.Thus,theadjustedpercentagevaluefor lesscomplex
modulesarenotdominatedbyrelativelysmallchangestothosemodules.
Table 10. Deltas for All Changed Modules Ordered by Deltas
Module Name
GC1ORB (New Module)
GFDORB (New Module)
O123.10
Relative
Complexity
O124.09
Relative
Complexity
Deltas
48.59 48.59210
46.31 46.31330
RCDDCO
REXRMS
RHMHLT
GTBUPL
GCQORB
GFKGRT
GFFORB
SSMANTMG
60.09
55.68
53.66
65.31
67.34
69.11
60.64
62.00
53.23
51.15
58.05
68.99
70.95
72.71
64.08
64.82
6.86650
4.52859
4.38365
3.68124
3.60988
3.59790
3.43670
2.82124
Percentage
Change
-13.73%
-9.06%
8.77%
7.36%
7.22%
7.20%
6.87%
5.64%
SM2OPS 67.62 69.84 2.21875 4.44%
SM4OPS 67.72 69.94 2.21875 4.44%
S4ICLN 45.84 43.65 2.18963 -4.38%
S2ICLNUP 45.76 43.59 2.17747 -4.35 %
SSTHYDFL 54.20 55.84 1.64205 3.28%
SULUPLIN 77.89 79.45 1.56215 3.12%
RVMCON 58.26 59.36 1.09612 2.19%
DMPMMMSG 82.13 82.84 0.70931 1.42%
RFPPOS 43.90 44.54 0.64376 1.29%
ASLTMC 60.09 59.49 0.60365 -1.21%
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Table 10. Deltas for All Changed Modules Ordered by Deltas
Module Name O123.10
Relative
Complexity
O124.09
Relative
Complexity
Deltas Percentage
Change
PMQTEC 50.66 50.10 0.55701 - 1.11%
GAALIM 49.66 49.11 0.55491 - 1.11%
RDDDDI 48.27 48.81 0.53908 1.08%
GSCVEN 55.75 56.25 0.50540 1.01 %
VS6SSTPR 69.22 68.80 0.41792 -0.84%
RSCSIN 45.80 45.38 0.41338 -0.83%
GO2ORB 79.98 80.26 0.27552 0.55%
PMRSLR 48.59 48.34 0.25088 -0.50%
GKWRMS 44.92 45.15 0.23031 0.46%
GRVLAN 48.44 48.22 0.22178 -0.44%
GR2ORB 49.17 49.38 0.20773 0.42%
GWKORB 54.77 54.59 0.18458 -0.37%
GR4ORB 47.46 47.63 0.17662 0.35 %
GWDRMO 52.14 52.27 0.12848 0.26%
GO8ORB 69.42 69.54 0.12578 0.25 %
GSQASC 59.55 59.67 0.12161 0.24 %
PMWSLW 61.72 61.60 0.11984 -0.24%
VS5SSTPR 66.59 66.48 0.11039 -0.22%
GCUGCS 44.89 44.99 0.10064 0.20%
RPHCTF 53.42 53.52 0.09646 0.19%
GO3ENT 85.56 85.64 0.08295 0.17%
AIESIP 86.80 86.87 0.07066 0.14%
GKKORB 48.64 48.57 0.06896 -0.14%
DMIMCD 68.92 68.85 0.06855 -0.14%
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Table 10. Deltas for All Changed Modules Ordered by Deltas
Module Name
GC9ORB
AIBGPCLO
O123.10
Relative
Complexity
47.37
92.27
O124.09
Relative
Complexity
47.44
92.33
Deltas
0.06713
0,06610
Percentage
Change
0.13%
0.13%
DUPNSP 95.65 95.71 0.06160 0.12%
DMZLOG 43.58 43.52 0.05977 -0.12%
GEBADH 55.87 55.82 0.05043 -0.10%
RWPPHC 45.58 45.63 0.05034 0.10%
RBMHDW 44.08 44.12
VULMMINT 51.45 51.49
0.04606 0.09%
0.03883 0.08%
GECRDH 53.54 53.50 0.03580 -0.07%
DCD 15301 42.96 43.00 0.03576 0.07%
GSTETS 65.26 65.22
VM2BDYFL 58.51 58.54
54.61GSMMPS
RXYCIN
54.64
48.10
50.85
46.86
ROVKYB
57.00
48.08
50.82
46.88
56.99
0.03563
0.03262
0.03005
0.02665
0.02638
0.02277
-0.07%
0.07%
0.06%
GACLIM
GKMRMS 50.00 50.01
GC7ORB 49.74 49.76
GFATRA 49.32 49.34
SAMITEM 44.95 44.96
SSRREC 44.28 44.29
GFIGRT 53.32 53.31
DCDDOW 54.80 54.81
SPCPPC
0.05%
0.05%
-0.05%
0.01492 0.03%
0.01419 0.03%
0.01217 0.02%
0.01087 0.02%
0.01087
0.01008
0.00884
0.00884
0.02%
-0.02%
0.02%
0.02%
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Table 10. Deltas for All Changed Modules Ordered by Deltas
Module Name OI23.10
Relative
Complexity
O124.09
Relative
Complexity
Deltas Percentage
Change
SSCFUELC 49.48 49.49 0.00884 0.02%
SSNO2N2Q 45.50 45.51 0.00884 0.02%
DCDDG3 46.01 46.02 0.00883 0.02%
SO2CONC 44.62 44.63 0.00883 0.02%
SPSPSP 74.42 74.43 0.00883 0.02%
SSHHYD 46.65 46.66 0.00883 0.02%
DCD 14401 43.06 43.07 0.00825 0.02%
GH6ABR 48.43 48.44 0.00755 0.02%
ARAGPCSW 65.19 65.19 0.00681 0.01%
ARDCSBUS 63.48 63.48 0.00681 0.01%
SSAAPUFU 46.21 46.21 0.00681 0.01%
DCDDG2 46.08 46.09 0.00551 0.01%
GGTTAE 58.19 58.18 0.00401 -0.01%
GP2ORB 50.29 50.29 0.00187 0.00%
GMUHAN 51.60 51.60 0.00183 0.00%
GPW3AX 50.20 50.20 0.00064 0.00%
DCDDG 1 46.10 46.10 0.00059 0.00%
GRTFIX 49.98 49.98 0.00021 0.00%
Net Change +30.77%
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Table 11. Deltas for All Changed Modules Ordered by Percentage Change
Module Name OI23.10
Relative
Complexity
O124.09
Relative
Complexity
Deltas Percentage
Change
GC1ORB (New Module) 48.59 48.59210
GFDORB (New Module) 46.31 46.31330
RHMHLT 53.66 58.05 4.38365 8.77%
GTB UPL 65.31 68.99 3.68124 7.36%
GCQORB 67.34 70.95 3.60988 7.22%
GFKGRT 69.11 72.71 3.59790 7.20%
GFFORB 60.64 64.08 3.43670 6.87%
SSMANTMG 62.00 64.82 2.82124 5.64%
SM2OPS 67.62 69.84 2.21875 4.44%
SM4OPS 67.72 69.94 2.21875 4.44%
SSTHYDFL 54.20 55.84 1.64205 3.28%
SULUPLIN 77.89 79.45 1.56215 3.12%
RVMCON 58.26 59.36 1.09612 2.19%
DMPMMMSG 82.13 82.84 0.70931 1.42%
RFPPOS 43.90 44.54 0.64376 1.29%
RDDDDI 48.27 48.81 0.53908 1.08%
GSCVEN 55.75 56.25 0.50540 1.01%
GO2ORB 79.98 80.26 0.27552 0.55%
GKWRMS 44.92 45.15 0.23031 0.46%
GR2ORB 49.17 49.38 0.20773 0.42%
GR4ORB 47.46 47.63 0.17662 0.35 %
GWDRMO 52.14 52.27 0.12848 0.26%
GO8ORB 69.42 69.54 0.12578 0.25%
GSQASC 59.55 59.67 0.12161 0.24%
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Table 11. Deltas for All Changed Modules Ordered by Percentage Change
Module Name OI23.10
Relative
Complexity
OI24.09
Relative
Complexity
Deltas Percentage
Change
GCUGCS 44.89 44.99 0.10064 0.20%
RPHCTF 53.42 53.52 0.09646 0.19 %
GO3ENT 85.56 85.64 0.08295 0.17%
AIESIP 86.80 86.87 0.07066 0.14%
GC9ORB 47.37 47.44 0.06713 0.13 %
AIBGPCLO 92.27 92.33 0.06610 0.13 %
DUPNSP 95.65 95.71 0.06160 0.12%
RWPPHC 45.58 45.63 0.05034 0.10%
RBMHDW 44.08 44.12 0.04606 0.09%
VULMMINT 51.45 51.49 0.03883 0.08%
DCD 15301 42.96 43.00 0.03576 0.07%
VM2BDYFL 58.51 58.54 0.03262 0.07%
GSMMPS 54.61 54.64 0.03005 0.06%
RXYCIN 48.08 48.10 0.02665 0.05 %
ROVKYB 50.82 50.85 0.02638 0.05%
GKMRMS 50.00 50.01 0.01492 0.03%
GC7ORB 49.74 49.76 0.01419 0.03 %
GFATRA 49.32 49.34 0.01217 0.02%
SAMITEM 44.95 44.96 0.01087 0.02%
SSRREC 44.28 44.29 0.01087 0.02%
SSNO2N2Q 45.50 45.51 0.00884 0.02%
SSCFUELC 49.48 49.49 0.00884 0.02%
DCDDOW 54.80 54.81 0.00884 0.02%
SPCPPC 56.99 57.00 0.00884 0.02%
.l
56
Table 11. Deltas for All Changed Modules Ordered by Percentage Change
Module Name
SO2CONC
O123.10
Relative
Complexity
44.62
DCDDG3 46.01
SSHHYD 46.65
SPSPSP 74.42
DCD 14401 43.06
GH6ABR 48.43
SSAAPUFU 46.21
ARDCSBUS 63.48
ARAGPCSW 65.19
DCDDG2 46.08
GMUHAN 51.60
O124.09
Relative
Complexity
44.63
Deltas
0.00883
Percentage
Change
0.02%
46.02 0.00883 0.02%
46.66 0.00883 0.02%
74.43 0.00883 0.02%
43.07
48.44
46.21
0.00825 0.02%
0.00755 0.02%
0.00681 0.01%
63.48 0.00681 0.01%
65.19 0.00681 0.01%
46.09 0.00551 0.01%
51.60 0.00183 0.00%
0.00059 0.00%
0.00021 0.00%
0.00064
DCDDG 1 46.10 46.10
GRTFIX 49.98 49.98
GPW3AX 50.20 50.20
GP2ORB
GGTTAE
GFIGRT
GACLIM
GSTETS
0.00%
50.29 50.29 0.00187 0.00%
58.19 58.18 0.00401 -0.01%
53.32 53.31 0.01008 -0.02%
46.88 46.86 0.02277 -0.05%
65.26 65.22 0.03563 -0.07%
53.54GECRDH 53.50 0.03580 -0.07%
GEBADH 55.87 55.82 0.05043 -0.10%
DMZLOG 43.58 43.52 0.05977 -0.12%
DMIMCD 68.92 68.85 0.06855 -0.14 %
GKKORB 48.64 48.57 0.06896 -0.14%
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Table 11. Deltas for All Changed Modules Ordered by Percentage Change
Module Name O123.10 OI24.09 Deltas Percentage
VS5SSTPR
PMWSLW
GWKORB
GRVLAN
PMRSLR
RSCSIN
VS6SSTPR
GAALIM
PMQTEC
ASLTMC
Relative
Complexity
Relative
Complexity
Change
S2ICLNUP 43.59 2.17747 -4.35%
S4ICLN 45.84 43.65 2.18963 -4.38 %
REXRMS 55.68 51.15 4.52859 -9.06%
RCDDCO 60.09 53.23 6.86650 - 13.73%
66.59 66.48 0.11039 -0.22%
61.72 61.60 0.11984 -0.24%
54.77 54.59 0.18458 -0.37%
48.44 48.22 0.22178 -0.44%
48.59 48.34 0.25088 -0.50%
45.80 45.38 0.41338 -0.83%
69.22 68.80 0.41792 -0.84%
49.66 49.11 0.55491 -1.11%
50.66 50.10 0.55701 -1.11%
60.09 59.49 0.60365 -1.21%
45.76
Tables 10 and 11 contain exactly the same data. The data in Table 10 are ordered by the absolute change
(Deltas) made to individual program modules. The data in Table 11 are ordered by the normalized
percentage change. For both Table 10 and Table 11, there are two modules that stand out: the first two
modules in each of these tables. These two modules were added in the builds between O123.10 and
O124.09. The net change in normalized percentage between O123.10 and O124.09 was 30.77%. The
precise nature of the changes that have occurred may be seen in the Section HI report.
From the standpoint of changes in relative complexity, the first 20 program modules in Table 10 account
for the majority of total change to system complexity. In accordance with the relationship between the fault
surrogate, relative complexity, and faults, it would be reasonable to suppose that these modules are the
ones into which new faults had the greatest likelihood of being introduced. These, then, are the modules
that should receive the greatest attention in subsequent testing effort.
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ThePMIPprocessorwill permitustoestimatethetotaltimespentineachprogrammodulewhilethePMIP
processorisrunning.Fromthesetimeestimates,wemaythenconstructtheexecution profile for each test.
We have data for seven such tests that were run on both OI23.10 and OI24.09. These execution profiles
and their associated tests are presented in Tables 12-18. The column labeled Execution Profile in each of
these tables represents the proportion that each module received during the execution of the test represented
by the table. The values in the execution profile column do not add up to 100%. We have tabled only
those profile values for those program modules that have non-zero delta values from Table 10.
Again, the test data we were working with did not represent actual regression tests of the code that had
changed but were used for the purposes of discussion. Had these tests actually been constructed to test for
the changes that had been made, the tests would have been demonstrably inadequate. In each of the Tables
12-18, the modules that were in our top 20 list for changes are marked with asterisks. In Table 12, only
four of these modules made the test. In Tables 13, 14, 15, 17, and 18, none of the modules in the top 20
list are represented here. Only the tests represented by Tables 12, 16, and 18 had any modules from the top
20 list. Clearly, these sample tests are seen to be inadequate based on their inability to execute the modules
in which most of the changes had occurred.
In each of the Tables 12-18 there are three numerical data columns for each module. The contents of the
.th .th
first column is execution profilep/ for the t module on the j test. The second column is the absolute
.th
change in relative complexity _ of the t module from O123.10 to O124.09. The third column in each of
the tables, labeled Test Efficiency, is the product of the previous two. From the standpoint of the formal
def'mition of test efficiency, the entries in this column represent the test efficiencies 0ij for each program
module0ij = t_p_ wherej is the number of the test.
The maximum possible value of test efficiency is 6.87 if we discount the fact that two new modules were
added whose delta values are the modules themselves. If each test were to assign all of its activity to the
module, RCDDCO, that had the highest change, then we would spend 100% of our time executing this
module to the exclusion of all others. Hence, the upper bound on test efficiency is equal to the value of the
largest delta. This is not necessarily the best test, however. In the trade-off between optimality and
fairness, all modules should receive test effort in proportion to the degree of change within the module.
This being the case, the maximum fair value for test efficiency would be 1.173 (again, discounting the new
modules).
At the bottom of each of the Tables 12-18 there are two values recorded. The first of these is labeled
Total. This value represents the sum of the test efficiency column. It represents the test efficiency of each
of the tests for changes that have been made to all program modules. In order to scale these number so that
they might be more readily interpreted, the last row in each table shows the test efficiency as a percentage
of the maximum possible value of 6.87. As we look at each table, we can see that the maximum test
efficiency was achieved by the test reported in Table 16. In this case the value is close to 5% of the
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maximum.Thoughthisis thelargestof all of the test efficiencies, it is still not very impressive if we were
to attempt to assert that this test was a good one. At the other extreme, at the low end, is the test
represented by the data in Table 14. Here the test efficiency is the lowest at 0.04%.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The concept behind the computation of test efficiency is that it is possible to evaluate or measure test
outcomes in terms of the potential each test has for exposing the potential faults that have been introduced
through changes to the code. As this current project has progressed, we have gradually built a reasonable
surrogate for software faults. This surrogate is relative complexity. We have systematically selected for
incorporation into the computation of relative complexity those measures that varied directly with software
faults. Each of the selected measures explained a significant proportion of variation in the corresponding
measure of software faults. In this context, the larger the value of relative complexity, the greater the
number of explained or potential faults that a module might have.
As a direct result of an effective test process, the faults from a particular set of code may be found and
removed. Ultimately, it is conceivable that a large number of the residual faults in a program may be
removed. Problems arise when this code is disturbed as additions and deletions are made to the code. The
purpose of the current investigation was to develop and demonstrate a measure that could be applied to the
regression testing process that would evaluate the overall effectiveness of this process. Thus the notion of
test efficiency was developed.
This current study can only demonstrate the possibilities for the use of this new measure. For test
efficiency to be fully validated, the data must be obtained directly from the test process at its inception at
each new build of PASS. It would be a worthwhile investigation for the PMIP processor to be enabled for
future testing of new builds for PASS. These data, in conjunction with the existing relative complexity,
should be employed as evaluative criteria for the effectiveness of the testing process. In addition, changes
that are made to individual program modules as a result of faults uncovered during the test and inspection
process should be noted for the full validation of the test efficiency concept. This study represents the first
step in the process of the measurement of test efficiency for changed code.
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Table 12. Tests ORBCK23Z-249
Module Execution Profile Deltas
G FFORB* 0.06914952 3.43670
GCOORB * 0.03118250 3.60988
Test Efficiency
0.23764616
0.11256508
GR2ORB 0.01376751 0.20773 0.00285992
GAALIM 0.00453390 0.55491 0.0025 ]591
0.01304194GR4ORB 0.17662
AIESIP 0.03074037 0.07066
ASLTMC * 0.00140665 0.60365
GWKORB 0.00298145 0.18458
DMIMCD 0.00659055 0.06855
DCDDOW 0.02600489 0.00884
GC9ORB 0.00299455 0.06713
GC7ORB 0.01054558 0.01419
DCDDG2 0.01655312 0.00551
GP2ORB 0.02?12692 0.00187
0.00230347
0.00217211
0.00084912
0.00055032
0.00045178
0.00022988
0.00020102
0.00014964
9.1208E-05
5.0727E-05
ARAGPC 0.00260071 0.00681 1.7711E-05
GTB UPL * 0.00000166 3.68124 6.1109E-06
DMZLOG 0.00006493 0.05977 3.8809E-06
GO2ORB 0.00000870 0.27552 2.3970E-06
GRTFIX 0.00417561 0.00021 8.7688E-07
DUPNSP 0.00000992 0.06160 6.1107E-07
GKKORB 0.00000227 0.06896 1.5654E-07
Total 0.3626681
% of Maximum 5.28%
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Table 13. Tests DEOCK23Z-249
Module
AIESIP
Execution Profile
0.03759479
Deltas
0.07066
Test Efficiency
0.00265645
GSCVEN 0.00130921 0.50540 0.00066167
DMIMCD 0.00814676 0.06855 0.00055846
DCDDOW 0.03226015 0.00884 0.00028518
DCDDG3 0.02656619 0.00883 0.00023458
GACLIM 0.00191361 0.02277 4.3573E-05
ARAGPC 0.00299542 0.00681 2.0399E-05
GPW3AX 0.01719282 0.00064 1.1003E-05
GRTFIX 0.00985202 0.00021 2.0689E-06
DMZLOG 0.00001143 0.05977 6.8317E-07
DUPNSP 0.00001048 0.06160 6.4557E-07
GO3ENT 0.00000231 0.08295 1.9161E-07
Total 0.00447491
% of Maximum 0.07%
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Table 14. Tests ENOMK23Z-249
Module
AIESIP
GSCVEN
DMIMCD
Execution Profile
0.02399549
0.00101414
0.00540574
Deltas
0.07066
0.50540
0.06855
Test Efficiency
0.00169552
0.00051255
0.00037056
DCDDOW 0.02119384 0.00884 0.00018735
DC DDG3 0.01741212 0.00883 0.00015375
GRVLAN 0.00035325 0.22178 7.8344E-05
GACLIM 0.00123505 0.02277
ARAG PC 0.00198728 0.00681
GGTTAE 0.00103280
GRTFIX 0.00674501
DMZLOG 0.00000633
GO3ENT 0.00000157
0.00401
0.00021
2.8122E-05
1.3533E-05
4.1415E-06
1.4165E-06
0.00016687GPW3AX
Total
0.05977 3.7834E-07
0.08295 1.3023E-07
0.00064 1.0680E-07
0.00304591
% of Maximum 0.04%
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Table 15. Teats RTLSK23Z-249
Module Execution Profile Deltas Test Efficiency
GFKG RT 0.00339348 3.59790 0.01220940
AIESl P 0.02507115 0.07066 0.00177153
GCUGCS 0.01017962 0.10064 0.00102448
DMIMCD 0.00564324 0.06855 0.00038684
DC DDOW 0.02234324 0.00884 0.00019751
GSQASC 0.00145211 0.12161 0.00017659
0.01724639 0.01008 0.00017384GFIGRT
GRVLAN 0.00060135 0.22178 0.00013337
GACLIM 0.00112650 0.02277 2.5650E-05
ARAG PC 0.00207811 0.00681
GSMMPS
DCDDG1
GSTETS
1.4152E-05
0.00040180 0.03005 1.2074E-05
0.01689900 0.00059 9.9704E-06
0.00024204 0.03563 8.6239E-06
GRTFIX 0.00549054 0.00021 1.1530E-06
DMZLOG 0.00000819 0.05977 4.8952E-07
GECRDH 0.00000595 0.03580 2.1301E-07
GPW3AX 0.00019781 0.00064
GEBADH
Total
% of Maximum
0.00000234 0.05043
1.2660E-07
1.1801E-07
0.01614614
0.24%
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Table 16. Tests ORB2K23Z-249
Module Execution Profile Deltas
3.43670
Test Efficiency
GFFORB * 0.06390412 0.21961929
GCQORB * 0.03615104 3.60988 0.13050092
GFI2ORB 0.01594873 0.20773 0.00331303
GAALIM 0.00513233 0.55491
GR4ORB 0.01510796 0.17662
AIESIP 0.03611892 0.07066
ASLTMC * 0.00163716 0.60365
GWKORB 0.00348506 0.18458
DMIMCD 0.00769291 0.06855
DCDDOW 0.03013646 0.00884
0.01247349
0.03122655
GC7ORB 0.01419
0.00187GP2ORB
ARAGPC 0.00301628 0.00681
GC9ORB 0.00029623 0.06713
DMZLOG 0.00018258 0.05977
GO8ORB 0.00002257 O. 12578
GRTFIX
Total
0.000210.00484038
0.00284798
0.00266837
0.00255216
0.00098827
0.00064327
0.00052735
0.00026641
0.00017700
5.8394E-05
2.0541E-05
1.9886E-05
1.0913E-05
2.8389E-06
1.0165E-06
0.36421763
% of Maximum 5.30%
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Table 17. Tests VUG9K23Z-249
Module
AIESIP
Execution Profile
0.08062626
Deltas
0.07066
Test Efficiency
0.00569705
DMIMCD 0.01840358 0.06855 0.00126157
DCDDOW 0.07095703 0.00884 0.00062726
ARAGPC 0.00707823 0.00681 4.8203E-05
0.00039032DMZLOG
Total
0.05977
% of Maximum
2.3329E-05
0.00765741
0.11%
Table 18. Tests VUP9K23Z-249
Test #8 (P9)
Module Execution Profile Deltas Test Efficiency
DMPMMM 0.05050691 0.70931 0.03582506
AIESIP 0.15213673 0.07066 0.01074998
ASLTMC* 0.00?70360 0.60365 0.00465028
DMIMCD 0.03464441 0.06855 0.0023748?
DCDDOW 0.13331710 0.00884 0.00117852
ARAGPC 0.01323108 0.00681 9.011ME-05
DMZLOG 0.00067702 0.0597? 4.1M65E-05
Total 0.05490928
%ofMaximum 0.80%
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Section V
Severity I Software Faults Analysis
Introduction
In an attempt to characterize the internal nature of computer programs, many measures of software
attributes have been developed and investigated. These software metrics represent quantitative descriptions
of program attributes. Some of these metrics have been shown to be related, somehow, to quantitative
measures of program quality. Software metrics can be obtained relatively early in the software life-cycle.
Measures of software quality, on the other hand, are generally developed over a longer time. A program of
any size must be run several years for the latent faults in it to be found. Thus, if we were to use the
number of program faults as a software quality measure, this information could probably be obtained only
after the program had reached obsolescence. Historical data from past program development and
maintenance scenarios may be used to develop predictive models. In this case, metric data that were
obtained early in the development process can be incorporated into a predictive model with a criterion
variable related to a measure of software quality obtained over time.
The foundations for the predictive model development based on software complexity metrics are clear.
There is a relationship between measures of software complexity and errors during the program
development and operational phases. However, there are no viable models at present that reflect program
complexity and potentials for program complexity in the prediction of error phenomena. There is a clear
intuitive basis for believing that complex programs have more errors in them than simple programs. There
is reasonable evidence to support the conclusion that computer software complexity metric models may be
integrated with software quality models.
By way of clarification of the intent of this study, it will be necessary to distinguish between the two terms,
error and fault. An error is a human action that results in a software product that contains a fault. As a
consequence of one or more failures of a program (i.e., events in which a system or system component does
not perform a required function within specific limits), a fault will be discovered and a change made to the
program segment.
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ThesoftwarecomplexitymetricsnowcollectedbytheHAIdSmetricanalyzer,HALMet,havebeenshown
tobecloselyrelatedtothedistributionof faultsinprogrammodules.Manyresearchershaveshownthatit
ispossibletodevelopapredictiverelationshipbetweencomplexitymetricsandfaults.Weareinterested,
then,ininvestigatingtherelationshipbetweenthenumbersof faults(changes)inprogramsandthe
particularsoftwaremetricsthatmaybeusedtoclassifyprogramsto groupsof similarfault(change)
characteristics.In particular,wearemostinterestedin theabilityof themetricstopredictheoccurenceof
particulartypesof faultsinsoftwaremodules.Notall faultsareof equalinteresttousin thisinvestigation.
Softwarefaultsin theSpaceShuttlePASSenvironmentareclassifiedintothreeseveritylevels.A
Severity1faultwill resultinthelossof theshuttleanditscrew.Itseffectsarepotentiallycatastrophic.A
Severity2faultwill likelyresultinanabortconditionandcauseaflightto bescrubbed.A Severity 3 fault
may, in fact, go totally unnoticed to the flight crew or ground controllers.
The state of the art in the use of complexity metrics as leading indicators of program quality is not good.
In current practice, many complexity metrics have not been validated; we are not sure just what they are
measuring. Even the collection of trouble reports for program is subject to great variability, even within a
single development group. We have investigated the potential use of multivariate regression techniques to
use complexity metrics as predictors of program quality. The results of this work suggest that metrics do
have great potential as predictors of program quality. However, in the short term, we believe that other
predictive techniques might yield better results than the direct prediction of measures of program quality.
A major problem in the application of multiple regression techniques for the prediction of numbers of faults
in programs, for example, is that the distribution of faults is heavily skewed in favor of programs that have
no faults or a small number of faults. This is so because the majority of program modules in a software
system will typically exhibit either no faults or very few faults during the latter stages of the software life-
cycle.
A predictive technique that does show promise for use in the circumstance of noisy and certainly non-
normally distributed data is that of discriminant analysis. In contrast to regression modeling techniques,
discriminant analysis will not be used to estimate the number of potential faults in program module, a
somewhat tenuous proposition given the nature of the current data collection processes. Rather,
discriminant analysis will be used to assign program modules to groups of modules of similar
characteristics. In this investigation we will use this technique to develop assignment models that will use
complexity information provided by the HALMet tool to assign programs into one of two mutually
exclusive groups. The model for the first group will be derived from the complexity characteristics of
programs that have been found to contain no faults. An alternate model will be developed for programs
observed to have had at least one Severity 1 fault. The overall objective of this procedure is to use past
development metric and quality data to develop a model and then use this model to assign new program
modules under development and those that have received major changes to whichever group its metric
profile most closely matches. From this basic model we could then identify a program or a program
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modulethathadacomplexityprofilethatwouldcauseit tobeassociatedwithahigh-severityfaultgroup.
Similarly,themodelmightassignamoduletoagroupcharacterizedbynofaults.Thespecificutilityof
thisapproachisthatit permitslimitedtestingresourcestobefocusedonthemoduleswhosecomplexity
characteristicshaveledto problemsinpastdevelopmentwork.
Theresearcheffortforthisdeliverablefocusedonthefeasibilityof theconstructionof astatisticalsoftware
filter toaidin theidentificationof thoseregionsof theonboardflightsoftwarethataremostproneto
Severity1failures.In thisphase,thesoftwarefaults(DRs)will beclassifiedastotheirseveritylevel1,2,
or3. A discriminantmodelbasedonorthogonalsoftwaremetricswasemployedtotesthehypothesisasto
whetherit ispossibleto uniquelycharacterizethesoftwareattributesthatareassociatedwithsoftware
faultsof Severity1. If it ispossibletoidentifysuchattributes,thenasoftwaretoolwill beimplementedfor
theHAL/Slanguageusingthediscriminantfunctionto examinexistingsoftwaremodulesandfuture
softwaremodulesforthoseregionsthataremostlikelytocontainSeverity1faults.Theprimedeliverable
atthisstage(MilestoneVI) isthereportdocumentingthestatisticalanalysis.
Modeling Methodology
The use of the discriminant analysis technique in software engineering is certainly not new or novel. It is
our intention to explore the viability of the technique as a tool for classifying program modules as to their
potential quality based on the complexity measures of the programs. What is novel in our approach to the
problem is the fact that the discriminant model will contain a deliberate distortion to classify program
modules into extreme groups: those containing few faults and those containing many faults.
The statistical technique of discriminant analysis is basically a classification procedure. The underlying
principle of the technique is that an operational hypothesis is formulated that there exists an a priori
classification of multivariate observations into two or more groups or sets of observations. Further, the
membership in one of these supposed groups is mutually exclusive. A criterion variable will be used for
this group assignment. Thus, a program module, for example, might be classified with a code of 1 if it has
been found to have one or more Severity 1 faults or with a code of 2 if it has no fault recorded.
In the application of discriminant analysis in this study, uncorrelated measures of program complexity
(domain metrics) will be used as independent variables in an attempt to classify programs into a group
whose programs contain relatively few faults or to a group whose programs contain a relatively large
number of faults. These metric variables will serve as discriminating variables that measure the
characteristics on which the two groups of programs (those with faults and those without) are expected to
differ. The traditional discriminant analysis proceeds by forming (for the two-group problem) two linear
combinations of discriminating variables. These discriminant functions are employed to produce
discriminant scores for individual observations. The presumption here is that the scores within a particular
group will be fairly similar.
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A generalproblemarisesintheuseof complexitymetricdatainstatisticalprocedures.Manyof the
underlyingstatisticalassumptionscannotbemet.Toconstructasimplelineardiscriminantfunctionthere
mustbehomogeneityofthewithin groups covariance matrices. That is, the assumption is made for this
type of analysis that all observations represent a sample drawn from the same population. When
complexity metric data are to be employed as predictors of quality, this criterion seldom can be met. In the
presence of heterogeneous within groups covariance matrices, where it is obvious that the measures in the
several groups are drawn from differing distributions, an alternate procedure must be used. In this case the
discriminant technique called logistic discrimination will be used. This technique will compute the
posterior probabilities of group membership from the prior probabilities of group membership, the group
means, and a pooled covariance matrix.
In the case of heterogeneous within group covariance matrices, the linear discriminant function is not
constructed. Rather, an estimate of the posterior probability of group membership is constructed using the
logistic discriminant procedure. For the two-group case, the posterior probability of an observation x
belonging to one of two groups is given by
2
e
where
D2x = (x- Ycj)r_(x - _j)
is the generalized squared distance from the observation represented by the vector x to the group j
represented by its mean, ,_j , and E is the pooled covariance matrix. In the case of two groups the values
of i andj are simply 1 and 2.
The focus of this investigation is on the application of discriminant analysis to explore the nature of the
relationship between measures of software complexity and those of software quality. The ability to develop
predictive models for this relationship is desirable for a number of reasons. Given the viability of the
classifications models and the fact that the measures of program complexity may be obtained early in the
software development process, program modules most likely to contain faults may be identified as they are
prepared. To the extent that a def'mitive relationship between the software metrics and an assessment of
known faults can be established, these metrics will serve as leading indicators of program reliability. Also,
program modules that will later prove difficult to maintain may also be identified.
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The Discriminant Analysis of PASS
The overall objective of this study is to explore the possibilities for developing a useful discriminant
procedure that will permit the identification of those program modules most prone to faults or changes. As
was mentioned earlier, the present state of the art in software measurement is not very precise. As a result
it is probably not possible to develop precise predictive models using the usual regression techniques. As
an intermediate step in the refinement of predictive techniques, however, it would be useful if a model could
be developed that would serve to identify those program modules most likely to require changes. If this
were possible, the limited resources of the testing and maintenance processes could be focused on the
modules most likely to cause problems. Discriminant analysis may be used effectively to solve this type
problem.
There are two distinct aspects of the creation of a viable discriminant analysis model. First, the
discriminant model must be able to perform the classification function with relatively little ambiguity.
Second, the model must be able to classify future observations equally successfully. To this end, the 572
high-level program modules were split into three groups. The f'trst group of 23 program modules contained
those that had demonstrated at least one Severity 1 fault. The second group were those containing faults of
Severity 2 and Severity 3. The third group was one in which no DRs were recorded. Normally, the
criterion variable, DRs, would be used to assign the observations to two or three mutually exclusive
groups. In this case, three distinct groups of programs were established based on the DRs.
At this point, the members of Group 2 were discarded, and were not used in the development of the
discriminant model. The discriminant analysis was performed only on Groups 1 and 3. In that the
remaining modules in Group 3 contained 190 program modules, these data would clearly dominate any
discriminant function over the 23 observations in Group 1. Thus, a random sample of 67 program modules
were drawn from the original set for a total of 90 observations for the discriminant model. This, of course,
created a deliberate distortion in the data and the subsequent model that was developed using these data.
The objective was to create a model that would, in a sense, magnify the differences between the set of
program modules whose characteristics resulted in Severity 1 faults and the characteristics of the programs
that had none. It is the stated purpose of this process to develop a methodology that will serve as a filter
for the identification of the program modules most likely to cause Severity 1 failures after they are placed
in service.
The basic discriminant analysis of variance that resulted is shown below in Table 19. All of the set of 18
metrics is seen to contribute to the formulation of the resulting model. The Wilks' Lambda for this analysis
was 0.262, which was significant (Pr < 0.01). This means that the resulting model was able to discriminate
between the set of modules in Group 1 from those in Group 3. Another way of stating this is that the
centroids of the two groups are distinctly separated. This means that the set of working metrics that we
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haveidentifiedfor our measurement purposes are tools that may be used to identify models that also have
the potential to contain Severity 1 problems.
Table 19. Discriminant ANOVA
Variable
Etal
STD
10.12
Total
STD
8.75
Pooled
STD
7.27
Between
R-Squared
0.260
Pr>F
0.0001
Eta2 95.87 70.99 91.24 0.457 0.0001
N1 749.83 567.69 694.09 0.433 0.0001
N2 375.82 287.81 342.56 0.420 0.0001
Stmts 181.01 129.38 179.06 0.494 0.0001
Loc 283.60 202.24 281.22 0.497 0.0001
Comments 231.57 147.10 252.47 0.601 0.0001
Nodes 84.98 62.77 81.11 0.460 0.0001
Edges
Paths
118.77
19426.00 15265.00
88.12 112.75
17048.00
0.455 0.0001
0.389 0.0001
2.23 0.077 0.0081
61.33 0.282 0.0001
56.49 0.256 0.0001
55.26 0.286 0.0001
0.42 0.095 0.0031
0.29 0.035 0.0737
0.18 0.245 0.0001
0.07 0.059 0.0202
Cycles 5.72 5.53
Maxp 82.07 69.92
Avgp 79.36
Ds 73.38
Sets 0.98
Rests 1.10
Maxsear 0.26
Maxrear 0.20
68.83
62.32
0.94
1.09
0.23
0.20
The basic discriminant function that emerged from this analysis is presented in Table 20. There are two
coefficient structures in this table. The first column of the table lists each of the metric variables in the
model. The second column is the Class 1 column. It contains the coefficients for the assignment
probability to the first group. This is the group containing as its members those program modules that
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havehadSeverity1DRsrecordedagainstthem.ThesecondatacolumnlabeledClass2will assignto
eachobservationtheprobabilityofgroupmembershiptotheclassofprogrammodulesthatdonotcontain
anyDRsagainstthem.
Table 20. The Discriminant Model
Variable
Constant
CLASS
1
-12.05718
2
-3.23276
Eta 1 0.35150 0.43050
Eta2 -0.00244 -0.02333
N1 -0.04590 -0.00355
N2 0.05778 0.00381
Stmts 0.04740 -0.00404
Loc 0.01231 0.00642
Comments 0.02016 -0.00144
Nodes 0.09366 0.17984
Edges 0.05824 -0.0904 1
Paths -0.00013 -0.00003
Cycles 1.06585 0.49148
Maxp 0.22921 -0.17148
Avgp -0.49036 0.10130
Ds 0.01167 0.00678
Sets 6.01484 -0.17031
Resets -4.96337 -0.58320
Max sear -3.29532 1.32406
Maxrear 10.62562 -1.04622
The purpose of discriminant analysis, at this stage, is to assign a probability of group membership to each
of the program modules. The program module will then be assigned to the group for which it has the
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greatestprobabilityof membership.Forthepurposesof presentationi thesetables,thereareonlytwo
groups,labeledasClass1andClass2. Class1isthegroupwithSeverity1DRs,whereasClass2isthe
groupwithnoDRs.Theresultsof theassignmentofthediscriminantmodeltoclassesi shownin
Table 21 below.
To analyze the a posteriori performance of the discriminant model let us assume that one of two distinct
faults of misclassification might occur. A Type I error will be the case where we conclude that a program
is fraught with faults when in fact it is not. A Type II error will be the case where we believe that a
program is relatively fault-free when in fact it is not. Necessarily, it is better to make a Type I error of
misclassification than it is to make a Type II error.
Table 21. Number of Observations and Percent Classified Into CLASS
From CLASS
1
1
18
2
5
Total
23
78.26 21.74 100.00
2 1 66 67
1.49 98.51 100.00
Total 19 71 90
Percent 21.11 78.89 100.00
There are several ways that the results of the discriminant analysis may be examined to determine the
relative rates of Type I and II errors. First, let us examine the rate of misclassification within the two
groups of validation data where the first group consists of those program modules actually containing
Severity 1 faults (Class 1) and the second group consisting of the program modules containing no faults
(Class 2). The Class 1 data are shown in the second column of Table 21. In this group there are 1 out of
67 cases of Type I errors for a net misclassification rate of about 1%. The Class 2 data are shown in the
third column of this table. Here there are 5 misclassifications out of 23 for a net Type II error rate of about
20%. The two cases considered here contain only the validation program data for those values of the
criterion variable that were used to develop the discriminant model.
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Theposteriorprobabilityfor groupmembershipforeachof the90testcasesisshowninTable22. The
firstcolumnof thistableis theobservationnumberepresentingtheparticularprogrammodule.The
secondcolumnistheactualclassto whichthemoduleinquestionbelonged.Class1moduleswerethose
thatcontainedatleastoneSeverity1fault. Class2moduleswerethosethathadnoDRsfiledagainst
them.Thenextcolunmshowshowthemoduleswereclassifiedbythediscriminantfunction.Those
markedwithasterisksarethosethatweremisclassified.Thefourthcolumnshowstheprobabilityof
membershipofeachmoduleinClass1. Thefifthcolumnshowstheprobabilityof membershipnClass2.
Whatisstrikingabouthelasttwocolumnsof the data presented in the table are the extremely high
classification probabilities. The resulting model is very definitely polarizing the two sets of program
modules with a high probability. The next logical step in the refinement of this modeling process is to
identify exactly what were the circumstances that led modules such as numbers 1 and 2 to be misclassified
with almost total certainty. A detailed analysis of such modules would almost certainly identify one or
more measurable attributes directly related to the Severity 1 faults that we are not now measuring.
Table 22.
Obs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Posterior Probability of Membership in Class
From
CLASS
1
Classified
Into CLASS
2*
2*
1 1
1 2*
1
0.0000
0.0000
2
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000 0.0000
0.0151 0.9849
1.0000
1 1 1.0000
1 2* 0.1952
1 1
0.0000
0.0000
0.8048
1.0000 0.0000
1 2* 0.0287 0.9713
1 2* 0.0000
0.9287
1.0000
0.0713
12 1 1 0.9999 0.0001
13 1 1 0.9994 0.0006
14 1 2* 0.0510 0.9490
15 1 1 1.0000 0.0000
16 1 2* 0.0218 0.9782
17 1 2* 0.0230 0.9770
18 1 1 0.9939 0.0061
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Table 22. Posterior Probability of Membership in Class
From Classified
Obs 1 2
CLASS Into CLASS
19 1 1 1.0000 0.0000
20 1 1 0.9913 0.0087
21 1 2* 0.3049 0.6951
22 1 1 1.0000 0.0000
23 1 2* 0.0035 0.9965
24 2 2 0.0022 0.9978
25 2 2 0.0006 0.9994
26 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
27 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
28 2 2 0.0062 0.9938
29 2 1* 1.0000 0.0000
30 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
31 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
32 2 2 0.0008 0.9992
33 2 2 0.0000 1.0000
34 2 2 0.0014 0.9986
35 2 2 0.3829 0.6171
36 2 2 O.1056 0.8944
37 2 2 0.0030 0.9970
38 2 2 0.0003 0.9997
39 2 2 0.2368 0.7632
40 2 2 0.4027 0.5973
41 2 2 0.0024 0.9976
42 2 2 0.0017 0.9983
43 2 2 0.2315 0.7685
44 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
45 2 1" 0.9897 0.0103
46 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
47 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
48 2 2 0.0004 0.9996
49 2 2 0.0279 0.9721
50 2 2 0.0288 0.9712
51 2 2 0.0007 0.9993
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Table 22. Posterior Probability of Membership in Class
From Classified
Obs 1 2
CLASS Into CLASS
52 2 2 0.0004 0.9996
53 2 2 0.0003 0.9997
54 2 2 0.0374 0.9626
55 2 2 0.3386 0.6614
56 2 2 0.0002 0.9998
57 2 2 0.0003 0.9997
58 2 2 0.0003 0.9997
59 2 2 0.0058 0.9942
60 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
61 2 2 0.0002 0.9998
62 2 2 0.0010 0.9990
63 2 2 0.0029 0.9971
64 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
65 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
66 2 2 0.0003 0.9997
67 2 2 0.0005 0.9995
68 2 2 0.0004 0.9996
69 2 2 0.0007 0.9993
70 2 2 0.0008 0.9992
71 2 1" 0.8352 0.1648
72 2 2 0.0000 1.0000
73 2 2 0.0010 0.9990
74 2 2 0.0011 0.9989
75 2 2 0.0002 0.9998
76 2 2 0.0000 1.0000
77 2 2 0.0373 0.9627
78 2 2 0.0018 0.9982
79 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
80 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
81 2 2 0.0002 0.9998
82 2 2 0.0006 0.9994
83 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
84 2 2 0.0007 0.9993
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Table 22. Posterior Probability of Membership in Class
From Classified
Obs 1 2
CLASS Into CLASS
85 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
86 2 2 0.0001 0.9999
87 2 2 0.0000 1.0000
88 2 2 0.0084 0.9916
89 2 2 0.0000 1.0000
90 2 2 0.0006 0.9994
* Misclassified observation
The bottom line of this particular discriminant procedure is that the procedure was able to make a
significant classification model for these data. The data were remarkably thin. We were able to identify
only 23 of the modules that had DRs that were classified as Severity 1. There were certainly many more of
these modules that had this property that were modified before the current DR tracking system was first
employed. These modules would be misclassified by us in this analysis as Class 2 modules when in fact
they were Class 1 modules. Nonetheless, the strength of the association between the things that we are
measuring and the Severity 1 fault class is very great. This would indicate very good potential for the
future use of this technique to aid in the identification of modules containing potential catastrophic faults.
Summary
The specific focus of this study has been to investigate some aspects of the relationship between program
complexity measures and program that may lead to catastrophic software problems in PASS. The
particular statistical vehicle chosen to measure this relationship was that of discriminant analysis. Based
on the experimental observations contained herein, we believe there is a useful relationship between •
program faults and the complexity domains that HALMet now measures. Further, the strength of this
relationship suggests that predictive models are indeed possible for the determination of program faults
complexity domains.
The basic technique we have developed in this study relates to some major problems we have observed in
the effort to develop reliable and meaningful predictors for program modules in terms of the number of
faults that these modules might contain. Software complexity metrics certainly would be useful in this
regard in that they are numerical measures which may be obtained before the test and validation of a
program. The present state of the art in terms of the prediction of software quality in practical applications
is not good. Most preliminary assessments of software quality are performed in an ad hoc manner by
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experienced software engineering managers. The discriminant analysis procedure presented here represents
a crucial step in the direction of a more rigorous approach to the prediction of software quality. One of the
principal virtues of this methodology is that historical data from past development projects may be used as
a baseline to build a statistical model for the prediction of quality measures of similar software systems
under development. As time progresses, a metric database may be developed and augmented with the
results of each new software product as it is developed and deployed.
As our understanding of the relationship between complexity metrics and software quality measures
becomes more clear, the implications for software development practice are profound. Those programs
with the complexity characteristics that will lead to a deterioration of software quality may be identified at
an early stage. If nothing else, the limited resources of the testing process may be focused on the programs
most likely to cause problems. There is also great potential for these data to feed back to the design stage.
If, for example, certain design practices lead to programs whose complexity characteristic will create
software quality problems, these design practices may be systematically modified. A lingering concern of
ours is the current receptivity within the software engineering community for qualitative as opposed to
quantitative software design and development models.
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Section VI
Software Reliability Assessment Tool Set
Introduction
The specific deliverables for Milestone 7 included:
1. The software system. The Dynamic Reliability Assessment Tool (DRAT) is implemented in the C
programming language and will be designed to run in the standard UNIX workstation environment.
The source code is included.
2. Program reference manual. This deliverable will document how the software will be used on the Unix
workstation.
3. User handbook. This deliverable will assist the user in the preparation of the data for input to the
system. The specific data inputs will consist of system performance data as obtained from a system
profiler such as PMIP and fault data for each of the program modules in the system.
The Theoretical Foundation for Dynamic Reliability Assessment
The traditional approach to the modeling of software reliability is based on a philosophical approach that
began with attempts to model hardware reliability. Inherent in this approach is the concept of the failure
event and the fact that it is possible to identify with some precision this failure event and measure the
elapsed time to the failure event. For hardware systems this has real meaning. Take, for example, the
failure of a light bulb. A set of light bulbs can be switched on and a very precise timer started for the time
that they were turned on. One by one the light bulbs will bum out and we can note the exact time to failure
of each of the bulbs. From these failure data we can then develop a precise estimate for both the mean time
to failure for these light bulbs and a good estimate of the variance of the time to failure.
The case for software systems is not at all the same. Failure events are sometimes quite visible in terms of
catastrophic collapses of a system. More often than not, the actual failure event will have occurred a
considerable time before its effect is noted. In most cases it is simply not possible to determine with any
certainty just when the actual failure occurred on a real-time clock. The most simple example of this
improbability of measuring the time between failures of a program may be found in a program that hangs
in an inf'mite loop. Technically the failure event happened on entry to the loop. The program, however,
continues to execute until it is killed. This may take seconds, minutes, or hours depending on the patience
and/or attentiveness of the operator. As a result, the accuracy of the actual measurement of time intervals
is a subject never mentioned in most software validation studies. Because of this, these models are
notoriously weak in their ability to predict the future reliability of software systems. A model validated on
gaussian noise will probably not do well in practical applications. The bottom line for the measurement of
time between failures in software systems is that we cannot measure with any reasonable degree of
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accuracythesetimeintervals.Thisbeingthecase,wethenmustlookto newmetaphorsfor software
systemsthatwill permitustomodelthereliabilityof thesesystemsbasedonthingsthatwecan measure
with some accuracy.
Yet another problem with the hardware adaptive approach to software reliability modeling is that the
failure of a computer software system is simply not time dependent. A system can operate without failure
for years and then suddenly become very unreliable based on the changing functions that the system must
execute. Many university computer centers experienced this phenomenon in the late 1960s and early 1970s
when there was a sudden shift in computer science curricula from programming languages such as
FORTRAN that had static run time environments to ALGOL derivatives such as Pascal and Modula that
had dynamic run time environments. From an operating system perspective, there was a major shift in the
functionality of the operating system exercised by these two different environments. As the shift was made
to the ALGOL like languages, latent code in the system, specifically those routines that dealt with memory
management, that had not been executed overly much in the past now became central to the new operating
environment. This code was both fragile and untested. The operating systems that had been so reliable
began to fail like cheap light bulbs.
A new metaphor for software systems would focus on the functionality that the code is executing and not
the software as a monolithic system. In computer software systems, it is the functionality that fails. Some
functions may be virtually failure free while other functions will collapse with certainty whenever they are
executed. The focus of this report is on the notion that it is possible to measure the activities of a system as
it executes its various functions and characterize the reliability of the system in terms of these
functionalities.
Each program function may be thought of as having an associated reliability estimate. We may chose to
think of the reliability of a system in these functional terms. Users of the software system, however, have a
very different view of the system. What is important to the user is not that a particular function is fragile
or reliable, but rather whether the system will operate to perform those actions that the user will want the
system to perform correctly. From a user's perspective, it matters not, then, that certain functions are very
unreliable. It only matters that the functions associated with the user's actions or operations are reliable.
The classical example of this idea was the expressed by the authors of the early UNIX utility programs. In
the last paragraph of the documentation for each of these utilities was a list of known bugs for that
program. In general, these bugs were not a problem. Most involved aspects of functionality that the
typical user would never exploit.
From a functional viewpoint, a program may be viewed as a set of program modules that are executing a
set of mutually exclusive functions. If the program executes a functionality consisting of a subset of these
modules that are fault-free, it will never fail no matter how long it executes this functionality. If, on the
other hand, the program is executing a functionality that contains fault-laden modules, there is a very good
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likelihoodthatit will failwheneverthatfunctionalityisexpressed.Further,it will failwithcertaintywhen
therightaspectsof functionalityareexpressed.Anothersignificantproblemin thedeterminationof the
reliabilityof asoftwaresystemistheprecisedeterminationof thefailureevent.Thefailureevent,andthe
circumstancesthatsurroundthefailure,haveproventobemostelusiveconcepts.Thisinvestigationwill
exploreanalternativeviewof softwarereliabilitytogetherwithamechanismfor thecollectionof thedata
necessaryto understandthefailure.
Themainproblemin theunderstandingof softwarereliabilityfromthisnewperspectiveisgettingthe
granularityof theobservationright. Softwaresystemsaredesignedto implementeachof their
functionalitiesinoneormorecodemodules.Insomecasesthereisadirectcorrespondenceb tweena
particularprogrammoduleandaparticularfunctionality.Thatis,if theprogramisexpressingthat
functionality,it will executexclusivelyin themoduleinquestion.In mostcases,however,therewill not
bethisdistinctraceabilityof functionalitytomodules.Thefunctionalitywill beexpressedinmany
differentcodemodules.It istheindividualcodemodulethatfails.A codemodulewill, of course,be
executingaparticularfunctionalitywhenit fails.Wemustunderstandthatit is thefunctionalitythatfails.
Asaprogramisexercisinganyoneof itsmanyfunctionalitiesinthenormalcourseofoperationof the
program,it will apportionitstimeacrossthissetof functionalities.Theproportionof timethataprogram
spendsineachof itsfunctionalitiesi thefunctional profile of the program. Further, within the
functionality, it will apportion its activities across one to many program modules. This distribution of
processing activity is represented by the concept of the execution profile. In other words, if we have a
program structured into n distinct modules, the execution profile for a given functionality will be the
proportion of program activity for each program module while the function was being expressed.
As the discussion herein unfolds, we will see that the key to understanding program failure events is the
direct association of these failures to execution events with a given functionality. A Markovian stochastic
process will be used to describe the transition of program modules from one to another as a program
expresses a functionality. From these observations, it will become fairly obvious just what data will be
needed to describe accurately the reliability of the system. In essence, the system will essentially be able to
appraise us of its own health. The reliability modeling process is no longer something that will be
performed ex post facto. It may be accomplished dynamically while the program is executing. The goal of
this three-year project has been to develop a methodology that will permit the modeling of the reliability of
program functionality. This methodology will then be used to develop notions of design robustness in the
face of departures from design functional profiles.
The failure of a software system is dependent only on what the software is currently doing: its
functionality. If a program is currently executing a functionality that is expressed in terms of a set of fault-
free modules, this functionality will certainly execute indefinitely without any likelihood of failure. A
program may execute a sequence of fault-prone modules and still not fail. In this case, the faults may lie in
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aregionofthecodethatisnotlikelytobeexpressedduringtheexecutionof a function. A failure event
can only occur when the software system executes a module that contains faults. If a functionality is never
selected that drives the program into a module that contains faults, then the program will never fail.
Alternatively, a program may well execute successfully in a module that contains faults just as long as the
faults are not expressed.
Some of the problems that have arisen in past attempts at software reliability determination all relate to the
fact that their perspective has been distorted. Programs do not wear out over time. If they are not
modified, they will certainly not improve over time, nor will they get less reliable over time. The only thing
that really impacts the reliability of a software system is what the system is doing at the moment. A
program may work very well for a number of years based on the functions that it is asked to execute. This
same program may suddenly become quite unreliable if its functionality is changed by the user.
By keeping track of the state transitions from module to module and function to function we may learn
exactly where a system is fragile. This information coupled with the functional profile will tell us just how
reliable the system will be when we use it as specified. Programs make transitions from module to module
as they execute. These transitions may be observed. Transitions to program modules that are fault-laden
will result in an increased probability of failure. We can model these transitions as a stochastic process.
Ultimately, by developing a mathematical description for the behavior of the software as it transitions from
one module to another driven by the functionalities that it is performing, we can describe the reliability of
the functionality. The software system is the sum of its functionalities. If we can know the reliability of
the functionalities and how the system apportions its time among these functionalities, we can then know
the reliability of the system.
Ongoing investigations into the etiology of software failures in the Space Shuttle PASS has provided
substantial insight into the measurement of the reliability of this system. This has led to the conclusion that
it is not the software system that fails: it is the software system executing a particular functionality that
fails. From this new perspective, the sequential execution of program functions may be modeled as a
stochastic process. In particular, the program functionalities are physically expressed within a program as
subtrees of modules in a program call-tree hierarchy. The transitions between the program modules in a
pairwise fashion may be represented in a transition matrix of a Markov process. Program failures are
represented by an absorbing state in the transition matrix. This view of reliability permits the dynamic
estimation of the parameters of the underlying multinomial probability distribution representing the
transition between program modules. This use of the multinomial probability distribution is particularly
convenient in that it has a Dirichlet distribution as its natural conjugate family. Thus, a Bayesian approach
may be employed so that each step or epoch in the dynamic operation of a system provides incremental
information as to the evolving reliability assessment of the program.
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A Formal Description of Program Operation
To assist in the subsequent discussion of program functionality, it will be useful to make this description
somewhat more precise by introducing some notation conveniences. Assume that the software system S
was designed to implement a specific set of mutually exclusive functionalities F. Thus, if the system is
executing a function f _ F then it cannot be expressing elements of any other functionality in F. Each of
these functions in F was designed to implement a set of software specifications based on a user's
requirements. From a user's perspective, this software system will implement a specific set of operations,
O. This mapping from the set of user-perceived operations, O, to a set of specific program functionalities
is one of the major functions in the software specification process.
Each operation that a system may perform for a user may be thought of as having been implemented in a
set of functional specifications. There may be a one-to-one mapping between the user's notion of an
operation and a program function. In most cases, however, there may be several discrete functions that
must be executed to expresses the user's concept of an operation. For each operation, o, that the system
may perform, the range of functionalities, f, must be well known. Within each operation, one or more of
the system's functionalities will be expressed. For a given operation o, these expressed functionalities are
those with the property
F TM = {f : F I V IMPLEMENTS(o,f)}
It is possible, then, to define a relation IMPLEMENTS over O x F such that IMPLEMENTS(o, J9 is true
if functionalityfis used in the specification of an operation, o. For each operation o _ O, there is a
relation p' over O x F such that p'(o,f) is the proportion of activity assigned to functionalityfby
operation o. An example of the IMPLEMENTS relation for two operations implemented in four specified
functions is shown in Table 23. In this table, we can see that functions f_ and f2 are used to implement
the operation o I .
Table 23.
OxF
Example of the IMPLEMENTS Relation
A
T
A
T
f,
01
o 2 T T T
In Table 24, there is an example of the relation p'. These numbers represent the proportion of time each
of the functions will execute under each of the operations.
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Table 24. Example of the p' Relation
0.2
L
0.8
L
0
A
0
o2 0 0.4 0.4 0.2
The software design process is strictly a matter of assigning functionalities in F to specific program
modules m _ M, the set of program modules. The design process may be thought of as the process of
defining a set of relations, ASSIGNS over F × M such that ASSIGNS(f m) is true if functionalityfis
expressed in module m. For a given software system, S, let M denote the set of all program modules for
that system. For each function f _ F, there is a relationp over F× M such that p(f,m) is the
proportion of execution events of module rn when the system is executing functionf. Table 25 shows an
example of the ASSIGNS relation for the four functions presented in Table 23. In this example we can see
the function f_ has been implemented in the program modules m_, m 2 and rna. One of these modules, m 1,
will be invoked regardless of the functionality. It is common to all functions. Other program modules,
such as m 2, are distinctly associated with a single function.
Table 25. Example of the ASSIGNS Relation
FxM
m 1
T
m 2
T
m 3 m 4
T
/'/'15 m 6
f2 T T T
f3 T T T
f4 T T T T
In Table 26, there is an example of the relation p. These numbers represent the proportion of time each of
the functions will execute in each of the program modules. The row marginal values represent the total
proportion of time allocated to each of the functions. These are the same values as the column marginals of
Table 24. Similarly, the column marginal values of Table 26 represent the proportion of time distributed
across each of the six program modules.
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p(f ,m)
f,
Table 26. Example of the p Relation
m 1 m 2
1
m 3
0
m 4
1
m 5
0
m 6
01
f2 1 0 1 0 0.1 0
f3 1 0 0.5 0 0 0.3
f4 1 0 1 0 0.4 0.1
There is a relationship between program functionalities and the software modules that they will cause to be
executed. These program modules will be assigned to one of three distinct sets of modules that, in turn, are
subsets of M. Some modules may execute under all of the functionalities of S. This will be the set of
common modules. The main program is an example of such a module that is common to all operations of
the software system. Essentially, program modules will be members of one of two mutually exclusive sets.
There is the set of program modules M c of common modules and the set of modules Mr that are invoked
only in response to the execution of a particular function. The set of common modules, Mc c M is
defined as those modules that have the property
M c = {m: M IVf _ F • ASSIGNS(f,m)}
All of these modules will execute regardless of the specific functionality being executed by the software
system.
Yet another set of software modules may or may not execute when the system is running a particular
function. These modules are said to be potentially involved modules. The set of potentially involved
modules is.
M_ y_ ={m" Mrl 3 f _FeASSIGNS(f,m) A O< p(f,m)< 1}
In other program modules, there is extremely tight binding between a particular functionality and a set of
program modules. That is, every time a particular function, f, is executed, a distinct set of software
modules will always be invoked. These modules are said to be indispensably involved with the
functionalityf This set of indispensably involved modules for a particular functionality,f, is the set of
those modules that have the property that
MI _ = {m" M e IVf _ F • ASSIGNS(f ,m) =:> p(f, m)= 1}
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Asadirectresultofthedesignof theprogram,therewill beawell-definedsetof programmodules,M:,
that might be used to express all aspects of a given functionality,f. These are the modules that have the
property that
m _ 114: = M, t..)Mp_:'u Mi <i'
From the standpoint of software design, the real problems in understanding the dynamic behavior of a
system are not necessarily attributable to the set of modules, M i, that are tightly bound to a functionality or
to the set of common modules, M C, that will be invoked for all executing processes. The real problem is
the set of potentially invoked modules, M. The greater the cardinality of this set of modules, the less
certain we may be about the behavior of a system performing that function. For any one instance of
execution of this functionality, a varying number of the modules in M may execute.
For each system S there is a call graph that shows the transition of program control from one program
module to another. To simplify this discussion, let us define a relation CALLS over M: x M:. A sample
call graph for the hypothetical program described in Tables 23-26 is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9. Sample call graph
This call graph represents the transfer of program control to a sequence of program modules, starting with
the initial node, 1.
A Stochastic Description of Program Operation
When a program begins the execution of a functionality, say f4 from Tables 25 and 26, we may envision
this beginning as the start of a stochastic process. From the sample call graph shown in Figure 9, we may
then construct a probability adjacency matrix, P, whose entries represent the transition probability from
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eachmoduletoanothermoduleateachepochintheexecutionprocesswhilethefunction,f4, is executing.
th
Thus, the element p_"_ of this matrix on the n epoch are the probabilities that CALLS(m;,mj ) is true
for that epoch. For example, consider the following matrix that contains the probabilities for the state
transitions for the four modules, ml, m 3 , m 5 , and m6, that constitute the set M/4
(0 1 0 0"_
10.2 0 0.3 0.51
P=[O 1 0 OJ0 1 0 0
The first row of this matrix represents the transition probability of m 1 to m 1, m3, m_, and m6, the second
row the transition probabilities for m 3 , and so forth.
Execution of the Carl Graph as a Markov Process
The transition from one module to another may be described as a stochastic process. In which case we may
define an indexed collection of random variables {X,}, where the index t runs through a set of non-negative
integers, t = 0, 1,2,... representing the epochs of the process. At any particular epoch the software is
found to be executing exactly one of its M modules. The fact of the execution occurring in a particular
module is a state of the system. For this software system, the system is found in exactly one of a finite
number of mutually exclusive and exhaustive states that may be labeled 0,1,2,..., M. In this
representation of the system, there is a stochastic process {X, }, where the random variables are observed at
epochs t = 0, 1,2,--. and where each random variable may take on any one of the (M + 1) integers, from
the state space A = {0,1,2,...,M}.
A stochastic process {X t } is a Markov chain if it has the property that
Pr[X,+, = jl X, = _, X,__ = i,_l, Xt_ 2 = i,_2,"', Xo =/o I = Pr[X,+_ = j1X, = i, ]
for any epoch t = 0, 1,2,.... and all states io,i_,.. ",4 in the state space A. This is equivalent to saying that
the conditional probability of executing any module at any future epoch is dependent only on the current
state of the system. The conditional probabilities Pr[Xt+ 1 = jl X, = it ] are called the transition
-<") = Pr[X, = j1 X,__ = i]. Withinprobabilities. In that this nomenclature is somewhat cumbersome, let/2ij
the execution of a given functionality, the behavior of the system is static. That is, the transition
probabilities do not change from one epoch to another. Thus, Pr[Xt+ 1 = ./1X t = 4] = Pr[X1 = jl X 0 =/0]
for i, j, in S, which is an additional condition of a Markov process.
Since the p_") are conditional probabilities, it is clear that
(n)
Pij >_O,foralli,jinA, n=O,1,2,--.
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and
M
___ (n)
p_j = l, for all i inA and n = O,1,2,...
)=0
If we use the nomenclature P to denote the matrix of one-step transition probabilities at the initial epoch,
then the system at the n + 1_tepoch can be obtained from the expression
p(n_= pn =p.p"-l
What we would like to ascertain is the unconditional probability of being in a particular module at a
particular epoch. To find this conditional probability let us first observe that
Pr[X,+_ = jl X, = _ ] = Pr[X_ = jl X 0 =/01
It is clear that the unconditional probability of executing a modulej and epoch n, then, is dependent only on
the initial state of the system. Thus,
M
Pr[Xn=j]=_p_"'Pr[X o =i]
i=0
Interestingly enough, for all software systems there is a distinguished module, the main program module,
that will always receive execution control from the operating system. If we denote this main program as
module 0, then
Pr[X 0 = 0] = 1 and Pr[X 0 = t] = 0 for i = 1,2, ...,M
We can see, then, that the unconditional probability of executing in a particular modulej is
Pr[Xn = jl = p_")Pr[Xo =Ol = p_")
State Transitions for Fault-Free Modules
The granularity of the term epoch is now of interest. An epoch begins with the onset of execution in a
particular module and ends when control is passed to another module. The measurable event for modeling
purposes is this transition among the program modules. We will count the number of calls from a module
and the number of returns to that module. Each of these transitions to a different program module from the
one currently executing will represent an incremental change in the epoch number. Computer programs
executing in their normal mode will make state transitions between program modules rather rapidly. In
terms of real clock time, many epochs may elapse in a relatively short period. Thus, we will now turn our
attention to the long-term behavior of the software system.
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Therearethreetypesof Markovprocessesthatmaybeusedtodescribeormodelthestochasticbehaviorof
asoftwaresystemdependingonthenatureoftheinteractionof theprogrammodules.It isacharacteristic
of thefirsttwotypesof MarkovprocessesthatPij ¢ 0 ¢=>pji ¢ 0 for i, j = 1, 2, ...,M and i ¢ j.
The first and least complex case is the description of a set of program modules that are not recursive. If
there is no recursion in the system, then p_0) = 0 for i = 1,2, ...,M. This will result in a periodic Markov
process. The periodicity, d, of this process is equal to the number of eigenvalues of P of modulus 1.
The second distinct Markov process is one that does have recursive functions in it. If there are one or more
recursive modules in the system, then 0 < p;0) < 1 for at least one i = 1,2, .--,M. The resulting Markov
process is ergodic and the steady-state behavior of the process may be characterized by a single transition
matrix. It can be shown that
lim n!.") = zj
rl ---_ _ rtJ
where the 't'j's satisfy the following steady state equations:
't'j >0,
M
zj = _._ z,p_ °), forj inA,
i=O
M
j=O
The "t'j's are the steady-state probabilities of the Markov chain. They represent the long-term distribution
of system activity in each of the program modules.
State Transitions for Failure-Prone Modules
The third type of Markov process is one that has an absorbing state, in which case p_0) = 1 for at least one
i = 1,2, ...,M. An example of such a system is a call tree that has a module that always exits to the
operating system. Once this state has been entered, no other state is reachable from this absorbing state.
We will use this notion of an absorbing state to model the failure of a system. In this case, we will consider
the failure of a program module to be the transition from that module to the absorbing failure state.
While the first two Markovian processes discussed above dealt with a program that would not fail, we now
wish to examine the potential for modeling the failure of a software system. When a program module falls,
we can imagine that the module has made a transition to an absorbing state, a failure state, in the Markov
transition matrix. Thus, every program may be thought to have a virtual module representing the failed
state of program. When this virtual module receives control, it will not relinquish it. The transition matrix
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forthisnewmodelisaugmentedbyanadditionalrowandanewcolumn.ForaprogramwithM modules,
let the error state be represented by a new state, T = M + 1. For this new state,
,._j'= 0 for allj = 1, 2, .... M
Prj _ = 1 forj = T , n = 0,1,2,...
This represents the augmented row of the new transition matrix• Each row in the transition matrix will be
augmented by a new column entry pi_ I for i = 1,2, ...,M, where pi_ represents the probability of the
•th th
failure of the t module in the n epoch. When a program dies, it is the result of a fault in one or more of
its modules. Not all modules are equally likely to lead to the failure event. The fault proneness of the
module is distinctly related to measurable software attributes. When program modules are executed that
are fault-prone, they are much more likely to fail than those that are not fault-prone. We seek a forecasting
or prediction mechanism that will capitalize on this understanding.
The Profiles of Software Dynamics
When a program is executing a functionality it will apportion its activities among a set of modules. As
such it will transition from one module to the next on a call (or return) sequence. Each module called in
this call sequence will have an associated call frequency. When the software is subjected to a series of
unique and distinct functional expressions, there will be a different Markov chain for each of the user's
operations in that each will implement a different set of functions that will, in turn, invoke possibly
different sets of program modules. For each of the functions it is clear that the transition matrix P may be
partitioned into a submatrix Pf where the rows and columns of this matrix represent the elements of My.
As a particular function is being executed, it will be necessary to record the transition from one module to
another. These data may be recorded in a matrix, A, whose elements represent the frequency of transitions
from one module to another. After a sequence of n epochs, the element, a 0 , of the matrix, A, will contain
the number of calls into modulej from module i during the n epochs. This matrix will have non-zero
entries for all of the modules in M c u M{ ;) . It may or may not have non-zero entries for the elements of
M _y). As an example of this notion, let us suppose that function f4 was run on two separate occasions.p
On the first occasion, the function, f4, executed for a total of 420 epochs. The resulting calls are
represented by the matrix A 1. All four modules, ml, m3, ms, and m6, that constitute the set My, were
executed in this first example.
(0 40 0 0"] (0 18 0 0_
140 0 120 501 118 0 0 751
A':L0 120 0 0 / A2=/0 0 0 0)0 50 0 0 0 75 0 0
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Thesecondmatrix,A2, represents the execution of the same functionality, f4, for 186 epochs, but this
time the module rn5 _ M_/') did not execute. The two matrices, A 1 and A 2 are symmetrical. The upper
triangular portion of these matrices represents the call from each module and the lower triangle represents
the returns from each call. The activity of the system in and out of modules will profile the activity of the
functions that software was designed to perform.
Functional Proffies
When a software system is constructed by the software developer, it is designed to fulfill a set of specific
functional requirements. The user will run the software to perform a set of perceived operations. In this
process, the user will typically not use all of the functionalities with the same probability. The functional
profile of the software system is the set of unconditional probabilities of each of the functionalities F being
executed by the user. Let Y be a random variable defined on the indices of the set of elements of F. Then,
o k = Pr[Y = k] ,k = 1, 2 ..... # {F} is the probability that the user is executing program functionality k as
specified in the functional requirements of the program and # {F} is the cardinality of the set of functions.
A program executing on a serial machine can only be executing one functionality at a time. The
distribution of o, then, is multinomial for programs designed to fulfill more than two specific functions.
The prior knowledge of this distribution of functions should guide the software design process.
Execution Profiles
When a program is executing a given functionality, say fk, it will distribute its activity across the set of
modules, My,. At any arbitrary epoch, n, the program will be executing a module m_ _ M_ with a
probability, u_k = Pr[ X, = il Y = k]. The set of conditional probabilities u.k where k = 1, 2,...,#{F}
constitute the execution profile for function fk. As was the case with the functional profile, the distribution
of the execution profile is also multinomial for a software system consisting of more than two modules. As
a matter of the design of a program, there may be a non-empty set M t/) of modules that may or may not be
P
executed when a particular functionality is exercised. This will, of course, cause the cardinality of the set
My to vary. A particular execution may not invoke any of the modules of M _y) On the other hand, all
p •
of the modules may participate in the execution of that functionality. This variation in the cardinality of
My within the execution of a single functionality will contribute significantly to the amount of test effort
that will be necessary to test such a functionality.
Each operation will implement a subset of functionalities, i.e. F_t°) c F. As each operation is mn to
completion, it will generate an execution profile. This execution profile may represent the results of the
execution of one or more functions. Most operations, though, do not exercise precisely one functionality.
Rather, they may apportion time across a number of functionalities. For a given operation, let l be a
proportionality constant. Then, 0 < l_ _<1 will represent the proportion of epochs that will be spent
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executingthek th functionality in F _°). Thus an operational profile of a set of modules will represent a
linear combination of the conditional probabilities, uik as follows:
Pi = Efkepo_lkUik"
Module Profiles
The manner in which a program will exercise its many modules as the user chooses to execute the
functionalities of the program is determined directly by the design of the program. Indeed, this mapping of
functionality onto program modules is the overall objective of the design process. The module profile, q, is
the unconditional probability that a particular module will be executed based on the design of the program.
It is derived through the application of Bayes' rule. First, the joint probability that a given module is
executing and the program is exercising a particular function is given by
Pr[X, =j_ Y= k]= Pr[Y= k]Pr[X, = jlY = k]= o_u_k
wherej and k are defined as before. Thus, the unconditional probability, q_of executing modulej under a
particular design is
qi Pr[Xn = i]
= ,.'_.,kPr[Xn = i_ Y= k)
_- _.dk ok uik
As was the case for the functional profile and the execution profile, only one module can be executing at
any one time. Hence, the distribution of q is also multinomial for more than two modules.
The Transition Probabilities for Functions
The final profile consideration will be the determination of the transition probabilities
P_J_°l= Pr[X 1 = j IX 0 = i] of p0. Each row i of P represents the probability of the transition to a new
state j given that the program is currently in state i. These are mutually exclusive events. The program
may only transfer control to exactly one other program module. Under this assumption, the conditional
probabilities that are the rows of p0, also have the property that they are distributed multinomially. They
profile the transitions from one state to another.
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Estimates for Transition Probabilities and Profiles
The focus will now shift to the problem of understanding the nature of the distribution of the
probabilities for various profiles. We have so far come to recognize these profiles in terms of
their multinomial nature. The multinomial distribution is useful for representing the outcome of
M
an experiment involving a set of mutually exclusive events• Let S = U Si where Si is one of M
i=1
mutually exclusive sets of events. Each of these events would correspond to a program executing
a particular module in the total set of program modules. Further, let Pr(S_) = w_and
WT =1--Wl--W 2 ..... WM,
under the condition that T = M + 1, as defined earlier, in which case w_ is the probability that the
outcome of a random experiment is an element of the set S i . If this experiment is conducted over
a period of n trials then the random variable X_ will represent the frequency of Si outcomes• In
this case, the value, n, represents the number of transitions from one program module to the next.
Note that
X r = n - X 1 - X 2 ..... X M
This particular distribution will be useful in the modeling of a program with a set of k modules.
During a set of n program steps, each of the modules may be executed. These, of course, are
mutually exclusive events. If module i is executing, then module j cannot be executing.
The multinomial distribution function with parameters n and w = (w 1, w2 ..... wr) is given by
I n! .. xM, (xl,Xz,. XM)_ SW:IW2 x2 .W M ..,
f(xln, w)=tHxi !
i=l
0 elsewhere
•th
where xi represents the frequency of execution of the t program module.
The expected values for the xi are given by
E(xi) = 7ci =nwi, i= 1,2,...,k,
the variances by
Var(x) = nwi(l - w_)
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and the covariance by
Cov(wi, w j) = -nwiwj, i ¢ j
We would like to come to understand, for example, the multinomial distribution of a program's
execution profile while it is executing a particular functionality. The problem here is that every
time a program is run we will observe that there is some variation in the profile from one
execution sample to the next. It will be difficult to estimate the parameters w = (w_, w z .... ,wr)
for the multinomial distribution of the execution profile. Rather than estimating these parameters
statically, it would be far more useful to us to get estimates of these parameters dynamically as the
program is actually in operation, hence the utility of the Bayesian approach.
To aid in the process of characterizing the nature of the true underlying multinomial distribution,
let us observe that the family of Dirichlet distributions is a conjugate family for observations that
have a multinomial distribution. The p.d.f, for a Dirichlet distribution, D(a,ar), with a
parametric vector a = (a_,a 2..... aM) where (a i > 0; i = 1,2 ..... M) is
f (wl a) = F(a, +M°t2 +"" + aM) w _ -1w2_-_ . .. wM"-_
l-I F(a_)
i=l
M
where (wi > 0; i = 1, 2,...,M) and _ wi = 1. The expected values of the wi are given by
i=1
T
where a 0 = _i=_ txi "
given by
E(wi) = ]-/i = _ (1)
t_o
In this context, tzo represents the total epochs. The variance of the w_ is
a,(ao - a_ ) (2)Var(wi) = 2
a o(a o+ 1)
and the covariance by
oti_ i
Cov(w_,wj) - a2o(ao + 1)
Within the set of expected values p_, i = 1, 2,..., T, not all of the values are of equal interest. We
are interested, in particular, in the value of PT. This will represent the probability of a transition
to the terminal failure state from a particular program module. So that we might use this value for
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oursucceedingreliabilitypredictionactivities,it will beusefulto knowhowgoodthisestimateis.
To this end,wewould like to set100(1-ct)%confidencelimits on theestimate.For theDirichlet
distribution,this is notclean. To simplify theprocessof settingtheseconfidencelimits, let us
observethatif w = (w_, w2 .... , wM) is a random vector having the M-variate Dirichlet distribution,
D(ot,ar), then the sum z = w_ +... + wu has the beta distribution,
or alternately
r(z +ar) z (1 _ z)°Tf z Jz, aT ) = r( z)r(ao
f_(wT I z,Otr) =
F(7 + aT)
F(y)F(aT)
(1 - wr) _(WT)°_ ,
where Y= al +a2 +'"+ aM.
Thus, we may obtain lO0(1-00% confidence limits for
Idr -- a < gr < l.gr + b
from
and
f]lT-° _ 1F_ (/.t r - a IZ, at) = ,0 ft_ (wr 17, ar )dw a2 (3)
F_(PT +bl Z,ar) = [u_+bao ftj (wr Iz, ar )dw = 1 ot
-7 (4)
Where this computation is inconvenient, let us observe that the cumulative beta function, FO, can
also be obtained from existing tables of the cumulative binomial distribution, Fb by making use of
the knowledge that
and
F0(zlp T-a,z+ar)=Fo(# r -al 7,ar)
Fb(ot T I 1 - (IJr + b),z +at) = Fo(p. r + b I7,ar)
The value of the use of the Dirichlet conjugate family for modeling purposes is twofold. First, it
permits us to estimate the probabilities of the module transitions directly from the observed
transitions. Secondly, we are able to obtain revised estimates for these probabilities as the
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observation process progresses. Let us now suppose that we wish to model the behavior of a
software system whose execution profile has a multinomial distribution with parameters n and
W = (w I , wz ..... w M) where n is the total number of observed module transitions and the values of
the we are unknown. Let us assume that the prior distribution of W is a Dirichlet distribution with
a parametric vector o_ = (a,,a 2 ..... aM) where (ai > 0; i= 1,2 ..... M). Then the posterior
distribution of W for the behavioral observation X = (xl, xz ..... x_) is a Dirichlet distribution with
parametric vector 0_*= (al + xl, a 2 +x 2.... , o_M+ xM). As an example, suppose that we now wish
to model the behavior of a large software system with such a parametric vector. As the system
makes sequential transitions from one module to another, the posterior distribution of W at each
.th
transition will be a Dirichlet distribution. Further, for i = 1, 2, .... T the 1 component of the
augmented parametric vector tx will be increased by 1 unit each time module m_ is executed.
An Example
Consider our simple example of the sample program executing the function f4. Initially we will
assume that we have little or no information as to the probabilities for p0. In the face of
incomplete information we may choose to assume that all state transitions are equiprobable.
Hence, the prior probability distributions for p0 will look like this:
(0 1 0 0 _
10.33 0 0.33 0.331
10 1 0 00 1 0 0
This would correspond to an initial observation matrix ,40 where each outcome has hypothetically
been observed once. Thus,
(0 1 0 0_
I1 0 1 11
1°1o:/
Now let us assume that we have actually executed this function and have observed the transfer of
control among the modules as indicated in the matrix A_ from above. The row marginals for this
M
matrix enumerate the total control transfers from each module. If we let a_0 = Ea_j then from
j=l
(1) above, the expected values of the posterior distribution for the rows of p0 may be obtained
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from
giving
(0 1 0 0_
p0' 10.19/ 0 0.57 0.24
=[0 1 0 0
to 1 0 0
The variances of the transition probabilities for the second row are only those that are interesting
in this example. They may be obtained from (2) and are (0.00073, 0, 0.00116.0.00086). The
eigenvalues of this matrix are (0, 1, - 1, 0) indicating that this structure has a periodicity of 2.
If we now continue running the program and observe the new module transitions shown in the
matrix A 2 . The total transitions observed so far will be
(0 59 0 0
|59 0 121 126
A3 = / 0 121 0 0
0 126 0 0
and the new posterior distribution for the rows of p0 would be
(0 1 0 0"_
pO" |0.19| 0 0.40 0.41
=|0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
The variances of the second row of this new transition matrix are (0.00051, 0, 0.00079.0.00080).
The variances, then, are diminishing as our information about the behavior of this system
improves.
Reliability Estimation
The modeling of reliability of systems will be implemented through the use of an absorbing
Markov chain. In this application, we will postulate the existence of a virtual program module
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representingthefailureof thesystem.Shouldcontroleverbetransferredto thismodule,it will
neverbereturned. Eachprogrammodulehasanon-zeroprobabilityof transferringcontrolto this
virtualfailuremodule. Thisprobabilityisdirectlyrelatedto thefault-pronenessof themodule.
Wemay,in fact,usethefunctionalrelationshipbetweensoftwarecomplexityandsoftwarefaults
to deriveourprior probabilitiesfor thetransitionbetweeneachprogrammoduleandthevirtual
failedstatemodule.
Whatis importantto understandis thateachprogrammoduleis distinctlyrelatedto oneor more
functions. If a functionis expressedby a setof modulesthatarefailure-prone,thenthefunction
will appearto befailure-prone.If, on theotherhand,afunctionis expressedby a setof modules
in acall treethatarefault-free,this functionwill neverfail. Thekeypoint is thatit is functionality
thatfails. Not all functionswill beexecutedby auserwith thesamelikelihood. If auserexecutes
unreliablefunctionsconsistently,thenhewill perceivethesystemto beunreliable.Conversely,if
anotheruserwereto usethesamesystembutexercisefunctionalitiesthatwerenotsolikely to
fail, thenhisperceptionsof thesamesystemwouldbeverydifferent.
To modelthereliability of asoftwarefunction,wewill augmenthebasicMarkovchainto include
anabsorbingstatethatrepresentsa virtual programmodulecalledthefailurestate.
Eachprogrammodulemayhaveanon-zerotransitionprobabilityto thisvirtualmodule. If a
moduleis fault-free,thenitstransitionprobabilitywill bezero.
To continuetheexamplefromtheprevioussection,let usnow augmenthetransitionmatrix pO
with a virtual failure state and an equiprobable transition of each module to this state. The new
matrix would look like this,
(0
10.25
po=l o
0
0
0.50 0 0 0.50)
0 0.25 0.25 0.251
0.50 0 0 0.501
0.50 0 0 0.50[
t
l)0 0 0
This would correspond to an initial presumed observation matrix A o of
r0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1[
0 1 0 0 11,
0 1 0 0 :]0 0 0 0
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which is to say that we have little or no information about the initial transition probabilities: each
of the outcomes is equally likely. After an arbitrary number of epochs, say 419, the new transition
matrix for the process at that point would be
_0
0
P°419 = 0
0
0
0 0 0 1_
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
As we observe the system at this point, there is complete certainty of a failure event in each of the
program modules, given our initial estimates of failure probabilities.
Now let us consider that we have run the system for the complete 420 epochs of our earlier
example. The system has failed three times in this example, once in module 2 and twice in module
3. This will give us a new matrix of observations as follows:
(0 41 0
41 0 121
p
A l = 0 121 0
0 51 0
0 0 0
o
51 21
031
o;j0
The new posterior distribution using these new observations would be
t
p0 =
( 0 0.9762 0 0 0.0238'
0.1907 0 0.5628 0.2372 0.0093
0 0.9758 0 0 0.0242
0 0.9808 0 0 0.0192
0 0 0 0 1
The elements of this transition matrix are derived from
T
where a0j = Z a0 •
i=l
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We arelearningthatthesystemis far lessfailure-pronethanour initial uninformedestimates,p0.
Also, we are coming to understand that not all modules demonstrate the same failure potential.
The probability of a failure from Module 3, for example, is materially less than that of Module 5.
Now let us assume that the system has been driven over an additional interval of 187 epochs. We
now observe that there is a non-zero probability of a projected execution of each of these modules
based on our revised estimates for the transition probabilities in p0. After the next hypothetical
sequence of 187 epochs, our current computed transition matrix for the process at this point
would be
( 0 0.0473 0 0 0.9525_
[ 0.0092 0 0.0273 0.0115 0.95181
p187' = ] 0 0.0473 0 0 0.9525 [
0 0.0475 0 0 0.9_23 /0 0 0 0
The observations made during these 187 epochs might show the following events, including one
failure attributable to module 2. This matrix of cumulative observations might hypothetically be
(0 59
59 0
p
A 2 = 0 121
0 126
0 0
0 0 1_
121 126 31
0 0 31
0 01810 0
It is derived by summing the elements of A L, A 2 , and A 3 . This, in turn, would yield a new
posterior transition matrix as follows:
r 0 0.9833 0 0 0.0167 _
0.1909 0 0.3916 0.4078 0.0097
0 0.9758 0 0 0.0242
0 0.9921 0 0 0.0079
0 0 0 0 1
The value of the failure probability estimates that we will have established in the above manner
lies in their usefulness for future predictive ability. This, in turn, is directly related to the
confidence intervals that we must establish for these estimates. These confidence intervals may be
obtained from equations (3) and (4). For the purposes of this example, the upper and lower 5%
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a a
confidence intervals (_--, 1 -- = 0.975) for the transition probabilities of each module to the
2 2
absorbing failure state have been compiled in Table 5. The lower confidence intervals are of little
interest. In fact, as the number of observed transitions becomes large, these values will approach
zero. What is of great interest to us are the upper confidence interval values for Pr" Functionally
these are the values that will have the greatest impact on the evaluation of our modeling. We can
see, for example, that the expected value of the failure probability of Module 3 is l.tr = 0.0097.
The upper confidence limit for this value is greater by more than a factor of two.
Table 27. Module Reliability Estimates With 5% Confidence Intervals
Interval Module ¢x
2
Initial Module 1
Module 3
Module 5
Module 6
Second Module 1
Module 3
Final
Module 5
Module 6
Module 1
Module 3
Module 5
Module 6
0.0126
_JT
0.5000
0.0063 0.2500
0.0126 0.5000
0.0126
0.0006
0.0011
0.0049
0.0005
0.0035
0.0040
0.5000
0.0244
0.0093
0.0242
0.0192
0.0167
0.0097
O_
2
0.8489
0.6024
0.8489
0.8489
0.0860
0.0255
0.0562
0.0684
0.0880
0.0278
0.0128 0.0242 0.0781
0.0019 0.0079 0.0424
To this point we have created a mechanism for modeling the transition of each program module to
the failure state. In this sense the reliability of each module m e may be directly determined by the
0 e0.elements, Pir, of With the Bayesian approach, we have also established a mechanism for
refining our estimates of these reliabilities and establishing a measure of confidence in each of
these estimates. This information will now be used to establish the reliability of functions that
employ each of the modules in varying degrees. The successive powers of p0 will show the
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failure likelihood for each of the modules. This will permit us to postulate on the probability of a
failure at some future epoch n based on the current estimates of failure probability.
Functional Reliability
Not all states that a system of M program modules can get into hold equal fascination for us. In
the augmented program model above, we postulated the existence of a virtual program module
m_, a program module representing an error state. This module may or may not be invoked
depending on the particular functionality being executed. If a function executes a set of unreliable
modules with a high probability, then the function will not be reliable. If, on the other hand, the
function executes only highly reliable modules, then the function will be perceived to be reliable.
It is a characteristic of each function that it exhibits an execution profile u._. Each module has an
.th (0)
associated reliability. Let us define the reliability of the j module to be t) = 1 - Pjr • The
m
expected value for the reliability of the function, then is /1: = E(r/) = _ujt) where u.j is the
j=l"
execution profile for the function as defined earlier and m is the number of modules. This
reliability estimate, however, is only for a particular functionality. It is derived from the execution
profile of a given functionality. Thus, each function has its own independent reliability
assessment. That was the original intent of this investigation, to demonstrate a mechanism for the
determination of the reliability of program functionality. It is program functions that fail. Some
functions are more reliable than others. We can measure reliability at the functional level.
The reliability of the individual functions is dependent on the distribution of u°j for the function.
As was indicated earlier, the underlying distribution for u.j is multinomial. We may derive
estimates for these probabilities in precisely the same manner that we used for developing the
estimates for the conditional probabilities of the transition matrix. We simply need to count the
frequency with which each module is executed when a particular function is being executed.
Computation for the estimates for the u.j will proceed as above, as will the determination for the
confidence intervals for these estimates.
Now we arrive at the real problem in the estimation of the reliability of a functionality. Our long-
term ability to understand and/or estimate the execution profile of a system is clouded by the set
of modules M tj° that may or may not execute when a particular functionality is expressed. Itp
would be arrogant or ignorant to assume that the execution profiles for all functions were stable
and knowable. (The worse the design, the more certain this is true). The Bayesian approach to
reliability determination is used in that we may use the information currently at our disposal to
provide the best estimate as to the future behavior of the system. If the set M _ is empty, thenp
the behavior of the system is quite tractable. In fact, if we were to normalize the elements of the
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A • cumulative observation matrices by dividing each element by the number of observed epochs,
we would find that resulting transition probabilities were quite stable over repeated observations.
The very best way to create a system whose reliability may never be understood is to design the
system with a large set of modules Mp_s_. The obverse of this coin is a tractable system with little
or no variability in its function execution profiles. The reliability of such a system may be assessed
quite accurately. This is not to imply that a reliable system is one whose reliability may be
measured accurately; quite the contrary. We may conceive a very unreliable system whose
behavior may be well understood.
A reliable system is one that by design spends a high proportion of its execution time in modules
that are not likely to fail. In other words, there is a strong positive correlation between the
measures of complexity of a module and its design functional profile. Such fault-prone modules
may, in fact, be identified by their intrinsic attributes during the design stage. If a system is
carefully designed with these criteria controlling the design process, the resulting software will be
reliable. It may, however, not be robust.
A design is robust if it does not suffer a diminution in its functional reliability in the face of
departures from its design functional profile. Not all reliable systems are robust. The overall
robustness of a system is dependent on how the specific functions implement users' operations.
A robust system is one that remains reliable in the face of departures from the design operational
profile of the system. Systems may be designed for both reliable and robust operation.
Data Collection for Reliability Estimation: A User's Guide for DRAT
It seems pointless to engage in the academic exercise of software reliability modeling without
making at least the slightest attempt to discuss the process of measuring the independent
variable(s) in these models. The basic premise of this report is that we really cannot measure
temporal aspects of program failure. There are, however, certain aspects of program behavior
that we can measure and also measure with accuracy. We can measure transitions into and out of
program modules, for example. We can measure the frequency of executions of functions, if the
program is suitably instrumented. We can also measure the frequency of executions of program
operations. This facility already exists in the PASS software testing environment. The PMIP tool
currently provides these data.
The objective of the DRAT is to provide a mechanism to compute the reliability of a complete
software system and also to compute the reliability of the functionalities of the system. These
values are determined from data obtained from an instrumented software system. The system is
designed to provide a mechanism for continually updating the reliability estimate for the system.
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If a systemwerefully instrumentedto monitortransitionsbetweensoftwaremodules,thetool
wouldbecapableof providingdynamicreliabilityassessmentsof theinstrumentedsystem.
Equallyimportantto thecomputationof thereliability aretheconfidenceintervalsfor these
reliability data. As moredataarecollectedontheoperationof aparticularsystem,theconfidence
intervalsshouldrapidlyconvergeabouttheestimatedreliability.
Thebasicoperationsof DRAT areto 1)createtheinitial transitionmatrixfor all top-level
programmodulesinPASS;2) provideamechanismto updatethis transitionmatrix asnewdata
becomeavailablefromthetestingactivity;and3) provideamechanismto deleteor addmodules
to thetransitionmatrixastheyenter/leavethePASSsoftwarebuilds. While thereareatotalof
1,266modulesin thePASSsystem,only769of thesearevisibleatthecall levelof program
execution.Theremainderof theprogrammoduleshaveessentiallyvanishedfrom visibility
becauseof theproprocessorincludeprocess.Theyexistonlyfully containedin otherprogram
modules.
Thefirst stepin usingthereliability tool is toprovideit with acompletelist of all program
modules.Thecardinalityof thissetwill beusedby thetool to determinethesizeof thetransition
matrix. If thereare769modulesin acurrentbuild thenthecall matrixwill have771rowsand
columns,includingtheFCOSandDR datarowsandcolumns.Theextracolumnwill containthe
DR countfor eachprogram.TheseDR countswill representhetransitionsto thefailuremodule
representedinternallyasthelast row in thecall matrix. This lastrowwill alwayscontainzeros
exceptfor the lastentry,whichwill alwaysbeaone.
Thecall matrixwill bebuilt for thesystemonly once.After that,it will only beupdated.There
aretwo distinct sourcesof updates.First,weunderstandthatnewmodulesmayenteratanytime.
Similarly,someexistingmodulesmaybephasedout from timeto time. Thus,thetoolhasa
provision,beforeits execution,of permittingthetransitionmatrix to beeditedto 1) includenew
modules,2) deleteobsoletemodules,and3)updateDR countsfor thecurrentworkingsetof
modules.This phaseof theexecutionof theprogramis designedto changethestaticstructureof
thematrix.
Thenextphaseof programexecutionis to updatethecontentsof thetransitionmatrix. Input to
thisphaseof programexecutionwill beafile containingPMIPoutput.Thus,aseverytestis
completed,thenewPMIPdatamaybeusedtoupdatethecontentsof thecall matrix.
To computethereliability of thecompletesystem,eachrow elementwill bedividedby its row
marginalto yieldatransitionmatrix for reliability assessment.
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Thefunctionalreliability of eachtestactivitywill beoperationallydefinedby thecontentsof the
PMIP file. Thatis, aseachfunctionis executed,agivensubsetof moduleswill beselectedfor
executionby thefunction. Thesoftwarewill computethefunctional reliability of the test just
entered by partitioning the call matrix into a reduced matrix whose rows and columns are defined
by the contents of the PMIP file. The reliability of each function will be computed from this
reduced matrix.
Programmer Reference
The DRAT system has two basic modes of operation. It may be run interactively to update the
module set representing the current state of the software system. As new program modules are
added to the system they must also be added to the existing call matrix that resides on a file in the
UNIX file system. As programs are removed from the build they must also be removed from the
call matrix. As new DRs are recorded against existing modules, these new DR additions must be
added to the information in the call matrix. These activities are all handled interactively.
When not in the interactive mode, the DRAT system will operate on new input as produced by the
PMIP system through the supplied GET_TRANS filter. The purpose of the GET_TRANS filter
is to reduce the PMIP data to a single file containing a set of records consisting of name pairs of
program modules and a frequency of the associated transitions. The first name in the name pair is
the name of the calling module. This name pair is followed by the relative # of times it occurred.
The second name in the pair is the called module. If the DRAT tool is to be used outside of the
Space Shuttle PASS environment, the calling pair data must be prepared through a user-supplied
filter similar to GET_TRANS.
The basic operation of DR.AT as a command line activity in UNIX is as follows:
drat -m module_file I-help] [-i] [-o out_file] [-c call_file]
[-u call_file] [-t trans_file]
where the options and their associated files are defined as follows:
-help print the option definitions and the above usage statement,
-m module_file specifies file containing modules and DR data
NOTE: -m option is always required
-i enter interactive mode to add or delete modules
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-o out_file specifies file in which to store transition matrix
NOTE: -o option required except in interactive mode
-c call_file
-u call_file
-t trans_file
create transition matrix (call_file is required)
NOTE: -c and -u options cannot be used together
update transition matrix
NOTE: call_file and trans_file are both required
specifies the name of the file containing input transition matrix
The files named in the the command line are defined as follows:
1)
2)
3)
module file ==>
out_file ::>
call_file =:>
4) trans_file =:>
line format: module-name DR-count
file format: module-column transition-matrix
line format: calling_module_name called_module_name frequency
This file is created from a PMIP output using the 'get_trans' filter.
file format: module-column transition-matrix
The output on stdout from DRAT consists of two sets of numbers. The first number is the
reliability of the system together with the 100(1- a  2)% confidence intervals for this estimate.
The second set of numbers is the reliability of the functional set of program modules operationally
defined by the PMIP data just processed together with the 100(1- a/2)% confidence intervals
for this estimate.
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HALMet ! RELATIVE COMPLEXITY METRIC
TOOLS PACKAGE--VERSION 3.1
INSTALLATION MANUAL
This manual provides the user with a detailed description of the requirements associated with the media
transfer and subsequent installation of version 3.1 of the HALMet/RCM Tools package. The instructions
contained herein should be explicitly followed with little or no need for changes that might normally be
associated with differences in the Unix systems chosen for the installation.
For a detailed explanation of the operational procedures and use of this tools package, see the operation
manual, Appendix B.
Media Transfer
There now exists a specific process by which efficient and dependable media transfer of the HALMet/
RCM tools package can be accomplished. This process is as follows:
1) "Tar" up the entire directory structure representing the distribution version of the HALMet tools
package into a single tar file. Another tar file will be created containing the distribution version of the
RCM tools package.
2) These tar files will then be compacted into much smaller binary files using the Unix 'compress' utility.
3) These files can then be downloaded via the standard File Transfer Protocol (ftp) that is associated with
normal data transfer via the Internet.
Installation Requirements
After having downloaded the necessary tools package, h will then be necessary to perform an installation of
the tools. In order to perform a full installation of version 3.1 of the HALMet HAL/S source code analyzer
and version 2.0 of the PCA/RCM tools, the following requirements will have to be met:
1) Hardware: Sun SparcStation or comparable Unix-based workstation with at least 10 megabytes of
available hard disk space and 5 megabytes of memory. These values represent the MINIMUM amount
required for installation. An additional 10 megabytes of disk space may be necessary for operational
purposes.
2) HALMet software: Version 3.1 of the HALMet analyzer as contained in the binary file,
'halmet31 .tar.Z'.
3) PCA/RCM tools software: version 2.0 of the pca-rcm package as contained in the binary file, 'pca-
rcm.tar.Z'.
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4) StandardUnixutilities:
uncompress ==>
tar ==>
make ==>
CC "-=>
ld ==>
ar ==>
yacc ==>
lex ==>
restores compressed files to their original form
archives/unarchives complete directory structures
compile and link manager and updater
"C" source code compiler
"C" object code linker
archiver for creating subroutine libraries
parsing program generator
lexical analysis program generator
Installation Procedures
To install the packages:
1. Uncompress the files containing the 'halmet' HAL/S source code analyzer and the PCA/RCM tools
package source code.
> uncompress halmet31 .tar.Z
==> produces a much larger file called halmet31 .tar
> uncompress pca-rcm.tar.Z
==> produces a larger file called pca-rcm.tar
2. Untar the resulting 'tar' files.
> tar -xvf halmet31 .tar
==> This will install version 3.1 of HALMet and its entire directory structure into a new
directory called 'halmet3.1'.
> tar -xvf pca-rcm.tar
==> This will install the source code for version 2.0 of PCA/RCM into a directory called pca-rcm.
3. Perform a 'make' in the 'halmet' library directory.
> cd halmet3.1/lib
> make
==> This will compile the library package.
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4. Performamakeandinstallationi the'halmet'sourcecodedirectory.
> cdhalmet3.1/src
> makeinstall
==>Thiswill createalltheexecutablesandplacethemintothe'halmet3.l/bin' directory.
5. Createthe'PCA/RCM'toolbyperforminga 'make'in itsdirectory.
>cdpca-rcm
>make
==>Thiswill createthe'pca-rcm'executable.
Sample Run
Also enclosed are both a small sample and a full Operational Increment of HAL/S source files that can be
used to perform some test runs of the analyzer if so desired. To run the analyzer:
1. Add 'halmet3.1/bin' to your path.
The procedure for doing this is dependent on the shell being run. For example, in a c-shell (csh), the
following might be used:
> setenv PATH "$PATH":$HOME/halmet3.1/bin
==> This appends the 'halmet3.1/bin' directory to the end of the PATH variable (assuming that
the PATH variable exists and that the 'halmet3.1' directory exists in the user's HOME
directory).
o Execute the command to begin gathering the metrics. NOTE: Assuming that the provided sample is
being used and can still be found as part of the original distribution, the following will be executed
from within the 'halmet3.1' directory.
> get_metrics -help
==> Displays a help message of available command-line options.
> get_metrics -dir ./appl
==> This will run the analyzer and create a metrics file called metrics.txt'. (takes about 10-20
minutes to run.)
NOTE: If the same is run on the full Operational Increment, it will take approximately 17 hours to
complete.
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. A sample data file has also been provide for a test run of the PCA/RCM tool and can be found in the
'pca-rcm' directory as '2301.data'. Therefore, the following command could be executed in the 'pca-
rcm' directory:
> pca-rcm
==> This will provide a usage statement and explanation of the options that must be specified on
the command line.
> pca-rcm 2301 .data -base -d 2301 .metrics -t 2301 .trans
==> This will display a significant amout of information on the screen, so it might be desireable
to pipe this to the 'more' command or redirect it to a file for later viewing. As per the
operations manual, it will create two output files: 2301 .metrics and 2301 .trans.
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HALMet TOOLS PACKAGE
--VERSION 3.1--
OPERATION MANUAL
Overview
This manual provides the user with a detailed explanation of the use and processes associated with version
3.1 of the HALMet/RCM tools package. A step-by-step description outlining the significance and purpose
of each of the individual executable functionalities will enable the user to better utilize the tools package
and all of its capabilities. A full understanding of this manual is highly recommended but not necessarily
required for implementation of the tools.
The following sections represent those sections that should be read as an absolute minimum before
attempting to use the tools package: Overview, Introduction, get_metrics, rcm, join_metrics.
For a detailed description of the installation requirements and procedures for this tools package, see the
INSTALLATION MANUAL.
As part of the standard installation, a set of documents will be installed that are suitable for using as
manual pages for the unix 'man' command. They can be found in the 'doc' directory within the halmet3.1
directory and provide a detailed explanation of the proper use and options available to each of the primary
operations performed by 'halmet'. A similar manual page exists for the PCA/RCM tool and can be found
in the 'pca-rcm' directory.
Introduction
In general, the HALMet analysis tool is run with a single call to the primary controller or executor,
'get_metrics', which makes the necessary calls in the appropriate order to the rest of the executable
programs. While the individual programs are kept in HALMet's 'bin' directory and can be accessed
directly from there, most of them are only implemented through the use of the 'get_metrics' executor.
In order to perform a HALMet analysis run, the following three items must exist on the system: a correctly
installed OI, the Major Action table, and the exceptions list. This is, of course, assuming that the necessary
steps have been taken to properly and completely install the HALMet tools as specified in the Installation
Manual.
A correctly installed OI requires that the OI be downloaded to the system on which HALMet is installed. It
must then be set up such that it is composed of four directories (appl, incl80, ss, and mlib80), each of
which contains the dataset members from the four original data sets (APPLSRC, INCL80, MLIB80, and
SSSRC). The modules contained in these directories must be filtered in such a way as to remove anything
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thatisnotHAL/Ssourcecode(i.e.,linenumbers).Thelineendingshouldalsobetranslatedto
correspond to the system on which the OI is installed. Finally, appropriate suffixes must be attached to
each module name that identify the type of the module. This module suffix mapping can be performed in
accordance with the memberlist file that corresponds to the given OI.
The Major Action table is a file containing the module names and the number of major actions filed against
each one as was previously extracted from an IMDB report. This file consists of one line for each module
that is composed of the module name followed by white space followed by a single integer value
representing the total number of major actions filed against that module. The name of this table defaults to
'maj act table'.
An exceptions list must also exist for proper operation of the HALMet tool, even if it is empty. This list is
simply a file containing the module names, one module name per line, on which the HALMet analysis
should not be run. While most of this need is taken care of by the suffix mapping, there may be some
future need or reason for eliminating certain HAL/S modules from the analysis. Currently, this file is
empty and defaults to the name 'x_list.txt'.
Previously Unidentified Metrics
Throughout this manual, many references are made to the various types of metrics that are being measured
on the Hal/S source code by HALMet3.1, and specific names are given to each of these metrics. Most of
the names used here are with direct respect to those metric names and their formal definitions described in
Sections I and II.
The only metric values referenced in this manual that have not been previously identified in Sections I and
II are the following:
Temporal metrics that are not significant to the current analysis:
Signal ==>
Termin ==>
MaxSiArg ==>
MaxTeArg ==>
Quality metrics:
Dis_Count ==>
Number of SIGNAL statements in a program module
Number of TERMINATE statements in a program module
Largest number of arguments in any one SIGNAL statement
Largest number of arguments in any one TERMINATE statement
Number of Discrepancy Reports in a program module
Extracted from the prologues of each module (DR #'s)
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Maj_Acts ==>
Total_DRs ==>
CRs ==>
PCRs ==>
Total_CRs
Number of Major Actions for a program module
Accumulated from an IMDB report generated and transferred to us
Summation of Dis_Count and Maj_Acts for a program module
Number of Change Requests in a program module
Extracted from the prologues of each module (CR #'s)
Number of Program Change Requests for a program module
Extracted from the prologues of each module (PCR #'s)
==> Summation of CRs and PCRs for a program module
Manual Organization
This manual is organized in such a way that each section of the manual corresponds to a specific
executable functionality of the HALMet/RCM tools package. This executable functionality, in turn, can be
identified and clearly related to the "C" source code on which it is based. This basis and a corresponding
search can be performed throughout the manual with reference to those lines that contain the word, 'FILE:',
beginning in the first column. The '.d' extensions indicate a relation between the "C" source files and the
documentation as contained in the 'doc' directory of the full installation.
Each section is organized into the following subsections: FILE, DESCRIPTION, SYNOPSIS, INPUT,
PROCESS, OUTPUT, COMPILATION, FILES, and SEE ALSO.
FILE:
geCmelrics
DESCRIPTION:
The "get_metrics" executable is the top level metric analyzer. It is responsible for creating a metric dump
of the HAL modules specified.
SYNOPSIS:
get_metrics -dir directory I-help] [-no_tree] [-no_def]
[-no_erase] [-t treefile] [-m modtable] [-x x_filename]
[-s structtable] [-a maj act_list]
[-out outpuLfile] [-flies filel file2 ...]
-dir directory ==> Specifies the path to the APPLication directory. This option must be specified by the
user. All HAL modules within the following directories are analyzed unless the -files option is used: appl/,
incl80/, ss/, and mlib80/.
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-help==>Printstheusagelineof get_metrics.
-no_tree==>Withthisoptionenabled,themetricanalyzerwill skipthegenerationof theinclusiontree.
Thisis typicallyusedwhenacurrentreefileexistsandisspecifiedbythe-t option.
-no_def==>Withthisoptiongiven,themetricanalyzerwill skipthegenerationof the.deffiles.
-no_erase==>Thisoptiontellstheanalyzerto allowthetemporaryfilesthatarecreatedtoremainafterthe
run.
-t treefile ==> Specifies the name of the treefile. If not specified, this value defaults to 'tree.out'.
-m modtable ==> Specifies the name of the module table. If not specified, this value defaults to
'modules.tab'.
-x x_filename ==> Specifies the name of the exceptions list. If not specified, this value defaults to
'x_list.txt'.
-s struct_table ==> Specifies the name of the structure table. If not specified, this value defaults to
'struct_table'.
-a maj_act_list ==> Specifies the name of the Major Actions list. If not specified, this value defaults to
'maj act table'.
-out output_file ==> Specifies the name of the metrics file. If not specified, this value defaults to
'metrics.txt'.
-files filel file2 file3... ==> Instead of analyzing all HAL modules within the directories, this option will
instruct the analyzer to limit the analysis to the given files. If this option is not given, all .HAL modules are
examined.
INPUT:
The following files are used by the analyzer:
'*.HAL' ==> A HAL module which the user wishes to have analyzed.
'modtable' ==> The modules table containing a list of all HAL modules and a path to that module's
file. This table is used to generate the inclusion tree.
'x_filename' _> The exceptions list. Refer to exceptions.d for more details.
'maj act list' m___>The file containing a list of the number of major actions in a HAL module.
B-4
PROCESS:
"get_metrics" functions according to the following procedure:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
Loads the exceptions list.
Loads the major actions table.
Runs "get_defs" which produces ".def" files for each file with a ".HAL" extension.
include REPLACE statements and DEFINE directives at this point.
Runs "get_tree" which creates the inclusion tree.
On each source file, get_metrics will:
a)
b)
The ".def' files
Obtain the quality metrics from the module.
Run "expand" to produce a dynamic state of the file or module by expanding its REPLACE and
local DEFINE instances. Creates a ".exp" file.
c) Run "counttokens" to obtain the first half of the metrics. Creates a ".tok" file.
d) Run "get_ctl_tokens" to extract the control flow tokens. Creates a ".ctl" file.
e) Run "getnode_edges" to obtain the node pairs or edges. Creates a ".rio" file.
f) Run "org_edges" to organize the node pairs. Creates a ".gph" file.
g) Run "get_cyc_metrics" to obtain the remaining metrics. Creates a ".dat" file.
h) Obtain the temporal metrics.
i) Write the final metrics of the module to the output file.
j) Remove all temporary files.
OUTPUT:
The final metrics file is in the following format with each field separated by white space:
MODULE-NAME 13-ORIGINAL-METS 10-TEMPORAL-METS 6-QUALITY-METS
where,
MODULE-NAME is the name of the HAL module,
13-ORIGINAL-METS is etal eta2 nl n2 stmts loc comments nodes edges paths cycles max_path
ave_path,
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10-TEMPORAL-METSis
SetsResetsSignalsCancelsTerminsMaxSeArMaxReArMaxSiArMaxCaAr
MaxTeAr,
and
6-QUALITY-METSisdis_countmaj_actstotal_drscrspcrstotal_crs.
COMPILATION:
get_metricsi comprisedof thefollowingsourcefiles:
get_metrics: exceptions.c
maj.act table.c
FILES:
new_ls.c hal_dr.c
get_temporal.c libtree.a
The following files are used or created by "get_metrics":
*.HAL
treefile
modtable
x_filename
struct_table
maj_act_list
output_file
*.def
*.exp
*.tok
*.ctl
*.rio
*.gph
*.dat
SEE ALSO:
exceptions.d
halmet.c
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KNOWN LIMITATION:
None.
FILE:
exceptions
DESCRIPTION:
exceptions.c is a source file containing functions to access the exception list (typically named 'x_list.txt').
The exception list contains a list of filenames (HAL modules) which are to be excluded from analysis.
SYNOPSIS:
int get_exceptions(x_file)
char *x_file;
get_exceptions0 loads the exception list specified by x_file into memory.
void print_exceptions0
After the exception list has been loaded into memory, print_exceptions0 will print the filenames within the
exception list.
int is_exception(f_name)
char *f_name;
After the exception list has been loaded into memory, is_exception will determine if the HAL module
f_name is in the exception list.
INPUT:
get_exceptions0 will read the specified file, char *xJist. x_list contains a list of filenarnes in the following
format:
MODULE1.HAL
MODULE2.HAL
MODULE3.HAL
MODULEn.HAL
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PROCESS:
get_exceptions0putsintoastructureachnamein theexceptionlist.
print_exceptions0traversesthestructureprintingeachfilename.
is_exception0traversesthelisttodetermineif thespecifiedfilenameis in thestructure.
OUTPUT:
get_exceptions0returnsthefollowingconditions:
0 if anerroroccurredwhiletryingto readthelist
1 if theexceptionlisthasbeenproperlyloaded
print_exceptions0displaysthelistoffilenamesto stdoutinthefollowingformat:
MODULE1.HAL
MODULE2.HAL
MODULE3.HAL
MODULEn.HAL
is_exceptions0returnsthefollowingconditions:
0 if thegivenfile ISNOTintheexceptionlist
1 if thegivenfile IS intheexceptionlist
COMPILATION:
The exceptions.c source is a file that compiles into "get_defs", "get_metrics", "expand", and "get_tree".
The Make specification:
get_defs : repdef.o exceptions.o new_ls.o
get_metrics : exceptions.o new_ls.o hal_dr.o halmet.o
expand : proc_io.o replace.o exceptions.o
get_tree : get_include_pairs.o modtable.o exceptions.o new_ls.o
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FILES:
x_list.txt==>theexceptionlist
SEE ALSO:
get_defs.d, get_metrics.d, expand.d, and get_tree.d
FILE: count_tokens
DESCRIPTION:
"count_tokens" is an executable responsible for obtaitaing the Halstead software science metric primitives
from a HAL module. The following information in the metrics structure is obtained, as indicated by '==>".
struct metrics {
==>
} met;
char *module_name; /* module name ==> first word in code */
int eta 1, /* unique operator count */
eta2, /* unique operand count */
n 1, /* total operator count */
n2, /* total operand count */
stmts, /* total statement count */
loc, /* total non-comment lines of code */
comments, /* total comment count */
nodes, /* total node count */
edges, /* total edge count */
paths, /* total path count */
cycles, /* total cycle count */
max_path; /* maximum path length */
double ave_path, /* average path length */
data_struct; /* to be dealt with later???? */
/* software metrics to be accumulated */
SYNOPSIS:
count_tokens filename [-p]
filename specifies the expanded HAL module (.exp) to analyze.
-p option prints out a report of token counts. First, the tokens and their counts are displayed. Next, the
identifiers and their counts are displayed.
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INPUT:
"count_tokens"operates on an expanded HAL module only. The associated .HAL module needs to be in
the same directory as the .exp module to obtain the lines of code and the lines of comment count.
PROCESS:
Refer to get_tokens.d, get_loc.d, and get_tok_funcs.d for more details.
OUTPUT:
The results are written to stdout in the following format:
printf("%-36.36s %d %d %d %d %d %d %dkn",
met.module_name,
met.etal,
met.eta2,
met.n 1,
met.n2,
met.stmts,
met.loc,
met.comments);
This format indicates that a character string containing the module name is printed followed by 7 numerical
integer values containing the specified metrics in the order in which they are listed above followed by a
new-line. The fields on each line are separated by white space.
COMPILATION:
"count_tokens" is comprised of get_tokens.c, get_tok_funcs.c, and get_loc.c. The Make specification:
count_tokens: get_loc.o get_tok_funcs.o get_tokens.o
FILES:
*.exp _> the specified expanded file
*.HAL ==> the associated HAL module
SEE ALSO:
get_tokens.d, get_tok_funcs.d, get_loc.d, expand.d
FILE: get_tokens
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DESCRIPTION:
The get_tokens.c source is a top level module responsible for obtaining the Halstead software science
metrics from a HAL module.
This module validates the command line and communicates with get_tok_funcs.c and get_loc.c to
determine the Halstead values of a HAL module.
SYNOPSIS:
main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
The argument count (argc) can range from two to three, argv specifies the name of the running program,
the name of the .exp file to analyze, and an optional value to display the token counts.
INPUT:
get_tokens.c takes its input from the specified .exp file. The input from the file is read one line at a time
and then separated into words.
word = [a-z]+[A-Z]+[0-9]+L#%]
PROCESS:
This module passes the .HAL filename to get_loc.c to obtain the lines of code and lines of comment of the
HAL file.
Next, the input words taken from the .exp file are passed to get_tok_funcs.c to obtain the operator and
operand count of the HAL module. If a compiler directive is encountered (a line where the first character is
a capital D), the line is skipped.
OUTPUT:
The results are written to stdout in the following manner:
printf("%-36.36s %d %d %d %d %d %d %dkn",
met.module_name,
met.etal,
met.eta2,
met.n 1,
met.n2,
met.stmts,
met.loc,
met.comments);
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Thisformatindicatesthatacharacterstringcontainingthemodulenameisprintedfollowedby7 numerical
integervaluescontainingthespecifiedmetricsin theorderinwhichtheyarelistedabovefollowedbya
new-line.Thefieldsoneachlineareseparatedbywhitespace.
COMPILATION:
Theget_tokens.csourceisafile thatcompilesinto"count_tokens"alongwithget_loc.cand
get_tok_funcs.c.TheMakespecification:
count_tokens:get_loc.oget_tok_funcs.oget_tokens.o
get_tokens.o:get tokens.c
FILES:
*.exp==>thespecifiedexpandedfile
*.HAL==>theassociatedHAL moduleof the.expfile
SEEALSO:
count_tokens.d,get_tok_funcs.d,get_loc.d,expand
HLE: get_tok_funcs
DESCRIPTION:
get_tok_funcs.c is a module that analyzes the tokens passed to it. This module is used by count_tokens to
count the number of operators and operands in a given HAL file.
This module is also used by get_ctl_tokens to examine the control flow tokens in a HAL file.
SYNOPSIS:
void Init Op_Counts0
This function prepares the module for lexicai analysis.
int Count_Token(word)
char *word;
Count_Token0 examines 'word' and determines if it is an operator or an operand. It then increments the
appropriate count for word. The following members of the metrics structure are updated accordingly, as
indicated by '==>':
struct metrics {
char *module_name; /* module name ==> first word in code */
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==>
==>
} met;
int etal, /* unique operator count */
eta2, /* unique operand count */
nl, /* total operator count */
n2, /* total operand count */
stmts, /* total statement count */
loc, /* total non-comment lines of code */
comments, /* total comment count */
nodes, /* total node count */
edges, /* total edge count */
paths, /* total path count */
cycles, /* total cycle count */
max_path; /* maximum path length */
double ave_path, /* average path length */
data_struct; /* to be dealt with later???? */
/* software metrics to be accumulated */
void Get_Token_Totals()
After a HAL file has been completely analyzed, Get_Token_Totals0 fills in the following metric values, as
indicated by '==>':
struct metrics {
==>
==>
} met;
char *modulename; /* module name ==> first word in code */
int eta 1, /* unique operator count */
eta2, ]* unique operand count */
n 1, /* total operator count */
n2, /* total operand count */
stmts, /* total statement count */
loc, /* total non-comment lines of code */
comments, /* total comment count */
nodes, /* total node count */
edges, /* total edge count */
paths, /* total path count */
cycles, /* total cycle count */
max_path; /* maximum path length */
double ave_path, /* average path length */
data_struct; /* to be dealt with later???? */
/* software metrics to be accumulated */
void Print_Token_Cts0
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This routine prints the results of the iexical analysis of a HAL module.
INPUT:
After this module has been initialized, Count_Token0 receives its input as words. Words can be HAL/S
reserved words or identifiers from the HAL module.
PROCESS:
After obtaining a word, the analyzer determines the token type: declarative, operator, or operand.
Declaratives are not counted as either operators or operands.
OUTPUT:
Output is facilitated with the Print_Token_Cts0 function. A list of declaratives and operators with their
associated totals is first displayed. Then, a list of identifiers, their count, and their type is displayed. The
type value is as follows:
0 = scalar type
1 = vector__type
2 = matrix_type
3 = other_type
COMPILATION:
The get_tok_funcs.c source is a file that compiles into "count_tokens" and "get_ctl_tokens". The Make
specification:
count_tokens: get_tok_funcs.o get_loc.o get__tokens.o
get_ctl_tokens: get_tok_funcs.o proc_io.o get_ctl_flow.o
get_tok_funcs.o: get_tok_funcs.c t_y.tab.h
FILES:
none
SEE ALSO:
count_tokens.d, get_ctl_tokens.d, get_tokens.d, get_ctl_flow.d
FILE: get_loc
DESCRIPTION:
The get_loc.c source obtains the lines of code and lines of comment from a given HAL module.
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SYNOPSIS:
intGet_LOC(filename)
char*filename;
ThefilenamespecifiestheHALmoduletoanalyze.
INPUT:
get_loc.copensthespecifiedHAL moduleandcountsthenumberof linesof codeandlinesof comment.
A commentmaybeof CstyleorFORTRANstyle.
A lineofcodeisanynonblanklineafterthelinehasbeenstrippedofcomments.
PROCESS:
ThegivenHALmoduleisopenedandreadin. If anerroroccursinopeningthefile,anerrormessageis
reportedandthefunctionreturns.
Whenacommentisencountered,it isstrippedfromthelineandthetotallinesof commentis incremented.
If theremaininglineisnonblank,thetotallinesof codeis incremented.
OUTPUT:
Thisfunctionreturnsthefollowingconditions:
0 ==>noerrors
1==>erroropeningfilename
Thefollowingmembersof themetrics tructurearefilled in:
met.loc
met.comments
COMPILATION:
Theget_loc.csource is compiled into "count_tokens" along with get_tok_funcs.c and get_tokens.c. The
Make specification:
counttokens: get_loc.o get tok_funcs.o get_tokens.o
get_loc.o: get_loc.c
FILES:
*.HAL --> the specified HAL module filename
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SEEALSO:
count_tokens.d,get_tok_funcs.d,get_tokens.d
FILE: graphcvt-->org__edges
DESCRIPTION:
graphcvt.ccompilesinto"org_edges".Thisexecutableisresponsibleforconvertingacontrolflowgraph
representedasnodepairsintoacontrolflow graphrepresentedasanadjacencylist.
SYNOPSIS:
org_edges<filename>
<filename>(usuallywiththeextension.rio)specifiesaninputfile whichcontainsthenodepairsthatareto
beconverted.
INPUT:
Inputistakenfromthespecifiedfile. Thefile containsinformationin thefollowingformat:
12
23
%d%d
PROCESS:
Thenodepairsareobtainedandrepresentedinternallyasanadjacencylist. Afterthenodepairshavebeen
exhausted,thelist isdumped.
OUTPUT:
Results are written to standard output. Each line begins with a node. This node is then followed by the
nodes to which it is connected. For example:
1 2
2 3
3 4 6
4 5
COMPILATION:
graphcvt.c compiles into the executable org_edges. The Make specification:
org_edges: graphcvt.o
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FILES:
*.flo==>thenodepairsspecificationof agraph
FILE: join_metrics
DESCRIPTION:
join_metrics.cisasourcefile thatcompilesintotheexecutable"join_metrics"."join_metrics"is
responsibleforjoiningthemetricsfile (createdby"get_metrics")withtherelativecomplexityand
operationalprofiles.It createsafinalfile withalloftheproperinformationforeachmodulecombined
together.
SYNOPSIS:
join_metrics[-mmetrics-file][-rrel-comp-file]
[-pop_profile-file][-xexceptions-file]output-filename
-mmetrics-file==>Specifiesthemetricdumpthatwascreatedby"get_metrics".
-rrel-comp-file==>Specifiesthefilecontainingtherelativecomplexityof themodules.
-pop_profile-file==>Specifiesthefile thatcontainstheunsummedoperationalprofiles.
-xexceptions-file==>Specifiestheexceptionslist.
output-file==>Specifiestheoutputfile towhichto write.
INPUT:
"join_metrics"readsfromthefollowingfiles:
"metrics-file"iscreatedbyget_metricsandshouldbeinthefollowingformat:
MODULE-NAME13-ORIGINAL-METS10-TEMPORAL-METS6-QUALITY-METS
where,
MODULE-NAMEisthenameoftheHAL module,
13-ORIGINAL-METSis
etal eta2nl n2stmtsloccommentsnodesedgespathscyclesmax_path
ave_path,
10-TEMPORAL-METSis
SetsResetsSignalsCancelsTerminsMaxSeArMaxReArMaxSiArMaxCaAr
MaxTeAr,
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and
6-QUALITY-METSis
dis_countmaj_actstotal_drscrspcrstotal_crs.
"rel-comp-file"holdstherelativecomplexityof someof theHALmodules.It shouldbein thefollowing
format:
MOD-NAMEFLOAT FLOAT FLOAT FLOAT REL-COMP.
"op_profile-file"holdstheoperationalprofiles.Thesemaybeunsummed.Thefile shouldbein the
followingformat:
MOD-NAMEFLOAT.
"exceptions-file"containstheexceptionslist. Refertoexceptions.d.
PROCESS:
"join_metrics"operatesaccordingto thefollowingprocedure:
1)Loadstheexceptionslist.
2)Loadsthemetricsfile.
3)Loadstherelativecomplexity.
If aRelativeComplexityexistsfor amodulewhichisnotin themetricsfile,anerroris reported.
4)Loadstheoperationalprofiles.
If anOperationalProfileexistsfor amodulewhichisnotin themetricsfile,anerrormessageisreported.
5)Dumpsthefinalmetricsfile to "output-file".
OUTPUT:
The "output-file" is in the following format with each field separated by white space:
MOD-NAME 13-ORIG-MET 6-TEMPORAL 6-QUALITY 1-RCM 1-OP 1-FCM
where,
6-TEMPORAL ==> Sets, Resets, Cancels, MaxSeAr, MaxReAr, MaxCaAr.
RCM --=> Relative Complexity Metric
OP ==> the summed Operation Profile
FCM ==> Functional Complexity Metric
Also, the last line of "output-file" has the total functional complexity.
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COMPILATION:
join_metrics is comprised of two modules:
join_metrics : join_metrics.c exceptions.c
SEE ALSO:
exceptions.d, get_metrics.d
FILE: strip_zero
DESCRIPTION:
strip_zero.c is a source file that compiles into the executable strip_zero. Strip_zero is a simple filter that
operates on metric dumps. Its purpose is to remove all COMPOOL files from the dump. Strip_zero should
be used on files created by dump_zero to remove all zero level COMPOOLS.
SYNOPSIS:
strip_zero < <metric_dump> > <output file>
<metric_dump> is the metrics file that might contain COMPOOL files. <output file> is the newly created
metrics file with COMPOOL files removed.
INPUT:
Strip_zero works on metric dumps. Typically, these are files created by get_metrics, dump_zero, or
dump_summed. A metrics file is a text file with each line holding the metric values of a single HAL
module. A line is in the following format:
<name> <value>...
where,
<name> is the filename of the HAL module, and
<value> is a certain metric value. The values are separated by spaces.
PROCESS:
Strip_zero takes the basename of <name> and tests if the first character is a 'C'. If this condition is false,
the line is printed to stdout.
OUTPUT:
The output of a line is in the same format as its input.
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COMPILATION:
The strip_zero.c source is a file that compiles into "strip_zero". The Make specification:
strip_zero : strip_zero.o
SEE ALSO:
dump_zero.d
FILE: dump_summed
DESCRIPTION:
"dump_summed" sums up all the zero level metrics and dumps the results (the level zero and level one
modules) to an output file.
SYNOPSIS:
dump_summed <wee_file> <metrics_file> <output_file>
<tree_file> is the inclusion tree structure.
<metrics_file> is the metrics file to be summed.
<output_file> is where the resulting output will be saved.
INPUT:
Dump_summed works with two files: the tree structure and the metrics file. Both of these files are created
by get_metrics.
Refer to read_tree.d for the format of the tree file.
The lines of the metrics file are formatted in the following style:
<name> <value>...
where,
<name> is the name of the module, and
<value> may be of type integer or float. Any number of values may follow the <name>, but this format
must remain consistent with the other lines of the metrics file.
PROCESS:
After loading in the tree and metrics file, "dump_summed" will add to a parent node the values of its
children. All of the metrics are then dumped to the output file.
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OUTPUT:
Theoutputfile is inthesameformatasthemetricsfile.
COMPILATION:
Thesourcefile,dump_summed.c,compilesinto"dump_summed".TheMakespecification:
dump_summed: ump_summed.clibtree.a
FILES:
tree_file ==>Theinclusiontree.Typicallycreatedbyget_metrics.
metrics_file==>Themetricsfile. Typicallycreatedbymetrics_file.
SEEALSO:
get_metrics.d,read_tree.d
FILE: dump_zero
DESCRIPTION:
"dump_zero" sums up all of the zero level metrics and dumps the results (only the zero level modules) to an
output file.
SYNOPSIS:
dumpzero <tree_file> <metrics_file> <output_file>
<tree_file> is the inclusion tree structure.
<metrics_file> is the metrics file to be summed.
<output_file> is where the resulting output will be saved.
INPUT:
Dump_zero works with two files: the tree structure and the metrics file. Both of these files are created by
get_metrics.
Refer to read_tree.d for the format of the tree file.
The lines of the metrics file may be formatted in the following style:
<name> <value>...
where,
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<name> is the name of the module, and
<value> may by of type integer or float. Any number of values may follow the <name>, but this format
must remain consistent with the other lines of the metrics file.
PROCESS:
After loading in the tree and metrics file, "dump_zero" will add to a parent node the values of its children.
The zero level values are then dumped to the output file.
OUTPUT:
The output file is in the same format as the metrics file.
COMPILATION:
The source file, dump_zero.c, compiles into "dump_zero". The Make specification:
dump_zero : dump_zero.c libtree.a
FILES:
tree_file ==> The inclusion tree. Typically created by get_metrics.
metrics_file ==> The metrics file. Typically created by metrics_file.
SEE ALSO:
get_metrics.d, read_tree.d
FILE: read_tree
DESCRIPTION:
"read_tree" is a utility program that will create a textual version of the inclusion tree. "read_tree" takes as
input the treefile generated by "get_metrics" and writes to standard output the entire inclusion tree.
SYNOPSIS:
read__tree <treefile>
<treefile> is the a file created by "get_metrics"
INPUT:
"read_tree" takes as input the tree source file generated by a run of "getmetrics". The analyzer requires an
inclusion tree in order to obtain accurate static analyses of the HAL source files. The "get_metrics"
executive is used to generate a source file for the tree data structure.
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Thesourcefileformatappearsbelow.Here,theparentfile isnotprecededbyagreater-thansign(>) while
itschildrenaresopreceded.So,below,thefirstfile hasthreechildren,thesecondfile (...CS4CPT.HAL)
hasnochildren,andthethirdfile (...CS4DART.HAL)has1child.
H!appl/CS2PXT.HAL
>I!incI80/STRPXT.HAL
>C!appl/CS2PDT.HAL
>C!appl/CSAPDT.HAL
H!appl/CS4CPT.HAL
H!appl/CS4DART.HAL
>C!appl/CS4INB.HAL
PROCESS:
"read_tree" internally generates a tree structure from the source file. Duplicates on level zero only appear
once within this internal representation. After the tree file has been completely loaded into memory, the tree
structure is then traversed and the node names are written to standard output.
OUTPUT:
The expanded inclusion tree appears in textual form as follows:
H!0!app1/CS2PXT.HAL
I! 1 !incl80/STRPXT.HAL
C! 1!appl/CS2PDT.HAL
C! 1!appI/CSAPDT.HAL
H !0!appl/CS4CPT.HAL
H !0 !appl/C $4 DART. HAL
C! 1!appl/CS4INB.HAL
The field separator is the exclamation point, so there are three fields. The first field specifies the
DETERMINED (i.e., not given) type of the file. This single character field has three types as described
below.
H ==> a HAL file
I _---->a file included directly by a HAL file
C ==> a COMPOOL
(this is also considered a HAL file)
The third field is obviously the path name of the file itself.
The second field describes the file's level in the current subtree. The basic or EXECUTIVE level is marked
by a "0", indicating that the current file is the root of a tree and is a "sibling" to other root nodes or
EXECUTIVE level modules. In general, a given entry with a level of k is the parent or ancestor of all files
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immediatelybelowit withalevelgreaterthank. Thismeansasubtreeconsistsof agivenentryhavinga
levelof k andall succeedingentriesbelowit withahigherlevel.
COMPILATION:
"read_tree"codeisbasedin read_tree.candthetree library. The Make specification:
read_tree : read_tree.c libtree.a
FILES:
treefile ==> A tree source file generated by "get_metrics".
SEE ALSO:
get_metrics.d
FILE: read_subtree
DESCRIPTION:
"read_subtree" is a utility program that will print the children of a given node. This function can be used to
find out what files a HAL module includes.
SYNOPSIS:
read_subtree <treefile> <filename>
<treefile> is the inclusion tree generated by "read_tree" and not the tree source file generated by
"get_metrics".
<filename> is the name of the parent module.
INPUT:
"read_subtree" takes as input the textual version of the inclusion tree generated by "read_tree" and not the
tree generated by "get_metrics".
Refer to read_tree.d for more details.
PROCESS:
"read_subtree" loads the inclusion tree into memory. The children of the given module name are then
dumped to standard output.
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OUTPUT:
Theformatofthesubtreefollowstheoutputformatof "read_tree".Refertoread_tree.dfor moredetails.
COMPILATION:
"read_subtree" code is based on get_subtree.c and the tree library. The Make specification:
read_subtree : get_subtree.c libtree.a
FILES:
treefile ==> The inclusion tree file generated by "read_tree".
SEE ALSO:
read_tree.d
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Appendix C
Principal Components Analysis/Relative
Complexity Metric (PCA-RCM) 2.0
Tool Installation Manual

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS /
RELATIVE COMPLEXITY METRIC
TOOLS PACKAGE--VERSION 2.0
INSTALLATION MANUAL
OVERVIEW
This manual provides the user with a detailed description of the requirements associated with the media
transfer and subsequent installation of version 2.0 of the PCA/RCM tools package. The instructions
contained herein should be explicitly followed with little or no need for changes that might normally be
associated with differences in the Unix systems chosen for the installation.
For a detailed explanation of the operational procedures and use of this tools package, see the
OPERATION MANUAL, Appendix D.
MEDIA TRANSFER
There now exists a specific process for efficient and dependable media transfer of the HALMet/RCM tools
package:
1) "Tar" up the entire directory structure representing the distribution version of the PCA/RCM tools
package into a single tar file.
2) This tar file will then be compacted into a much smaller binary file using the Unix 'compress' utility and
made available for authorized transfer via standard File Transfer Protocol (ftp).
INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS
After having downloaded the necessary tools package, it will then be necessary to perform an installation of
the tools. In order to perform a full installation of version 2.0 of the PCA/RCM tools, the following
requirements will have to be met:
1) Hardware: Sun SparcStation or comparable Unix-based workstation with at least 500 kilobytes of
available hard disk space and 1 megabyte of memory. These values represent the MINIMUM amount
required for installation and subsequent sample operations.
2) PCA/RCM tools software: version 2.0 of the PCA/RCM package as contained in the binary file, 'pca-
rcm.tar.Z'.
3) Standard Unix utilities:
uncompress
tar
make
cc
ld
==> restores compressed files to their original form
==> archives/unarchives complete directory structures
==> compile and link manager and updater
==> "C" source code compiler
==> "C" object code linker
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INSTALLATION PROCEDURES
To install the package:
1. Uncompress the file containing the PCA/RCM tools package source code.
> uncompress pca-rcm.tar.Z
==> produces a larger file called pca-rcm.tar
2. Untar the resulting 'tar' file.
> tar -xvf pca-rcm.tar
==> This will install the source code for version 2.0 of PCA/RCM
into a directory called pca-rcm.
3. Create the 'PCA/RCM' tool by performing a 'make' in its directory.
> cd pca-rcm
> make ==> This will create the 'pca-rcm' executable.
SAMPLE RUN
A sample data file has been provide for a test run of the PCA/RCM tool and can be found in the 'pca-rcm'
directory as '2301 .data'. Therefore, the following commands could be executed in the 'pca-rcm' directory:
> pca-rcm
==> This will provide a usage statement and explanation of the options that must be specified
on the command line.
> pca-rcm 2301 .data -base -d 2301.metrics -t 2301.trans
--> This will display a significant amount of information on the screen, so it might be
desirable to pipe this to the 'more' command or redirect it to a file for later viewing. As per
the operations manual, it will create two output files: 2301 .metrics and 2301.trans.
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Appendix D
Principal Components Analysis/Relative
Complexity Metric (PCA-RCM) 2.0
Tool Operation Manual

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS /
RELATIVE COMPLEXITY METRIC
TOOLS PACKAGE--VERSION 2.0
OPERATION MANUAL
FILE: pca-rcm
DESCRIPTION:
The "pca-rcm" executable is the final result of the compilation and linking of the source code representing
the Principle Components Reduction tool and the Relative Complexity Metric tool. It is responsible for
reducing a raw metrics data file into its related independent domains and then, using this reduction, it
calculates the relative complexity for all of the modules occurring in the original data file.
SYNOPSIS:
pca-rcm <file 1> -[baselbuild] -d <file2> -t <file3>
<filel>
<file2>
<file3>
-base
-build
-d
-t
-- name of data file to be analyzed,
-- file in which to store domain and relative complexity
metrics,
-- file in which to store (retrieve) the required info for
baseline (build) analysis,
-- switch indicating a baseline analysis is desired,
-- switch indicating a build analysis is desired,
-- switch indicating that next argument is file2,
-- switch indicating that next argument is file3,
**** NOTES ****
1) Only 1 of -build or -base may be used at a time.
2) All options are required on the command line.
3) First argument given must be the data file to be analyzed.
Once created, a simple call to the "pca-rcm" executable with no arguments specified on the command line
will display a help/usage statement with a listing and brief explanation of all of the options available. The
user can then use the options to specify the input data file, the type of analysis desired, and the files in
which to store the output.
INPUT:
The following files are used by the RCM tool:
<filel> ==> The data file that contains the raw metrics (i.e, that which was output by the HALMet
analyzer). The only specifications governing the format of this file are:
1) The option must be given on the command line indicating whether the raw metrics file is to be
analyzed as a baseline file or a build file.
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A baseline analysis involves the complete reduction of the data file, calculation of the RCM, and the
saving of the baseline data that will be necessary for subsequent build analyses. A build analysis
involves the calculation of the RCM relative to a prior analysis that has been determined, previously, to
be its baseline. The baseline analysis is, typically, performed once, while a build analysis will be
performed a number of times.
See Section II for further explanation.
2) The lines of the data file must be composed of a single module name in the first column (or field)
followed by the numerical values representing the raw metrics. These metric values can be represented
as integers, floating point numbers, or in FORTRAN style scientific notation. The columns are
separated by white space (spaces or tabs), and a carriage return indicates the end of the line.
Note that the columns and rows of this data file represent the variables and observations, respectively.
<file2> --> The file that is specified on the command line with the '-d' switch which will serve as the
output file for the final Domain Metrics and RCMs.
<file3> ==> The file that is specified on the command line with the '-t' switch in which will be stored
certain baseline information during a 'baseline' analysis and from which will be read this baseline
information during subsequent 'build' analyses. The information to be store in this file is necessary to
make a 'build' analysis possible.
PROCESS:
"pca-rcm" functions according to the following procedure:
1) Opens the <file 1> file and reads the first line to determine the number of variables that will be assumed
to be the number of metrics taken on all of the modules in the data file. An error message is displayed if
the file cannot be found.
2) If the analysis is to be a baseline analysis, the following is performed:
1. Reads each succeeding line of the <filel> file matching the length of each line (number of
numerical values per line) to the length of the fin'st metrics line.
2. Calculates column means, variance, covariance, and correlation.
3. Determines the independent domain metrics using a Principle Components Reduction of the
correlation matrix that was created from the raw metrics data file.
4. Uses the domain metrics to calculate the Relative Complexity Metric for each module.
5. Stores the baseline information that will be required for related build analyses in the <file3> file.
6. Displays various levels of information from the resulting analysis on the screen (stdout), so that the
user can monitor the progress of the analysis or redirect the information to a file.
7. Stores the module name, domain metrics, and Relative Complexity Metric in the <file2> file.
3) If the analysis is to be a build analysis, the following is performed:
1. Checks for the existence of the <file3> file and prints an error message if the file cannot be found.
2. Loads the information contained in the <file3> file.
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3. CalculatestheRelativeComplexityforeachmoduleinthe<filel> filerelativetothebaseline
information.
4. Displaysthemessagesfromtheresultinganalysisonthescreen(stdout).
5. Storesthemodulename,domainmetrics,andRelativeComplexityMetricin the<file2>file.
OUTPUT:
Errormessages==>variouserrormessagesaredisplayedasencountered.
Analysisoutput ==>variousmessagesanddatacalculationsarepresentedto theuserfor monitoringand
progressevaluationthroughoutthefull analysisof theinputmetricsdatafile.
Metricsoutput==>a subsetof thefull analysiscontainingthemodulename,domainmetrics,andRelative
ComplexityMetricisstoredin the<file2>fileaccordingtothefollowingformat:
Module_NameDomainl Domain2....DomainNRCM
Baselinedata==>thatinformationfromtheoutputof a baselineanalysisthatis storedin the<file3>file
sothatit canlaterbeusedfor arelatedbuildanalysis,if oneisperformed.
COMPILATION:
"pca-rcm"iscomprisedofthefollowingsourcefile:
pca-rcm:pca-rcm.c
FILES:
The following files are used or created by "rcm":
<filel> ==> metrics input data file
<file2> ==> output of the domain metrics and relative complexity
<file3> ==> build analysis data related to the associated baseline
stdout ==> partial analysis output
SEE ALSO:
get_metrics.d, Section II
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Objective
This paper describes an experiment to determine whether the inclusion of metrics in a reliability model that
uses failure data for parameter estimation will improve its prediction accuracy. According to Loral Space
Information Systems, formerly IBM Federal Systems Division, the Schneidewind Model fits "the data best"
of the models that have been tried on the NASA Space Shuttle flight software. However, improvement in
prediction accuracy that could be accomplished by any means, including the use of metrics, is welcome,
given the safety critical nature of the application.
This experiment is not limited to the Space Shuttle application. Our objective also includes making a
general contribution to the software measurement field regarding this very important and challenging issue:
Will the inclusion of the characteristics of the software improve the accuracy of so-called "black box"
reliability models? We suggest, for the reasons given below, that we should not pre-judge and assume that
"obviously" the answer is in the affirmative. Although a specific model is used in the experiment, the
results should at least be partially applicable to this class of model, in general, because all the models have
the characteristic of using either failure count or time between failures data for parameter estimation.
Note: This experiment is not complete. This is a progress report. More software and different
techniques for incorporating metrics in the model must be evaluated.
Purpose
1) If metrics improve prediction accuracy, they would be included in the model for future Space Shuttle
software reliability prediction. 2) It is appealing to believe that high complexity results in low reliability;
therefore, by this reasoning, the inclusion of software metrics should improve prediction accuracy.
We cover the following: revision of the software reliability model to include metrics; metrics validation
methodology for producing validated metrics for classifying software quality; application of classification
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resultstorepresenttheinfluenceof softwarecharacteristicsin themodel;andsomepreliminaryresults
comparing"withmetrics"with "nometrics"predictions.
Background
Currently the model uses three parameters. Alpha (o0 is the failure rate in the failure count interval s-l.
(The interval s-I precedes the interval s where we start to use the failure data of the parameter estimation
range s,t.) Beta (13)determines how fast the failure rate decreases. This model uses s to optimally select
the failure data for parameter estimation [1,2,3]. In the model, the parameters ot and _ are assumed to be
constant. Actually, it has been observed that they vary with execution time. There are three possible
explanations for the fact that 13varies with execution time, signifying a change in the rate of change in
failure rate: 1) variations in the characteristics of the code at various execution times; 2) a reflection of the
fact that, with fewer faults left in the code, as they are discovered and corrected, finding the remaining ones
requires increasing amounts of execution time; or 3) noise. The last factor does not seem to be the case
because the variation in the parameters is systematic and not random, as will be shown later. If the
explanation is 1), the use of metrics in parameter estimation could be beneficial.
Theory
o In general, modules that fail in execution have metrics values that are both larger and more correlated
with discrepancy report counts (drcount), a measure of quality in the Shuttle, than in the population of
modules (i.e., 1397 modules). Thus we can postulate a metrics Boolean discriminant function (BDF)
that would classify quality with greater accuracy for failed modules than in the population of modules,
of which the failed modules are a subset.
. The failure rate per failure, beta (_), in the revised Schneidewind model (one that uses metrics) is a
function of the initial failure rate alpha (00; execution time t; and K=Kp/Kf, where Kp is the accuracy
with which a BDF of metrics D can classify modules Mp in the population as having drcount>O,
given that drcount>O and Kf is the accuracy with which the same BDF can classify modules Mf as
having drcount>O, given that these modules have been identified as causing failures, where MecMp.
We assume K is approximately constant in the parameter estimation range s,t.
3. Beta can be modeled by equation (1), where the parameter estimation range of tx and 13is s,t. (In
Method 2 of parameter estimation, s is the starting interval where failures will be counted.)
_=o_K(t-_+l) (1)
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4. Therationaleofthismodelof betaisasfollows:
,
a. The condition of the software is not static; it changes over time with modifications. Therefore,
rather than _ being constant, it should vary with execution time. Because small [3 is associated with
a large failure rate and large 13is associated with a small failure rate, 13should increase for given
values of K and t, as s increases, reflecting reliability growth over execution time (For parameter
estimation purposes, t>s).
b. We should have _=tx, when K=I, because this value of K corresponds to the situation on a relative
basis, where the characteristics of failed software are no different than the characteristics of the
software in the population. Also, when t=s-1 (the index value for the beginning of interval s), we
should have _=t_, the initial failure rate.
We can substitute _=t_K (t-s÷])for 13in the original Schneidewind model M.L.E. equations, obtain K
from a BDF and substitute it in the M.L.E. equations, and estimate tx. Once K and ct have been
obtained, we use them to estimate [_. Once all parameters have been estimated, we can make a variety
of predictions.
Analysis
1. To test the plausibility of _=otK (t-s÷_),we investigated whether K=(_/tX) (l/(ts+l))is approximately
constant in a subset of the parameter estimation range s,t (t=20) for three operational increments (OIs):
OIB, OIC, and OID, where previously estimated paired values of [3 and ct, corresponding to each value
of s in its range, were used. The results are plotted in Figure 1, for OIC. In this analysis, K is
approximately the ratio of K=Kp/Kf we would have to obtain from the BDFs of the population and
metrics data for these OIs, respectively, for the model to be validated. Although it might appear,
because of the scale, that there are large variations in K, the range is actually quite narrow. The mean,
standard deviation, and their ratio, for K are shown in the following Table 1.
Table 1: Values of K Versus Starting Interval (s)
Values of K (over s) OIB OIC OID
Mean .893 .841 .862
Stand. Dev. .0349 .00967 .00423
Mean/Stand. Dev. .0391 .0115 .00491
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, A second test of the plausibility of beta was to compute [_=o_K It-s+l), and compare it with the original
beta that had been estimated using M.L.E. The purpose of this test was to evaluate how well the
assumption of constant K would fare over the range of s. To do this, we used the mean of K, over s, in
_=o_K(ts+l). The plots of the original and new beta are shown in Figure 2 for OIC. Using a constant K
did not produce too much variation between the old and new betas.
Revised M.L.E. Equations
1. To estimate the new alpha and beta and to incorporate K in the revised model, revised M.L.E.
equations were produced. The original generalized likelihood function is shown in function (2) [1,2,3].
log L = X, [log X, 1log(1 exp(fl t))] + Xsl [log(1 exp(-fl(s 1)))]
Us
+ X_,¢[log(1 exp(fl))]flZ(s+ k 1)Xs+k
k=O (2)
In this estimate: t is the last observed count interval; s is the index of time intervals; Xkis the number
of observed failures in interval k; Xs_j is the number observed from 1 through s-l; X_.tis the number
observed from s through t; and Xt=X_.1+X_,t.
Because software evolves over time and therefore the more recent failure data is more relevant with
respect to the current and future process and product, only failure counts in the range s,t are used.
This method had produced much more accurate predictions for the Shuttle than using all the failure
data [1]. The following equation is used to estimate [3.
• Us
. Xs+k
1 t- s+ 1 = Y__K
exp(fl)l exp(fl(t-s+l))l k=o X_,, (3)
The starting interval s is that value in the range 1,t that yields minimum mean square error (M.S.E.).
By substituting ]3=txKtt_+l) and K0=K ct-_+l)in equation (2), taking 0(log L)/0cx and setting the result to
zero, and making the adjustments for estimating tx and _ in the range s,t, as was the case with equation
(3), we arrive at equation (4) for estimating tx in the revised M.L.E. Once tx is estimated, _ is obtained
from [_=_K (t-s+l).
Xs,t t- s+ l Us
exp(a Ko)l Koexp(a Ko(t- s+ 1))
-Zkxs+k (4)
k=0
E-4
Revised Prediction Equations
1. Once the new parameters have been estimated, revised prediction equations are used to predict various
reliability quantities for the Shuttle. For example, the old failure rate equation
f(s,t)=cx(exp(-13(t-s+ 1)))
would be replaced by:
f(s,t,K)=o_(exp(-o_K (t-_+l)(t-s+l))).
(5)
(6)
Discriminative Power Validation Model
Now we explain how the discriminative power validation model is used to identify BDFs for obtaining Kp
and Kf. The basis of this model is the validation of metric values that have the ability to discriminate high
quality from low quality; these metric values are called critical values [4]. There are two types of criteria
for validating critical values: statistical and application.
Critical Values
The Kolmogorov-Smimov (K-S) test [6] is used to determine the critical value of a metric (Mcj). It tests
whether the samples taken from different categories of data are from the same or different populations. Put
differently, the method tests whether the sample cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) are from the
same or different populations. The two populations are Fi<Fc and Fi>F¢ (drcount=O and drcount>O in the
Shuttle, respectively). In the K-S test, the test statistic is the maximum vertical distance between the CDFs
of two samples. If the difference is significant, the value of Mij corresponding to maximum CDF distance
is used for MCj,as expresses in equation (7).
K-S(M0=max {[CDF(Mij/(Fi<_F¢)]-[CDF(M_j/(Fi>Fc)] } (7)
Metrics are added to the BDF (see equation (8)) in the order of their K-S distance.
Statistical Criteria
For the statistical criteria we use the Contingency Table (see Table 2) and its accompanying chi-square
(X2) statistic [6]. In Table 2, M_j and F_ classify modules into one of four categories. The left column
contains modules where not one of the metrics exceeds its critical value; this condition is expressed with a
Boolean AND function of the metrics. The right column contains modules where at least one metric
exceeds its critical value; this condition is expressed by a Boolean OR function of the metrics. The top row
contains modules that are high quality; these modules have a quality factor that does not exceed its critical
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value(e.g.,drcount=-O). The bottom row contains modules that are low quality; these modules have a
quality factor that exceeds its critical value (e.g., drcount>O).
Equation (8) gives the module count, based on Boolean functions of Fi and Mij, that are calculated over the
n
c,1= COUNT FOR ((E LEFc) ^ (MSUBi 1LE M¢I)...^(M_j LE Mcj)...A(Mim LE Mcm))
i=l
c,2= COUNT FOR ((E LIE F¢) A ((Mi, > Mcl)...v(Mij > Mcj)...v(Mim > M¢m)))
i=l
n
c2,=COUNT FOR ((F_ > Fc) ^ (M_, LE Mcl)...^(M_j LE Mcj)...^(Mira LE Mere))
i=l
c2,=COUNT FOR ((F_ > F¢) A ((M_, > Mcl)...v(Mij > Mcj)...v(Mim > Mcm)))
i=l
n modules for m metrics.
for j= 1..... m, and where COUNT(i)=COUNT(i-1)+1 FOR Boolean expression true and
COUNT(i)=COUNT(i- 1), otherwise; COUNT(0)=0.
The counts correspond to the cells of the Contingency Table, as shown in Table 2, where row and column
totals are also shown. A special case of Table 2 is the use of a single metric. The analysis could also be
generalized to include multiple quality factors, if necessary; in this case, the Contingency Table would have
more than two rows.
Table 2: Validation Contingency Table
Fi_Fc
High Quality
FI>F_
_w Quality
^(MuSSel _)
Ell
Type 1
C21
v(Mu>M¢ j)
Type 2
C12
C22
N_ N2
nl
n2
n
E-6
We validate Mcj statistically by demonstrating that it partitions Table 2 in such a way that C11 and C22 are
large relative to C12 and C21. If this is the case, a large number of high-quality modules (e.g., modules with
zero drcount) would have Mij<_Mcj and would be correctly classified as high quality. Similarly, a large
number of low-quality modules (e.g., modules with positive drcount) would have Mij>Mcj and would be
correctly classified as low quality. The degree to which this is the case is estimated by the chi-square (Z 2)
statistic. If calculated zEc>x2s (chi-square at specified o_) and if calculated ot_<o_, we conclude that Mcj is
statistically significant.
Application Criteria
This validation is treated under the categories of Misclassification, Inspection, and Quality [5].
Misclassification
We estimate the discriminative power of Mcj by noting in Table 2 that ideally C_ l=n_=N1, C12=0, C2_=0,
C22=n2=N2. The extent that this is not the case is estimated by the number of Type ] misclassifications
(i.e., the module has low quality and the metrics "say" it has high quality) and by the number of Type 2
misclassifications (i.e., the module has high quality and the metrics "say" it has low quality). Thus we
define the following measures of misclassification:
Proportion of Type 1: Pt=C21/n (9)
Proportion of Type 2: P2=C12/n (10)
LQC: Proportion of low quality (i.e., drcount>O) software correctly classified=C22/n2 (11)
11
RF =,____Fi FOR ((Mii LEMSUBc 1)...^(Mij LE Mcj)...A(Mim LE Mcm)) forj = 1 ..... m.
i=l
(12)
Quality
We estimate discriminative power by summing remaining quality factor RF (e.g., remaining drcount),
given by equation (12). This is the sum of Fi not caught by inspection because (Mij<_M_j) for these
modules.
We estimate the proportion remaining by equation (13), where TF is the total Fi before inspection.
RFP=RF/TF ( 13)
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In addition, we estimate the count of modules remaining that have Fi>0. The proportion remaining RMP is
given by equation (14). Note that RMP=P1 (proportion of Type 1 misclassifications) when Fc=0 (i.e., the
only modules with Fi>0 will be in the C21 cell); see Table 2.
RMP=(Cll+C21)/n, FOR Fi>0 (14)
Inspection
Inspection is one of the costs of high quality. We are interested in weighing inspection requirements against
the quality that is achieved for various values of Mcj. This is another way to estimate discriminative
power. We estimate inspection requirements by noting that all modules with M,j>Mcj must be inspected;
this is the count C12+C22. Thus the proportion of modules that must be inspected is given by:
I=(C 12+C22)/n (15)
Validation Example
An example of validating BDFs in the population using the above equations is shown in Table 3. The
critical values of the metrics and the order of adding metrics was determined by applying equation (7),
which yielded the K-S distance values in the table.
Stopping Rules for Adding Metrics
One rule for stopping the addition of metrics in a BDF is to quit when RFP no longer decreases as metrics
are added. This is the maximum quality rule. The last two rows of Table 3 illustrate this rule where only
1.24 percent of the drcount is not caught by inspection. The addition of the sixth metric nodes has not
improved quality. If it is important to strike a balance between quality and cost (i.e., between RF and I),
we add metrics until the ratio of the relative change in RF to the relative change in I is maximum, as given
by the quality inspection ratio in equation (16), where i refers to the previous RFP and I:
QIR=( IARFP ]/AI)(I_/RFP_) (16)
The third row in Table 4 has the highest value (4.82). So, by this criterion, three metrics would be used.
This analysis indicates the importance of performing a marginal analysis, which involves adding the
metrics one at a time to the BDF and observing the effect on quality and inspection cost. If, on the other
hand, many metrics are added at once, the contribution of individual metrics is obscured.
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Table 3: Discriminative Power Validity Evaluation (Population)
Metrics C_ Sc E2_ L_ ]EI_ Nc
C 63
C,S 63 27
C,S,E2 63 27
U,S,E2,L 63 27
C,S,E2,L,E1 63 27
U,S,E2,L,E1,N 63 27
K-SDistance 1.59 .511
45
45
45
45
47
29
29 9
29 9 17
.46 .43 .431
el
%
6.22
3.22
2.51
2.00
1.43
1.43
P2 LQC RFP RMP I
% % % % % %2c
15.10 84.90 6.13 6.23 50.1 472.10
22.12 92.19 2.95 3.22 60.1 417.90
24.62 93.92 2.17 2.51 63.4 392.35
29.35 95.14 1.78 2.00 68.6 318.83
34.93 96.53 1.24 1.43 74.7 244.62
34.93 96.53 1.24 1.43 74.7 244.62
I I I I I
C:
S:
E2:
L:
El:
N:
Co:
Sc :
E2c:
Lc :
EI_:
No:
P_:
P2:
LQC:
RFP:
RMP:
I:
_2c:
total comment count
total statement count (executable code; no comments)
unique operand count
total non-commented lines of code
unique operator count
total node count (in control graph)
critical value of comments
critical value of statements
critical value of unique operator count
critical value of lines of code
critical value of unique operator count
critical value of nodes
Percentage of Type 1 misclassifications
Percentage of Type 2 misclassifications
Percentage of low quality software correctly classified
Percentage of drcount remaining after inspection
Percentage of modules remaining after inspection with drcount>O
Percentage of modules inspected
Calculated chi-square; _=0 in all cases.
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Table 4: Discriminative Power Marginal Analysis (Population)
Metrics [[
C
C,S
C,S,E2
C,S,E2,L
C,S,E2,L,E1
C,S,E2,L,E1,N
QIR
2.60
4.82
2.19
3.41
QIR: Quality Inspection Ratio
Some Preliminary Results
We now apply the metrics that were validated in the previous section to computing K=Kp/Kf. Using the
first BDF in Table 3, the one consisting only of comments, it correctly classifies every module in Table 5,
which consists of modules that have caused failures in OIC. Therefore, Ke= 1. To obtain Kp, we note that
LQC=.849 in Table 3 for the first BDF. Therefore K=Kp/Kf =.849/1.0=-.849. Using the revised M.L.E.
equation (4), we estimate ct and then 13from equation (1). Then we predict cumulative failures at T=30,
using equation (17) for both the "no metrics" and "with metrics" cases, and compare the two in Figure 3.
We also note the pronounced difference between the means of metrics in the sample (means of the metrics
associated with failed modules) and the means of metrics in the population.
In addition, we compute the M.S.E. for the two cases with equation (18) and compare the results in Table
6. Both Figure 3 and Table 6 indicate the "with metrics" prediction is more accurate.
F(T)=(0J_)[ 1-exp(-_((T-s+ 1)))] +Xs-i (17)
Currently failure data from additional OIs are being investigated. Complete results are not yet available.
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Failure
Number
t
Z [a / 13(1 exp(fl(is+ 1))) Xs,i] 2
MSEv- i=_
Severity
Level
1 2
2 3
4 3
35
ts+l
Table 5: Failure and Metrics Data for OIC
Module
ID
13
974
1286
711
1300
comments
493
299
115
205
82
6 3 515 851
7 2 464 69
7 2 465 76
stmts eta2 Ioc
738 336 1026
192 141 240
110 104 180
2
53
222
53
875 338 1101
15 20 62
30 45 86
7 2 466 68 15 20 61
7 2 467 72 30 45 77
7 2 468 153 10 29 145
7 2 472 100 1 4 107
8 4 555 943 819 432 947
10 3 904 122 128 86 163
882 157 107 91 129
63 27 45 29
253.7 204.9 113,2 306.6
134.6 70.2 81.3 132.3
11 4
Critical Value
Sample Mean
Population Mean
(18)
dr
etal nodes
cnt
46 394 22
31 98 2
28 48 5
5 96 6
8 20 1
44 529 15
16 12 4
24 21 4
16 12 4
24 21 2
11 75 3
6 40 1
34 174 26
31 64 1
30 51 5
9 17 0
23.6 110.3 6.7
16.7 28.4 1.8
Metric values in italics would fail to flag modules identified with failures (i.e., value _<critical value).
Difference between Sample Mean and Population Mean significant at _<.05 except for eta2.
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Table 6: Prediction "With Metrics" versus "No Metrics"
With Metrics 7
No Metrics 7
_ F(30) MSEr
1.3530 .13681 11.53 .356
1.3667 .12574 12.34 .505
Actual cumulative failures at T=30 is 12
F(30): Predicted cumulative failures at T=30
MSEF: Mean Square Error in range 7,30
Summary,
A general framework for including metrics in the Schneidewind Software Reliability Model has been
developed, which may be applicable to other models. Because the appearance of the factor K in the
parameter [3is systematic rather than random, it was hypothesized that K accounts for the influence of
various software characteristics, as represented by the metrics, on the occurrence of failures. The process
of using BDFs to provide the factor K in the revised model was illustrated. Many more OIs and modules
must be investigated before any conclusions can be drawn about whether the inclusion of metrics in the
model improves prediction accuracy. In addition to the method for obtaining K that has been described, the
following methods will be explored:
1. Compute K as the ratio of successful classifications to total classifications, considering the metrics
individually, for each module in the failure data, obtaining n values of K per OI, where n is the number
of modules that caused failures. Estimate K as a function of Mij in the failure data.
2. Compute the mean of K as the ratio of total successful classifications to total classifications by m
metrics across n modules, considering the metrics individually in the failure data, obtaining one value of
K per OI. Estimate the mean of K as a function of the mean of Mij.
With methods 1 and 2, metrics would be included directly in the model.
3. Obtain the coefficients of a multivariate discriminant function in the population. Using the means of the
metrics in the population compute its discriminant function. Do the same with the means of the failed
modules. Set K equal to the ratio of the former by the latter.
4. Forget metrics and estimate K by M.L.E from equation (4) directly!
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